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1ABSTRACT
Allied blockade policy during the First World War jeopardized 
the traditionally amicable relations between Great Britain and 
Switzerland. Situated between the two belligerent camps, neutral 
Switzerland was compelled by the peculiarities of her economic structure 
to maintain normal commercial ties with both the Allies and the Central 
Powers. In exercising diplomatic and commercial pressure on the Swiss 
to minimize trade with Germany and Austria-Hungary in conformity with 
the demands of the blockade, the Foreign Office had to avoid the extremes 
of forcing the confederation into alliance with the enemy for the sake 
of economic survival, and of drawing her into complete dependence on 
the Allies for materials whose delivery would have constituted an 
embarrassment if not an impossibility. Direct pressure on the Swiss 
executive had its limits as the Swiss government could not compromise 
their nation’s neutrality by issuing export prohibitions too favourable 
to Allied blockade policy.
The British solution to these problems was found in a policy 
of agreed rationing and in the establishment in autumn 1915 of the 
S.S.S., a semi-official agency under the direction of Swiss businessmen. 
This body acted as unique consignee and distributor for all goods from 
the Allied countries or from abroad transported across Allied 
territory, and controlled the re-export of these goods to the Central 
Empires.
2German counter-pressures, Allied need for substitute markets 
in Switzerland, and the technical difficulties of imposing control on 
a free-wheeling economy made the operations of the trust organization 
at first difficult and unpopular. British firmness and Swiss reali­
zation of the advantages of co-operation, however, ultimately made the 
trust a great success so that by autumn 1916 the Swiss section of the 
blockade was regarded as the most efficient in Europe.
At the same time, a jealous regard for their national sovereignty 
and forthright openness with both belligerent groups enabled the Swiss 
government to maintain complete political independence. A rational 
policy of commercial control, agreed to and conducted by Swiss business­
men under the guise of a commercial enterprise, obviated foreign 
interference in the political life of the nation and avoided the dangers 
for Swiss independence inherent in British wartime policy. In this 
way the continuance of cordial Anglo-Swiss relations was ensured during 
the difficult years 1914-1916.
3PREFACE
The subject of this thesis was suggested by Professor W.N.
Medlicott whose official history of the blockade so admirably treats 
Anglo-Swiss relations under analogous circumstances during the Second 
World War,
Secondary literature dealing with the blockade* of Switzerland 
during the First World War is scarce. Nothing has been written 
specifically on this subject from the British viewpoint and, except for 
a flurry of monographs dating mainly from the Twenties (and therefore 
without reference to primary sources), little from the Swiss side.
Primary sources, however, are not lacking. The Public Records Office 
conserves some 140 folio volumes of records from the Contraband Department 
alone which bear directly on Switzerland and which had not previously 
been investigated. The Federal Archive in Berne matches this collection 
in the volume of materials available to the reader, while the records 
preserved in the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry in Bonn throw 
interesting sidelights on the German reaction to their enemy*s dealing 
with Switzerland. It has been possible to see in these records for the 
first time the coherent story of Anglo-Swiss relations during the years 
I have attempted to describe.
I owe a great debt of thanks to Professor Medlicott for his 
inspiration and encouragement. Professor James B. Joll, who kindly 
accepted the supervision of my work after the retirement of Professor 
Medlicott, has shown unfailing patience in smoothing out an occasionally 
jagged narrative and in offering advice and criticism deriving from his
4thorough knowledge of the First World War period. To him I am very 
grateful•
I should also wish to record my thanks to the officials of the 
Public Record Office, the Archives of the Foreign Ministry in Bonn, and 
the Federal Archive and Landesbibliothek in Berne. The Central Research 
Fund of the University of London kindly made available to me a generous 
grant to continue my researches in Berne in the summer of 1967.
Thanks are due as well to Dr. Paul Stauffer of the Swiss Embassy in 
London, to Miss Marion C. Siney of Western Reserve University for her 
expert advice on ferreting out pertinent documents, and to Frfiulein 
Elisabeth Brenn of Berne for help in deciphering several manuscripts 
written in difficult German script.
Dr. Heinz Ochsenbein of Berne painstakingly read the entire 
manuscript, weeded out several gross errors, and suggested many 
improvements based on his wide acquaintance with the domestic Swiss 
political, economic, and social scene during ^orld War I. I am much 
endebted to him for his ready and indispensible assistance.
David D. Driscoll 
London, 3 October 1968.
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FR: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States
GFM: German Foreign Ministry
NB: Neutralitfitebericht
N.O.T.: Netherlands Overseas Trust
Pol.Dept.: Politisches Departement
RI: Rapport Interieur
RO: Reoueil Qf'ficiel
S.S.S.: Soci£t6 Suisse de Surveillance Economique
S.T.S. Schweiz*rische Treuhandstelle
Note: References to Foreign Office documents in the Public Record
Office will be cited in the following way:
FO class nuraber-volurae number-document number/year.
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KINGDOM Aj'.D CONFEDERATION
'It is needless to say that the prospect of a general
conflagration, with Switzerland standing out as a rock surrounded ’by-
rough seas, is causing great uneasiness here*, reported the British
minister in Berne (Evelyn Grant Duff) to the Foreign Office on 29 July
1914» reflecting the tenseness and uncertainty of the situation in the
confusion of his metaphors. But he added soberly that there was 'no
question that this country will strictly maintain her neutrality'.*
This dispatch caused no surprise in the Foreign Office, but did much to
relieve anxiety in the War Office where the ominous reports of Colonel
2
Charles Delme-Radcliffe dating from 1909-1910 had not been forgotten.
As military attach^ in Rome and in Berne, Delm^-Radcliffe had confidently 
expected Swiss sympathies to be entirely on the side of Germany in the 
event of 'strained relations' between Germany and England, and felt the 
Germans would experience little difficulty in inducing the Confederation 
to proceed to offensive measures in support of German policy 'just as
1. Grant Duff-FO, 29 July 1914# dispatch, B.D.. xi, no.324*
2. W.G. Nicholson (C.I.G.S.)-FO, 10 August 1914# letter, FO 371-2109- 
38124/14* A War Office memorandum of 25 November 1910, commenting 
on Delm6-Radcliffe*s report, observed that the Swiss were allies 
of Germany and Austria-Hungary in all but name.
8if the Swiss formed the extreme left wing of the German army1,*
The Germans did not share Delm£-Radcliffe•s confidence that 
Switzerland would abandon her traditional neutrality to take up arms 
with Germany in the event of war. Sohlieffen himself had briefly 
considered a scheme to envelop the French armies from the south, but 
rejected the plan when he saw that far from enlisting Swiss support for 
the enterprise he would have to reckon with 'a victorious campaign 
against Switzerland and • • . the capture of the Jura forts —  
time consuming enterprises during which the French would not remain 
idle1. 2
Any vestiges of uncertainty about Switzerland's position in the 
conflict were erased by the announcement by the Federal Council on 
4 August 1914 to the signatory powers of the Neutrality Act of 1815, 
and to other states, that Switzerland was determined 'faithful to her 
century-old tradition not to depart in any way from the principles of 
neutrality'• At the start neither group of belligerents had cause to 
regret the determination of the Swiss to remain neutral. As the war 
progressed, both groups had reasons to encourage it. Switzerland's
1. Delme-Radcliffe-FO, 17 November 1909» memorandum, B.D.. viii, no,53$* 
The Foreign Office did not doubt Delm£-Radcliffe's facts, but were 
skeptical about M s  conclusions. Sir %re Crowe could not see 
what would tempt Switzerland to take up arms with Germany. Sir 
Edward Grey felt *,,.some of the conclusions (of the memorandum)
are probably rather forced'. Minutes, ibid.
2. G. Ritter, The Sohlieffen Flan (London, 1958)» Appendix I, text of 
Schlieffen's Great Memorandum of December 1905 entitled 'War with 
France', p.136. General von Moltke, however, felt such a campaign 
would be feasible.
9strategic position and well armed neutrality shortened the battle
lines between Prance and Germany as well as between Italy and Austria,
Switzerland became a center for propaganda, for the gathering of
information, for the repatriation of nationals uprooted by the conflict,
and for the interment of prisoners of war from both sides,* Espionage
2
in Switzerland was notorious, and presumably of some value. Then too
Switzerland provided a nttutral ground for possible peace feelers, and
acted as representative of the interests of the belligerents in each
other's countries, Switzerland became, in effect, an everyman's land
between the two opposing lines.
It was in the interest of both the British and the Swiss
governments to preserve the traditional friendliness of their peoples
under the strain of war. Cordial relations had existed between the
3
English and the Swiss since the time of Henry VIII, and they were 
particularly renewed and strengthened at the close of the Nai>oleonic wars. 
Stratford Canning was a member of the Swiss committee of the Congress 
of Vienna, and Great Britain, along with the other great powers, 
signed the Act of Neutrality of 20 November 1815 in Paris, recognizing 
the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and guaranteeing the integrity
1. About 30,000 men were constantly interned after 1915*
2. The British minister in Berne reported soon after the opening of 
hostilities, 'Switzerland probably contains more international spies 
than any other country in Europe and the war has certainly not 
lessened their number appreciably'. P0 371-2109-66729/14* W.
Somerset Maugham, who was employed as a British agent in Switzerland 
until 1916, has left a fictionalized account of his experiences in 
Ashenden. or the British Agent. Some of the stories have a remarkable 
air of verisimilitude.
3. J.P. Muirhead, 'British Representatives in Switzerland', The Con- 
temrx)rary Review, cxxx (August 1926),pp.205-211.
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and inviolability of her territory. 1 Later the British government 
furnished strong support to the Confederation d\iring the crises of 
1847 a**d 1856-57 when Switzerland’s steady progress toward modem 
statehood put her neutrality and territorial integrity in grave jeopardy. 
The first of these crises begem in 1845 when seven Catholic 
cantons, concluded a defensive alliance among themselves, forming a 
league (the Sonderbund) to resist changes in the federal structure and 
the introduction of a unified central government at the expense of 
cantonal sovereignty. While the remaining cantons deliberated on 
ways of breaking the power of the league, Prinee Mettemich, unsettled 
by the new liberal stirrings in Switzerland and apprehensive of their 
effect on Europe generally, came out in support of the Sonderbund as 
authentic guardians of the status quo against the new radicals. He 
urged the Powers to join in common intervention in favour of the 
Sonderbund by forcing the other cantons to accept mediation. His 
efforts on behalf of the league won over Guizot to the cause, but Lord 
Palmerston, regarding the Sonderbund as illegal and advocating the 
principle of non-intervention in internal politics of other nations, 
refused to lend British support in forcing on the liberals the mediation 
of the Powers. Mettemich*s proposal was therefore dropped. Deprived 
of the support of the Powers, the Sonderbund was quickly suppressed by 
force (November 1847)» and the way was opened for the introduction of
1, This arrangement would preserve Switzerland as a barrier or buffer 
state between Prance and Austria. A.G. Imlah, Britain and 
Switzerland 1845-60 (London, 1966), pp.7-8*
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the Federal Constitution of I848.*
As precursor to the Revised Federal Constitution of 1874 in 
force today, though much ammended, the Constitution of I848 owed its 
existence in great measure to the British policy of national self- 
determination, which commanded the gratitude of the Swiss toward the 
English once the benefits of the new confederation were recognized and 
accepted by the nation as a whole.
Great Britain intervened with the Powers once again in favour of 
Switzerland during the NeuchAtel crisis of 1856-57* Napoleon I had 
bartered NeuchStel for Hanover with the King of Prussia in 1806, and 
the canton remained under the personal sovereignty of the Prussian King 
(though not of the Prussian State) after reunion with the Confederation 
in 1815* This connection between the King and NeuchStel was broken 
in I848 when a revolution introduced a republican constitution, and the 
Swiss federal state recognized the new government. Fredrick William IV 
refused, however, to acknowledge the fait accompli, and encouraged 
counter-revolutionary action, but the resulting internecine strife led 
to bloodshed, and Prussia had to call on the Powers to intervene. For 
a time it seemed that war would break out as both Prussia and 
Switzerland prepared for a campaign in 1857*
At this juncture, Palmerston cnce again came to the assistance 
of the Confederation. A European war could only harm British commerce 
which depended on continental peace. Besides, agreement on NeuchStel
1. E. Bonjour, Geschichte rter schweizerischen Neutralitat 
(Basel and Stuttgart, 1967)» I, 294-95.
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threatened to effect a rapprochement between Prussia and the Prance of 
Louis Napoleon (who had offered to mediate). This eventuality the 
British were anxious to avoid. As he regarded the King as the aggressor 
in the affair, Palmerston brought strong diplomatic pressure to bear 
on the Prussian government, calling on them in unequivocal language 
to honour the guarantee of Swiss neutrality, independence, and integrity 
contained in the Acts of 1815. After a conference in Paris in the 
Spring of 1857 in which the British delegates gave their resolute 
support to the Swiss, the King of Prussia reluctantly accepted the fact 
of Neuchfitel's republican government, and abandoned his sovereign rights 
over the canton for all time, leaving the way open for the Swiss to admit 
Neuchgtel to full rights as a member of the Confederation.'*' Great 
Britain emerged from the conflict as undisputed champion of the rights 
of the Swiss confederation, and so drew tighter the bonds linking the 
two nations.^
1. Bonjour, op.cit.t I, 339-57•
2. It is significant that Gaston Carlin, the Swiss minister in London 
during the First World War, in giving his assurances to Sir Edward 
Grey that Switzerland would observe the strictest neutrality, 
mentioned that the Swiss government had not forgotten the friendly 
attitude of the British at the time of the Sonderbund and of the 
dispute with Prussia over Neuchfitel. Grey-Grant Buff, 14 November 
1914, letter, FO 368-1133-71005/14.
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Relations between Great Britain and Switzerland remained amicable 
throughout the nineteenth arid intc the second decade of the twentieth 
century in spite of Delme-Radcliffe's alarmist reports from Rome (1909-10) 
on presumptive military' understandings between the Swiss and the Germans 
and Austrians. Delm^-Radcliffe had hinted at the possibility of a Swiss- 
German military understanding against France, and a secret Swiss-Austrian 
military alliance against Italy. These suspicions obviously derived from 
the influence cf the military circles in Rome who were exercised about 
Italian irredenta in Switzerland and Austria, and had conceived a phobia 
about a joint Swiss-Austrian attack on Italy itself.^ A categorical 
denial by Federal Councillor Ludwig Forrer (head of the Swiss Military 
Department) in 1912 that such understandings existed relieved the Foreign
1. As early as 1907 Colonel Theophil Sprecher von Bernegg, chief of 
the Swiss general staff, had entered into discussions with the 
Austrian general staff regarding joint Swiss-Austrian military 
action against the Italians. These operations were to be 
defensive, as Italy with her irredenta in Tessin and in Austria 
was regarded as a possible aggressor. As the discussions remained 
on the level of the general staffs, however, there was no question 
of a ’military alliance* between Switzerland and Austria. The 
same may be said for any supposed understanding with Germany 
against France.
0. Uhl.Die diplomatische-politischen Beziehunaen zwischen 
Grossbritannien und der Schweiz in den Jahrzehnten vor dem 
Ere ten V.eltkrieg (1890-1914^ (Basel;, and Stuttgart, 1961), p.165* 
Also, R. Dannecker, Die Schweiz und Osterreich-Ungarn (Basel and 
Stuttgart, 1966), pp.256 ff.
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Office of their immediate fear that Switzerland would side with the
Central Empires in the event of a general war. Rumours to this effect
persisted for the next two years,^however, until they were finally
laid to rest by Grant-Duff’s reasoned analysis of the situation in the
immediate pre-war days, and by the Feaeral Council’s unequivocal
declaration of neutrality on 4 august 1914*
The diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Switzerland
during the war years were specified by the Confederation's geographical
position arid the peculiarities of her economy. When the sides were
ultimately drawn, Switzerland was found to be one of six European 
2
neutrals, and the only one eventually to be surrounded completely by
belligerents. As a limitrophe neutral ideally situated to trade with
Germany and Austria-Hungary, as well as with the Allies, Switzerland’s
commercial interests inevitably ran counter to Britain's blockade
policy. The problem of reconciling this conflict of interests provided
the main theme of Anglo-Swiss relations from 1914 to 1918.
The problem was made no easier by the profound ignorance of
Swiss trade cycles reigning in the Foreign Office in 1914 in spite of
the pains taken by the vice-consul in Zurich (J.C. Milligan) to
emphasize in his annual reports the growing dominance of Germany in
3
practically every branch of the Swiss import trade. Milligan failed
1. ibid.. p.248.
2. Denmark, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
3. E. Hamblodh, British Council (London, 1938), P»14«
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to dispel the William Tell image of the Swiss as a nation of simple 
3hepherds, the world forgetting and by the world forgot, an image 
which the Swiss were pleased to project, but which no longer corresponded 
to reality. Switzerland was in fact a highly industrialized nation 
of 3*8 million people, arm far from being agriculturally self-subsistant, 
had to import most of her foodstuffs.’ In 1911-13, for example, the 
yearly average consumption of grains of all types (wheat, barley, rye,
oats, corn, rice) was about 1, <--61,000 tons, of which 642,000 tons, or
2
about 60 percent, had to be imported. Even grazing, which popular 
imagination seemed to regard as the sole Swiss industry and which in 
fact ranked as a major industry, depended in large measure on imported 
fodder3.
Switzerland is astonishingly poor in every natural resource 
with the exception of water power. The raw materials for her 
industries — coal,iron, and non-ferrous metals, as well as cotton, silk, 
and petroleum — derived entirely from abroad. She purchased these 
goods indiscriminately from the nations ultimately to oppose one 
another in the war. Germany supplied her with coal and iron, some 
foader, and many important manufactures, while Austria-Hungary 
contributed petroleum, sugar, wood, and horses. Grain came from 
Russia, Rumania, and North America, silk from Prance, Italy, and the
1. 23.6 percent of the land was thoroughly unproductive (lakes, rocks, 
glaciers), and 23*8 percent v.as good only for pasture. P.Erdman, 
Swiss-American Economic Relations (Basel, 1959)* p*6.
2. L.A. Rufener, The Economic Fosition of Switzerland during the War 
(Washington, 1919), P«7*
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Orient, cotton from Egypt and the United States. Non-ferrous metals 
were drawn (in either the unfinished or semi-finished state) from 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Prance, Great Britain, and the Straits 
Settlements.
These materials were worked up into finished products of all
kinds, from delicate precision instruments and watches, ribbands,
cotton embroideries, and luxury textiles, to heavy turbines and
railway locomotives from the factories in Winterthur, which in turn,
together with the surplus from the grazing industry (cattle, milk,
cheese, and chocolate), comprised the principal exports from the
Confederation, ^ But just as her imports were drawn from various
countries entirely irrespective of their political allegiances, so
Switzerland*8 exports were shipped in about equal proportion to the
Central Empires and the Entente nations. The politically eclectic
nature of the Swiss trade cycle is well illustrated by the import and
2
export figures for 1913*
1. The principal exports from 
francs, were:
1. embroideries (194)
2. watches (183)
3. silks (107)
4. machines (98)
5. cheese (70)
Switzerland in 1913* in millions of
6. chocolate (58)
7. condensed milk (44)
8. ribbands (42)
9. dyes (30)
10. shoe3 (19)
2. Statistik des Warenverkehrs der Schweiz mit dem Auslande im Jahre 
1913* ed. Vchweizerische Zolldepartement (Bern, 1914)»
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Import g
value (inoo fr) per cent
exports 
percent value (lOOOfr) 
total 100 1,376,3991,919,-016 100
Central Empires
630,870 32.8 Germany 22.2 303,659
100,468 3.6 Austria-Hungary 5*7 78,357
entente
347,985 18.1 France 10.3 141,249
207,024
112,665
10.8 Italy 6.5 89,153
5-9 Great Britain 17*1 236,164
71,467 3*7 Hussia 4-2 58,718
Thus while the Central i&upires supplied Switzerland with some 38 percent 
cf her imports and took about 28 percent of her exports, the 
corresponding figures for the Entente were 38 percent and 38 percent, 
a fairly even match.
The .foreign Office soon discovered that the problem of blockading 
Germany’s imports and later of restricting her exports through 
Switzerland was enormously complex. How was Switzerland to be supplied 
with sufficient foodstuffs, fodder, and industrial materials without 
their being reexported to the Central Powers? On the other hand, how 
could Switzerland be coerced into adopting restrictive trading 
practices without alienating her sympathies, or perhaps even driving 
her into alliance with the Central Fowers? As about 70 percent of all 
Swiss spoke German, while only 24 percent spoke French and 6 percent 
Italian, the Foreign Office feared the sympathy of the Swiss heavily
18
favoured the cause of the Central Empires in any case. Apart from 
humanitarian considerations, too harsh a policy toward the Swiss must 
necessarily have adverse social and political effects. Too lenient a 
policy would only frustrate the general blockade effort.
From a technical viewpoint, Switzerland was easier to control
than the other JSuropean neutrals as she lacks direct access to the se$.
Before the war, she drew her overseas imports principally Up the Rhine,
2
or by rail from ilarBeilles and Genoa. Immediately hostilities opened, 
the Rhine route was closed by the British to Swiss imports on the 
pretext they were in danger of confiscation by the German authorities. 
There reclaimed then only the rail lines from the French and Italian 
ports. But France and It?ly, by the simple exercise of sovereign 
right over their means of transport, could regulate the traffic on 
these routes at their discretion. Consequently no practical obstacle 
stood in the way' of stopping Swiss imports completely had it been in 
the interests of Allied policy.
Switzerland could not be allowed freely to re-export goods
1. Allegiance to Switzerland and her traditional neutrality was 
however, in the last analysis, the predominant political sympathy
of all the Swiss during the war.
2. The Rhine route was by far the cheapest and was growing in 
importance. Of about 35*000 tons of wheat imported from Russia 
and Rumania in 1912, for example, 15,000 tons came via the Rhine, 
16,000 tons from Marseilles, and 3,200 tons from Genoa. Genoa was 
used less and less in the years after 1905 because of the expense 
of hauling goods over the Alpine passes. Port taxes were also high 
there: 25 centimes per ton, as against 6 pfennig in Rotterdam.
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to the Central Empires as she was a potential emporium for supplying 
the civilian and military goods denied them by stringent blockade 
measures elsewhere in force. Cotton, non-ferrous metals, rubber, 
lubricating oil, leather, and machinery, not to mention grain, dairy 
products, and cattle fattened on fodder supplied by the Allies were 
available to German and Austrian agents in Switzerland. Clearly an 
effective overall policy of blockading the Central Powers demanded 
some Allied control over the ultimate destination of goods in 
Switzerland.
Some success in restricting re-exports to the Central Empires 
was achieved in the early months of the war by inducing the Swiss 
authorities to issue export prohibitions for certain goods on the 
grounds they were needed for Swiss domestic consumption. Allied 
wishes in this regard coincided to some extent with the desire of the 
Federal Council to control prices and ensure sufficient supplies for 
the nation which led to their establishing government monopolies for 
grain, fodder, rice, sugar, and the like. Pressure was also 
exercised on the Swiss government to guarantee the domestic 
consumption (or conversely the non-re-export) of individual shipments 
of goods like copper, rubber, and lubricating oil, by holding these 
cargoes at Gibraltar or Marseilles, but a limit to this process was 
set by Switzerland^ need to export to Germany in order to pay for 
the coal and iron which the Allies could not supply, and to obtain 
other products like petrol, benzine, and fertilizers which the Germans 
would release only in barter for specific products of Allied
20
provenance. Since the Allies were in no position to supply all of 
Switzerland's needs, nor, as it soon appeared, to assimilate all her 
exports, some compromise in allowing her to trade with the Central 
Empires had to be devised.
The compromise solution was suggested by the success of the 
Netherlands Overseas Trust, a private company sot up in Holland to 
act as sole consignee and distributor of imports from the -allies*
Some efforts in this direction had already been made in the winter 1914-15 
by C*P* Skipworth, the assistant commercial attache in Berne, who 
si£sned contracts with individual firms whereby they pledged, in 
return for the receipt of Allied goods, not to re-export to the Central 
Empires. Sir Francis Oppenheiiner, the commercial attache in the Hague, 
who had negotiated the H.G.T., was therefore dispatched to Switzerland 
to see if a general organization similar to the B.O.'T. could be set 
up there.
Deliberations with Federal Councillor Arthur Hoffmann (Chief
of the Federal Political Department, the Swiss Foreign Office) in
the Spring of 1915 led Oppenheimer to believe the Federal Council were
amenable to and even anxious for the establishment of such an organization
to put Swiss commerce on a firmer basis. Factional interests and the
prevalent policy of economic laissez-faire, however, precluded the
*
regulation of traffic from the Allies by an official federal agency.
From these deliberations was born the Societl Juisse de Surveillance 
jSconofitique. a semi-official body uesigned to act as unique consignee 
of all goods from the Allied, t v  from neutral nations transported across
21
Allied territories, whose re-export to the Central Empires was 
restricted in the interests of the blockade.
The Allies further refined their control over imports iyito 
Switzerland, and consequently over imports into the Central Empires, 
by imposing on the Swiss a rationing system whereby they vo.ild be 
allowed their average imports less their average exports to tfae Central 
Empires, delivered on a quarterly basis. Naturally since rationing 
conflicted with the exchange system established by the Central Empires 
for doling out their exports to Switzerland, the rationing scheme met with 
vociferous protest from the Swiss who feared the loss of nesefssary 
commodities supplied by the Central Empires only in exchange .for Allied 
goods. Protest, however, was futile since the Allies were in a 
position to impose a ration whether the Swiss accepted it o* not. 
Consequently, after obtaining a few concessions in the matter of 
exchanges, the Federal Council agreed to the establishment >f the S#S.S. 
and to the imposition of rationing in October 1915*
The subsequent history of Anglo-Swis3 relations during -the war 
is essentially the history of the Foreign Office’s efforts *,o preserve 
and improve the control exercised by the S.S.S. This cont?oil was 
menaced in two distinct and contrary ways.
First, there was the tendency of the British Admiralty *and War 
Office, and of their French counterparts, through distrust >f the 
S.O.S, to interfere with consignments to that organization, arnd to 
subject these consignments to endless delays. This gave Us*© to a 
movement among Swiss traders, exasperated by these obstructLorns in
2?
receiving goods and attributing the difficulty to the trust organization, 
to demand the immediate dissolution of the S.S.S, During the early 
part of 1916, the organization seemed on the verge of collapse, and 
survived only "because of the Foreign Office’s vigorous defense 
against its critics and their success in overcoming obstacles placed 
in the way of Swiss imports.
Second (after the S.S.S. had. been fully accepted), there rose a 
tendency on the part of the Allies to bypass the S.S.S., and to unload 
on Switzerland consignments of goods whose normal markets had been 
closed by the war. Thus, the Foreign Office had first to deal with an 
inadequacy of supply for the Swiss, and then with a superfluity of goods 
pouring into the country and the consequent probability of leakage to 
the Central Empires. After seeking to impose restraints on the Swiss 
in the first year of the war, Great Britain was then obliged to restrain 
her Allies to preserve the blockade’s effectiveness. Italy, whose 
economy was the shakiest of the Allies’, was the principal culprit in 
this regard, and only by setting up Allied purchasing agencies for 
Italian fruit and 3ilk was it possible to divert these Italian exports 
from the enemy,
As the war progressed and more stringent blockade measures 
recommended themselves, adjustments in the bj e^-laws of the S.S.S., 
particularly in the regulations allowing for the re-export to the Central 
Empires of restricted amounts of goods finished in Switzerland, were 
negotiated by the Allied and Swiss governments. Rationing quotas 
were constantly revised throughout the war on the recommendation of the
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Cofflgiiafcion i.eraanente intcrr.atonale de contin&ement (C.P.I.C.) in 
laris, an organization responsible for gathering the statistics on 
Swiss imports and cutting off supplies when the quarterly rations were 
filled. The harmonious functioning of the various international 
agencies and the cooperation of the Allied governments in maintaining 
the Swiss section of the blockade provide a unique example of inter­
allied effort during the First World War. Swiss trade was consequently 
controlled more successfully in 1917-1& than was that of any other 
neutral.
This achievement in even ore impressive if cne considers that 
the Germans held the powerful weapon of monopoly over the Swiss coal 
supply with which in abstracto they could have coerced the Swiss into 
trading with them. But fortunately (from the British viewpoint) the 
general effect of the blockade and particu]arly the suppression of 
Germany's overseas export trade rendered this weapon useless. During 
the fir^t two years of the war the Germane actually had too much coal 
on hand which, si ce it constituted one of their few export possibilities, 
they were only too willing to forward to the Swiss. Fanpover and 
transport shortages necessitated rationing in September 1916 but 
thereafter the Germane made every effort to fill their quota as the 
high price fetched by coal lent satisfactory support to the faltering 
Reichsmark.
The governments of the Central Empires experienced even less 
success in dominating the Swiss ecoiiomy through their barter scheme.
When the Allies rejected Swiss demands for supplementary re-export
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material for the Central Bowers in compensation for goods received from 
them, the German and Austrian governments supinely accepted the 
situation and, though reluctantly, abandoned the exchange system.
This was regarded as a signal diplomatic victory foir the Allies, and 
encouraged them to maintain a hard lire on granting trade privileges 
to the Swiss. The imposition of a German counter-blockade on the 
Swiss to bring thorn under the economic domination of Germany, which 
the Allies had 1 ong feared, became practicable only in the Spring of 1918 
after Russian's defeet had (deceptively as it turned out) broken the 
blockade ring and secured for the Central Empires the economic self- 
sufficiency required for such ventures. The establishment of the 
German control organization, the Gchweizerjsche Trenhandrtelle (S.T.S.), 
in May 1$)18 came however too late appreciably to affect Swiss ecohomic 
independence.
The available trade statistics indicate a manifest victory for 
the Allies in the economic war waged on Swiss territory. Imports from 
overseas reached the Central Empires through Switzerland only in amounts 
specified by the Allies in the S.S.S. agreement, while \llied pressure 
succeeded unexpectedly in forcing the Swiss to reduce the export to the 
Central Empires of domestic products like cattle, cheese, condensed 
milk, and chocolate. Meanwhile the Allies, by an aggressive policy 
of placing orders with Swiss manufacturers and by supplying their 
factories with the requisite coal, which the Germans had naturally 
refused them, were able to corner some 87 percent of the Swiss 
munitions export market. 1 Bty 1917, the Foreign Office were
1. Mainly shrapnel fuses, and projectiles of copper and steel.
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jusxified in regarding the bwiss section of tne blockade as ‘super- 
excellent 1: Swiss imports arid exports were moving entirely to the 
satisfaction of the allied Dlockaue authorities.
fhe entry of America into the conflict threatened at first to 
disturb the harmonious workings of the 'Swiss blockade', but after 
an initial perica of uncertainty, the State Lepartment agreed actively 
to support the S.S.s. and tne existing interallied agencies concerned 
with regulating Swiss trade, fhe financial contribution made by the 
United States to the fruit and silk purchasing agencies helped 
alleviate the buruens imposed on Italy by the blockade, and their 
guarantee to deliver ample grain supplies to the Confederation, though 
it occasioned some misgivings for the Lonaon Shipping Control, did much 
to counteract German propaganda during 1918.
In spite of the far-reaching controls exercised over Swiss 
commerce by Doth belligerent groups, certain Swiss industries 
actually experienced a boom during tne war years. In I9I6 the balance 
of trade turned in owitzerlana' s favour for the first time since the 
1680's, thanks xo decreased imports, increased productivity, and 
higher prices paid for finished goods. Agriculture, encouraged by 
the Federal government, achieved great success in making the Swiss less 
dependent on imports by more intensive cultivation of farming land and 
by converting pastures and marginal acreage to crop growing. Swiss 
financial circles profited from the embarrassment of the belligerents 
by lending considerable sums to both sides. Great Britain herself 
negotiated a loan for 100 million francs in 1918 to help pay for her
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purchases tn the Corfederation.
On the other hand, certain dislocations were experienced in 
industries like tourism, the production of luxury textiles, and wine, 
while the cost of mobilization added the staggering burden of 1220 million 
francs to the natioral debt. Moreover the high price of coal and the 
rationing of bread caused meat hardship especially among the poor on 
whom the burdens of war weighed most heavily*
Great Britain had every reason, however, to be satisfied with 
her wartime relations with Switzerland. Her policy as regards Swiss 
commerce had been directed primarily to reducing Swiss export and re­
export trade with the Central Empires, and at the same time to keeping 
the Swiss economy healthy by providing her with sufficient food, fodder, 
and industrial materials, and assimilating, as far ns possible, her 
exportable surpluses. By the winter of 1916-17 this nolicy had 
succeeded beyond the expectation of even R.L. Craigie, the Foreign 
Office expert on Swiss affairs, who was sent out to Berne with Sir 
Horace Rumbold (the new minister' in September 1916 to direct the 
enterprise from rearer at hand because he felt sterner measures against 
the Swiss were called for. His complete volte face in their regard 
provides some indication of the success of British policy.
There was nothing dramatic in this policy as it was a question
of ’unobtrusive detail energetically pursued*. The following chapters
intend to show in detail how the British aims were accomplished in spite 
of the manifold difficulties Involved in pursuing a policy of imposing
restrictions on a friendly nation harassed on every side, and of
retaining at the same time her good will and support.
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After recounting in Cnapters 2 and 5 the initial British 
efforts to control Swiss trade which led to the establishment of the 
S.3*S., and considering the counter moves of the Central Empires in 
Cnapter 4» Cnapters ') and 6 illustrate how the Foreign Office were able 
to make a success of the S.3.S. in face of opposition in Switzerland and 
in the Allied nations. The final Chapter will show the effect of 
America's entry into tne wax* and of Britain’s financial policies on 
the economy of bwitzerland.
The principal protagonists in the economic war in Bwitzerland 
in the .years 1^14-ld were Great Britain arid Germany. Though it had 
Deen agreed in l^ib that France should take the lead in active blockade 
measures where Bwitzerland was concerned, the superior organization of 
the British blockade agencies, and the unified direction they enjoyed, 
gave Great Britain the commanding position throughout the war. Germany 
was of far greater commercial importance to Bwitzerland than was 
austria-nungary whose similar economy and difficult communications with 
the Confederation itept trade between them to a minimum. Firmer grasp of 
the facts of the Swis3 economic position and assiduous devotion to 
detail, combined with subtly applied pressures and a singleness of 
purpose, gave Great Britain a distinct edge over the Germans in 
Switzerland. It was an achievement with which the Foreign Office had 
every right to be satisfied.
\
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II
BLOCKADE BEGINNINGS
The legal foundation for maintaining a naval blockade on which 
the Admiralty had built their contingency plans during the century 
previous to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 had been laid down to 
specifications suited to the naval wars between 1756 and 1814.* British 
admiralty lawyers, disposing at the close of the Napoleonic wars of a 
greater body of precedents than their continental colleagues, tended 
to regard British blockade practice as normative to the law of nations.
That the assumptions underlying British practice were at variance with 
those of continental jurists became evident during Anglo-French naval 
operations in the Crimean war. While the British, for example,
regarding the nationality of the owner of the goods as decisive, seized
all enemy goods wherever found, the French looked to the nationality of 
the ship's owner, confiscating all goods on enemy ships and releasing 
even enemy goods on neutral ships, according to a ’free ships, free 
goods, enemy ships, eneny goods' norm.
1. The official history of the blockade is A.C. Bell, The Blockade of
Germany and of the Countries Associated with her in the Great War 1914- 
1918 (London. 1937). Two other authoritative accounts by historians who 
were connected with the administration of the blockade are: W.E.Amold- 
Forster, The Economic Blockade 1914-1918 (London,1920), and H.W.C. Davis 
History of the Blockade, Emergency Departments (London, 1920). The best
account of the development of thought on the blockade is found in Bell,
pp.1-32. Highly recommended also is the forthcoming work of M.R. Pitt, 
Karitime Rights and Economic Warfare: British Policy 1854-1914.
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The awkward situations engendered by these contradictory views and 
the consequent irritation caused to neutrals clearly demanded a uniform 
maritime code. The general provisions of this code, essentially an 
eclectic conglomeration of century old precedents, were formulated in 
the treaty of Paris of I856, the two Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907* 
and finally in more specific form, in the declaration of London in 1909• * 
Though unratified by the great powers before the 1914 war, the 
declaration of London was formally recognized 'subject to certain 
conditions and modifications' as the basis of their blockade policy by
Great Britain, Prance, and Russia shortly after the opening of
2
hostilities. In 1914 then, the following propositions were regarded 
as law* (l) a blockade to be binding must bar access to all enemy 
harbours, (2) 'free ships make free goods', i.e., no innocent cargoes, 
even of enemy provenance or destination, might be confiscated if 
carried on friendly or neutral vessels, but (3) under certain conditions 
contraband cargoes might be seized. Contraband was either relative or 
absolute. Relative contraband comprised those goods which could have 
(but not necessarily did have) a military use, and might be confiscated 
only if its ultimate destination was known to be the enemy's forces.
1. Texts of the Peace Conference at the Hague. 1899 and 1907. ed.
J.B. Scott (Boston. 1908). The Declaration of London. February 26. 
1909. ed. J.B. Scott (New York, 1919).
2. Order-in-Council. 20 August 1914. The texts of the maritime Orders-in^ 
Council are reprinted in Bell, Blockade. Appendix I, pp.711-719*
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Absolute contraband, on the other hand, consisted of materials useful 
only in war, such as cannon or shells, and might always be seized by 
the blockading nation. Furthermore, the doctrine of continuous 
voyage (the right of a belligerent to confiscate goods whose ultimate 
destination is the enemy even if these goods are delivered first to an 
intermediary neutral) might be invoked in the case of absolute, but not 
of relative contraband.^
By 1914*however, it was obvious that legal formulations had not 
kept pace with technological developments such as the mine and the 
torpedo which rendered close-cordon blockade impossible,and made 
search at sea to determine if cargoes contained contraband a highly 
dangerous practice. The legal codes were for the most part irrelevant. 
Though for political reasons the Admiralty had officially supported the 
declaration of London, the practical difficulties involved in 
maintaining a blockade under its strictures were widely recognized 
among naval officers. Captain Maurice P.A. Hankey, the naval 
assistant secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, was moved to 
write a long memorandum deprecating the declaration of London and
suggesting measures to establish a 'long distance1 blockade of the
2
type in fact employed during the war. When this memorandum was
1. E. Turlington, The World War Period (New York, 1936), p.x. This
is the third volume of Neutrality, its History. Economics, and Law, 
ed. P.C. Jessup.
2. M.P.A. Hankey (Lord Hankey), The oupretie Command. 1914-1918 (London, 
1961),1,99-100. A 'long distance* blockade avoided the dangers of 
picketing enemy harbours and carrying out search at sea by determin­
ing whether a cargo was contraband before it was shipped, and by 
requiring the carrying vessel to call at a designated port to see
if the cargo conformed to the bill of lading telegraphed from the 
port of embarkation.
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brought to the attention of the Admiralty, Hankey received the private 
assurance of admiral of the fleet Lord Fisher that he need not worry 
about the declaration of London because it was absolutely certain that 
all these arrangements would tumble down as soon as the guns went off.
To a certain extent the admiral's prediction proved correct, for within 
a few months of August 1914 the declaration of Paris and the six Hague 
conventions bearing on naval warfare had disappeared, and what remained 
of the declaration of London was 'withdrawn* by the maritime rights 
Order-in-Council of 7 July 1916.
Indeed little purpose was served in retaining legal justifications 
for a blockade which was never in fact attempted. The Admiralty had 
made no immediate plans to deploy the fleet as picket ships off the 
German coast. At the start of the conflict, a cruiser squadron 
(the Tenth) was sent to patrol the far reaches of the North Sea, and 
a few destroyers were set out to guard the entrance to the Mediterranean 
at Gibraltar, but even these patrols were subsequently withdrawn because
they had become otiose.^ Capture and search at sea were obsolete
#
in an age when the less dramatic means of curtailing enemy trade through 
bunker control, denial of insurance coverage, and restriction of credit 
proved at the same time more effective. Verification of cargoes was 
carried out swiftly and efficiently in assigned harbours in the United 
Kingdom and in the Mediterranean, where every ship making for a 
European port was required to call. No owner would dare allow his ship
1. Arnold-Forster, op.cit.. pp.l7t152.
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to omit calling in for this check for fear of terrible commercial 
*prisal from Whitehall.
The administrative machinery for controlling the so-called 
'long distance' blockade, which replaced the traditional picketing of 
enemy harbours, was extremely complicated, and while the disorder of 
its components, an inevitable result of its hasty construction, created 
considerable friction in the beginning, these defects were eventually 
hammered out so that at war's end it was operating with remarkable 
efficiency.*
The term 'blockade', as applied to the measures adopted by the
Allies to bring pressure to bear on the enemy's commerce, is a term
of convenience rather than of strict accuracy, for a blockade in the
formal sense was never declared during the war, nor could it have been,
considering the impossibility of effectively patrolling the whole of
Germany's coastline, especially the Baltic ports, as required in the
conditions set down in the treaty of Paris for the erection of a legal 
2
blockade. Germany, on the other hand, did declare a blockade of 
the English coast, although it haB been wryly observed that the 
blockade which the British government did not declare was much more 
effective than the one the German government did declare.^
1. For the details of the administrative organs, see Davis, op.cit.. 
pp.5-25, and M.C. Siney, The allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916
(Ann Arbor, 1957)* PP-50-32; 70-73-
2. Grey-W.H.Page (U.S. ambassador in London), 10 February 1915» 
Memorandum, Fll 1915» supplement, pp.327-552.
5- M- Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power (London, 1924),p.38.
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As regards the neutrals, the British policy of blockade or 
economic encirclement had three purposes: (l) to prevent food and
raw materials from reaching the Central lowers through the neutral 
nations, (2) to prevent, as far as possible, exports to the enemy of 
the neutral’s domestic products, and (3) to maintain the economic 
stability of the neutral by allowing her sufficient, but not over­
abundant, imports.
The implementation of this policy in the case of Switzerland was
enormously simplified from a practical and a legal point of view by
the confederation's geographical position. Contraband from the north
could be withheld because it had to pass over enemy territory and,
during the period of Italy's neutrality, from the south by application
of the doctrine of continuous voyage, since so many Swiss firms were
dealing with the enemy.'1’ The entry of Italy into the conflict in May
1915 simplified the legal problem even further as it was then no longer
necessary to have recourse to the continuous voyage doctrine, which
had caused much ill-will. Thereafter all imports into Switzerland
could be refused transport facilities across French and Italian
territory by the mere exercise of these countries' sovereign right to
2
grant rail privileges to whomever they pleased. The Swiss harboured
1. The doctrine of continuous voyage (goods are confiscatable if the
neutral intermediary will forward them to the enemy) applied auto­
matically in the case of absolute contraband. The Allied naval 
forces in the Mediterranean applied the doctrine to relative contra­
band as well in the supposition that this material was being sent to 
the Gerr.an army. This supposition was of course disputed.
2. Astonishingly, over a year after Italy's entry into the war, Sir E)yre
Crowe, who was head of the Contraband Department, did not know the
legal basis for the 'blockade' of Switzerland. In a minute in June
1916 he regretted that Allied pressure 'will always have a smack
of illegality'. Lord Robert Cecil rejoined, 'Surely not. A 
—  /contd.over/
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no illusions about the capability of the Allies to starve her, and 
were finally forced to accept a programme of control and agreed 
rationing which ultimately made Switzerland the strongest link in the 
chain of blockade around the Central Empires. But before this 
satisfactory state was achieved, a long period of inept diplomacy was 
to transpire, which threatened to destroy the traditional good 
relations existing between the United Kingdom and the Swiss 
Confederation.
The original Committee on the Restriction of Enemy Supplies 
(Sir Francis Hopwood, Chairman), established in August 1914 to gather 
information on the ways and means by which food and supplies reached 
the enemy, was soon augmented by various committees from the Admiralty, 
the Board of Trade, and the Foreign Office, all of which conspired to 
destroy the commerce of the enemy. For administrative as well as 
political reasons it was the Foreign Office who gradually assumed 
leadership of the other departmental committees, and by exercising this 
leadership dominated blockade policy even after the formation of a 
separate Ministry of Blockade in 1916. The most important governmental
reference (2) continued
sovereign state has as much right to forbid its territory being 
used for transit as it has to forbid its products being exported.* 
Crowe was chastened: ’I had overlooked the right of France and 
Italy to stop transit. Lord Robert Cecil is right.* Minutes on 
FO 382-1072-123004/16.
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organ, as far as economic policy regarding Switzerland was concerned, 
was the Contraband Department, constituted in the Foreign Office during 
the first week of November 1914. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, 
set down principles under which the department should strive t o achieve 
the closest co-operation between the frequently conflicting policies 
of the Admiralty, the Board of Trade, and the Foreign Office. Alwyn 
Parker was appointed its immediate supervisor, and Sir Eyre Crowe was 
responsible for all negotiations with neutral states regarding contraband. 
The Contraband Department was ultimately divided into eight sections 
which eventually grew to unwieldy proportions. In February 1916, 
therefore, at Crowe’s urging, a distinct department of state, called the 
Ministry of Blockade, was formed. The Contraband Department continued, 
however, to be the real organ of blockade under the formal authority 
of the Blockade Ministry. The Ministry itself was housed under the 
Foreign Office roof, managed by Foreign Office officials, and headed by 
Lord Robert Cecil who retained his title of under secretary of state 
for foreign affairs even after entering the cabinet as minister of 
blockade.*
Removing Sir Eyre Crowe from his position as head of the War 
Department and placing him in charge of all contraband negotiations in 
November 1914 must be regarded as a decisive step in the history of the 
blockade. Far sighted, possessed of an extraordinarily incisive mind 
and balance of judgment, he had, by reason of ids famous memorandum of
1. Cecil himself suggested this. G.M. Trevelyn, Grey of Fallodon 
(London, 1937)* p.308.
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1907» long been regarded as the most articulate spokesman for the 
anti-German school which grew up in the Foreign Office after the turn 
of the century. Under his direction the weapon of blockade, forged 
from the various committees and departments, was thrust powerfully and 
relentlessly at the economic heart of the Central Empires.
Within the Contraband Department, organized in geographical 
divisions, Robert Leslie Craigie was entrusted with the supervision of 
negotiations with Italy and Switzerland until September 1916 when he 
was transferred to the British Legation in Berne to supervise the 
blockade in Switzerland from a closer vantage p o i n t H i s  work in the 
Foreign Office was continued under the direction of two able and 
conscientious public servants, Owen St. Clair 0*Malley and Sidney P. 
Waterlow.
The Contraband Department maintained a permanent executive
secretariat in the contraband committee which met daily in the Foreign
Office beginning in November 1914* This committee was composed of
representatives of the trade division of the Admiralty,the Foreign
Office, the Board of Trade, the Procurator General, and later of
members of the Restrictions of Ifriemy Supplies Committee and the War
2
Trade Advisory Committee. The decision to release or to retain a
cargo to a nautral land was taken by the contraband committee after a
consideration of the evidence as to the ultimate destination of the
1. Crove-Runbold, 17 January 1918, letter, FO 382-1979-2944/18. Craigie 
commanded the respect of the Swiss from the start. A month after his 
appointment, H. Grobet-Roussy, director of the S.S.S., wrote to the 
Swiss foreign minister: *M. Craigie est tr&s intelligent et a la 
vlrite tree pointilleux. Mais il est en m<me temps tres juste1.
/cont. over/
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shipment, based on intelligence and consular reports, intercepted 
telegrams and cables, and information from insurance brokers.
The French counterpart to the contraband committee was the 
coiomission des derogations, an interministerial body organized in 
November 1914 and attached to customs to deal with all questions of 
export to neutrals.* Co-operation between the French and English 
committees, as later between the respective Ministries of Blockade, 
so essential to the success of the joint venture, was not easily 
achieved, as will subsequently be seen.
Meanwhile, even before the Allies had begun to marshal their 
military and administrative forces to attack the enemy’s commerce, 
the Swiss government had adopted certain defensive measures, though they 
were limited and inadequate, to shield their nation from the effects
references 1 & 2 continued:
Grobet-Roussy - Hoffmann, letter,EVD KW 1914-1918» Abkommenen mit 
Frankreich. Schaclitel 10. The official report of the S.S.S. says 
of him: fIl fut avant tout l’homme-blocus1. SSS RI, p.305»
2.Bell, Blockade, p.36, note.
1.Lea Organisations de Blocua en France pendant la Guerre (1914-1918), 
ed. Denys Cochin (Paris, 1926), p.1 5 . Denys Cochin was the 
French minister of blockade.
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of the commercial war. Their efforts were confined, to ensuring 
grain and coal imports. Ironically the inspiration for these 
measures was French, and their adoption was due more to French 
insistance than to Swiss foresight.
The French government doubted that Switzerland would be able 
to maintain her traditional neutrality in the event of a general 
European war, but were convinced she would be forced 'pour des 
raisons de ravitaillement* to join one side or the other. * Accordingly, 
Commander Pageot, the French military attach^ in Berne, was commissioned 
by the French War Office to investigate the particulars of Swiss grain 
consumption so that if war came the French could be ready to supply 
their needs. By February 1914 Pageot had devised a scheme for 
supplying the Swiss daily with 1500 tons of wheat and 400 tons of 
fodder (from America) across French rails,beginning on the thirty-fifth 
day after mobilization. Official discussions with Colonel Theophil 
Sprecher von Bemegg, Chief of the Swiss General Staff, followed in 
April and resulted in an agreement to transport daily to Geneva 1900
tons from Bordeaux and Nantes, and if possible from Marseilles, and to
2
consign it to the Swiss Oberkriegskommissariat. To avoid possible
1. A. Lacher, Die Schweiz und Frankreich vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Basel and Stuttgart, 19^7), p.194* He quotes the 1913 report 
of Commander Pageot, the French military attache in Borne.
2. Sprecher-Milit&'rdepartement, 28 April 1914* report, Pol.Dept..
2, 639.
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S
French requisition en route to Geneva, the Swiss consul at the port
of origin was to certify the cargoes."^
These arrangements alleviated much of the French concern about
the neutrality of Switzerland as well as the anxiety of the Federal
Council about the grain supply through France. They incidentally
provided a convenient fulcrum with which to pry similar concessions
from the German government, relative to Rhine traffic in grain and
6oal. After an exchange of notes beginning in Fay 1914 between Baron
von Romberg, the German minister in Berne, Kerr von Jagow, the
secretary of state, and Imperial 'Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, the
Swiss government were assured that grain and coal coming up the Rhine
would, in the event of war, continue to be allowed through to
$
Switzerland in undiminished quantities.
Swiss grain stocks at the end of duly 1914 were estimated at a
three month supply which, with the domestic harvest, would cover the
3
nation*s needs only until the end of the year. To preserve these 
stocks, the export of wheat, flour, and oats (along with a great number 
of other comraodities^was prohibited by a decree of the Federal
1. P. Cambon (French ambassador in London)-FC, 26 August 1914* note,
FQ 368-1151-43481/14, containing a letter from the French minister
for Foreign Affairs to the minister of finance, 20 August 1914*
2* NB I. 1 December 1914» p.ll* Bonjour, op.cit.. II, 555-556.
3. A. Huber, Die Einschrankung der Handels-und Gewerbefreiheit durch
das Notverordnungsrecbt des Bundes. (Bern,1925V. p.48.
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Council on 51 July. Further prohibitions of export were issued just
after the outbreak of war (on 2,5,7,15, and 18 August), forbidding the
transport across the frontier of scores of products such as weapons,
leather, telephones, cables, automobiles, oil, petrol, animals, fodders,
and foods. The object of these prohibitions was, of course, to retain
for domestic use goods which might be in short supply in a prolonged
war. The list of goods the expert of which was forbidden by the
Federal Council was to be enormously extended during the course of
the war, both spontaneously and under pressure from the belligerents.
As the European political situation deteriorated and ultimata and
declarations of war flashed from capital to capital, the Federal
Assembly met in emergency session in Berne at the beginning of August
to enact measures to ensure the safety of Switzerland and the preservation
of her neutrality. Of supreme importance in this regard is the decree
of 5 August 1914 giving unlimited powers, and an unlimited credit, to
2
the federal executive during the period of national danger.
J£Q. (30), 1914* *Arr6t£ du Conseil Federal concemant la mise de 
piquet de l*armee du 51 juillet 1914! P«335»
2. ibid.. fArr&te federal sur les mesures propres a assurer la
securite du pays efc le maintien de sa neutralite du 3 aomtit 1914*,
p.547. Articles 5 and 4 read:
Article 5* L* Assemble federale donne pouvoir illimite au 
Conseil federal de prendre toutes les mesures 
necessaires a la securite, l'int6grite et la
neutralite de la Suisse, a sauvegarder le credit
et les interGts economiques du pays et, en 
particulier, a assurer lfalimentation publique.
Article 4* A cet effet il est ouvert au Conseil federal 
un credit illimite.
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By virtue of this decree the Federal Council immediately 
established a federal bureau for grain supply (EidgenSssisches Bureau 
fflr Oetreideversorgung) to receive for the account of the Confederation 
all shipments of grain in transport through Germany, France, and Italy, 
and to guarantee the non-export of these supplies from Switzerland.
3200 waggons of grain for Switzerland lay in Mannheim, Strasbourg, and 
Kehl, or were in transit on the Rhine in August; by the close of the 
year, 2600 carloads had been received by the bureau, as well as more 
than forty-seven shiploads of grain of various types from the French 
and Italian ports.^ The Swiss government also launched an immediate 
campaign to buy up grain in America and in Argentina to make good the
deficit caused by the discontinuation of the supplies from Russia, and
2their efforts were met with reasonable success. All frontiers had 
been closed at the commencement of hostilities, but traffic from France
was resumed on 13 August thanks to the representations of the French
3
ambassador to his government, while shipping on the Rhine and
4
transport by rail on its right bank began again on 24 August.
!• NB , 1 December 1914» pp. 11-14*
2. Eid. Bureau fiir Getreideversorgung-Stovall, (U.S. Minister in Berne), 
12 August 1914» letter; Pol.Bept.-P.Ritter (Swiss Minister in 
Washington),18 August 1914* telegram, Pol.Dept.. 2001 (k), Schachtel
14.
3. Ministre de Guerre-J.B.P.Beau (French Ambassador in Berne),13 
August 1914* letter, Pol.Dept., 2001 (k).Schachtel 14*
4. R. Pfenninger, Die Handelsbeziehungen der Schweiz mit Deutschland 
wShrend des Krieges 1914-1918 (zUrich, 1928), p.22.
with the enactment of these measures to ensure the grain 
supply the Federal Council embarked on a comprehensive programme to 
maintain the economy of the land under wartime stress. This effort 
proceeded during the war under four headings: (l) the issue of
export prohibitions to preserve domestic supplies for domestic use 
and as a means of barter for goods from other nations, (2) the 
encouragement of imports by the activity of Swiss commercial agents 
abroad, by the establishment of semi-official purchasing bureaus in 
foreign nations and, most import ant ly, by the erection of import trusts at 
home, (3) the encouragement of domestic agricultural and industrial 
production through measures regulating the use of land and material, and 
(4) the rational distribution of available goods through a system of 
rationing.^
No characteristic of the Swiss is more pronounced ror more 
commented upon than their sense of independence as well in commerce 
as in politics. That the national government Would be allowed to
enter so fully on this programme of commercial restriction in the 
laissez-faire economy of 1914 becomes intelligible only in the context 
of the belligerents’ threat to the commercial life of the nation. The 
first indication that neutrality was no insurance against commercial 
interference came on 14 August when the Swiss war commitsariat
1. J. KSppeli and M. Riesen, Die Lebensmittelversorgurg der
Schweiz untor dem Einfluss des Weltkrieges von 1914 bis 1922 
(Bern, 1925). pp. 15-16".
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(Eidgenfissisches Oberkriegs-kommissariat, to which the bureau for grain 
supply was attached) was informed that the SS Honttegiple. destination 
Antwerp with 57*726 bushels of wheat for Swiss accounts, had its cargo 
confiscated in London.'*" Later that day it was announced that the SS 
Berwindmoor with 5000 quarters of wheat had likewise been detained at 
Falmouth by the British naval authorities. K. Gaston Carlin, the Swiss 
minister in London, made immediate representation to the Foreign Office, 
but Sir Eyre Crowe, though aware of the undesirability of ’annoying* 
neutrals, refused to sanction the passage of these supplies because of
the possibility of their being confiscated by the German authorities
2
during the journey up the Rhine. He recommended that all ships with
cargoes for Switzerland should be diverted from Holland to either the
French Atlantic ports or, if the French rail system was overburdened
with military traffic, to Genoa.^ E*y the 22 August the main flow of
grain supplies to Switzerland had been channelled to Bordeaux and St
j^azaire, and the Swiss government was told that no naval patrols
would molest vessels then bound for those ports (SS Atherstone, Astrea,
Strathor), whose cargoes had been purchased by the bureau for grain 
4
supplies. fhe prohibition of the use of Butch ports for Swiss
1. Eid. Oberkriegskommissariat-Mil. Dept., 14 August 1914* letter,
Pol.De^t. 2QC1 (k), Bohaohtel 14. fhe C.K.K. was a permanent branch
of the military administration whose duty it -was to supply food for the 
army . Because of its experience in supplying corn and grains it was 
charged by the Federal Council with the grain monopoly for civilian 
use as well (until May 1915)•
2. Carlin-Grey, 15 August 1914* letter, FO 368-1131-39666/14. Minutes by 
Tufton and Crowe.
3. Minute cn Carlin-Grey, 16 August 1914* FO 368-1131-39869/14*
4. FO-Grant Buff, 22 August 1914* telegram, FO 368-1131-4l580/l4» Hoffmam 
Grant Duff, 20 August 1914* note, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k),Schachtel 14.
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supplies extended to other cargoes such as metals or cotton, which
were either detained in British ports or rerouted to the Atlantic or
Mediterranean ports
In spite of the assurance of Commandant Pageot, the French
military attach^ in Berne, that arrangements for five wheat trains a
day from Bordeaux and three from Nantes or St. Nazaire had been 
2
completed, the worsening military situation in France led President 
Arthur Hoffmann to summon the British minister, ISvelyn Grant Buff, 
on 27 August to petition the reopening of the Rotterdam route for 
grain, supplies, with the formal SflSUIWlce that these were strictly for 
Swiss use, and that His Majesty’s government would be informed 
instantly in the event of confiscation by German authorities.^ The 
Foreign Office remained adamant, however, informing the Swiss minister 
in London that the British government would allow no further shipments 
to Switzerland by way of the Rhine where they could be seized by the 
enemy.^ Reports from the British ambassador in Bordeaux (where 
the French government had fled at the approach of the Germans to Paris)
1. FO-Carlin, ?3 August, letter, FO -368-1131-41354/14*
2. Pageot-Pol.Dept., 23 August 1914, note verbale. Pol.Dept. 3.001 (k) 
Schachtel 14»
3. Grant Duff-PO, 27 August 1914, telegram, FO 368-1131-43959/14. 
Grant Buff-FO, 27 August 1914, dispatch, FO 368-1131-44872/14.
4* FO-Carlin, 8 September 1914, letter, FC 368-1131-44305 14*
>
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and Rome had stated that rail facilities were adequate to supply Swiss
needs and served to confirm the Foreign Office in the determination, in
face of continued applications from the Swiss government, to eliminate
traffic going up the Rhine.1
Later in the autumn by way of experiment a small consignment of
fifteen tons of cotton, a commodity which was not at that time
contraband, was allowed to proceed by rail from Rotterdam to Basle,
2
where it arrived safely on 1C Kcvember. In the meanwhile, consultation 
with the Home Office, the Board of Trade, and Customs had led the 
Foreign Office to the conclusion that payment of tolls and freights 
to German transport firms was forbidden by the trading with the 
enemy proclamation of 7 August. This definitively closed the Rfcine 
route to all exports from the United Kingdom and from the British 
Empire. Goods from other neutrals to Switzerland were being diverted, 
at the insistance of the Committee on the Restriction of Enemy 
Supplies, under title of danger cf confiscation by the Germans. Wo 
law, however, prohibited the transport of Swiss goods in the opposite
1. Sir Francis Bertie-FO, 14 September 1914, telegram, FO 568-1131- 
49427/14. Rodd-FO, 24 September 1914, telegram, FO 363-1131-52595/14
2. FO-Carlin, 2 October 1914, note, FO 368-II3I-53630/14. Grant-Duff-FO 
17 November 1914, dispatch, ?0 36S-1131-74354/l4.
3. Customs-FO, 30 November 1914, letter, FC 36S-1131-77324/14*
\
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direction, by water or rail from Basle to Rotterdam and thence to 
England, as the Swiss minister was assured in writing on 28 August.^
This route was reopened five months after the outbreak of hostilities,
and goods shipped in that direction remained unmolested by the German
2
authorities to the very end of the war.
The Swiss government made a last despairing effort to set a
precedent for using the Rhine for transportation of goods of non-
British provenance when, toward the end of September, they requested
3
that a consignment of petrol be allowed through from Rotterdam. Since
this product originated in the United States where business interests
had already begun to show concern over British interference with trade,
the petition probably constituted an attempt to intimidate the British
government, ever sensitive to public opinion in the most powerful
neutral. If so, the attempt failed, for the Foreign Office, deftly
ignoring the point at issue, had the French government contact the
Swiss Political Department (i.e., the Swiss foreign office) for
particulars of the petrol shipment and the measures to be taken to
4
prevent any portion from reaching Germany. ' The Swiss government,
1. Carlin-Pol.Dept., 28 August 1914, telegram, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k), 
Schachtel 9*
2. Pfenninger, op.cit.. p.23. Also, W. Waldvogel, Les Relations
Economiques entre la Grande Bretagne et la Suisse dans le Passe
et le Present. (Reuveville, 1922), p.166.
3. Carlin-F0,20 September 1914, letter, FO 368-1132-51199/14.
4. FO-Bertie, 20 September 1914, telegram, FO 368-1132-51199/14*
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f
recognizing the futility of further struggle, merely expressed their
thanks to the French, and the Foreign Office, to remove all doubt of
their determination, informed Carlin that they were making enquiries of
the French government with a view to transport *via a French port1**
The Rhine was not to open again to overseas traffic for two years, and
2
then only for the import of sugar.
Inevitably in the disruption of trade attending the sudden 
outbreak of war, the Swiss imports, particularly of foodstuffs, 
suffered a considerable reduction. The causes of this inhibition of 
trade were three, (l) The capture or the driving into neutral ports 
of ships flying the German and Austro-Hungarian flag and carrying 
goods bound for Switzerland.'' If impounded in British ports, these 
goods were eventually returned to their owners, but litigation usually 
delayed their delivery for several months. Transferal of cargoes in 
neutral ports of refuge to neutral or British ships was likewise a 
time consuming process.
(2) Several Swiss cargoes on neutral or British ships were 
erroneously condemned as contraband and sold by order of the Admiralty.
In September the Swiss minister in London presented Sir Edward Grey 
with a list of fourteen ships whose grain cargoes had reportedly been
1. Bertie-FO, 1 October 1914, telegram, FO 368-1132-55057/14. PO-Carlin, 
7 October 1914, note, FO 368-1132-55057/14.
2. The Allies* motive in allowing this traffic in sugar was to free
the Swiss from dependence on Germany for their sugar supply.
Waterlow's minute, 6 October 1916, FO 382-lO82-19704l/l6.
3. Freiherr von Romberg (German minister in Switzerland)-Bethmann-
Hollweg, 9 April 1915, dispatch, 0PM (2l),141.
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sold, with a demand for payment in kind rather in cash because of 
the shortage in the world grain market.^ The Foreign Office's ex­
asperation at the Admiralty was mitigated somewhat when the Board 
of Trade showed that the Admiralty marshal had actually ordered only
two of the fourteen cargoes sold (SS Oceano, Homanby). presumably
2
because of their perishable nature. Litigation for the proceeds of 
the sale in this case, however, dragged out until august 191|f. ^
3) With the closing of the Rhine, new trade routes through 
France and Italy had to be developed, and existing routes expanded.
In spite of the efforts of the authorities Concerned, deliveries 
through France and Italy were smaller than those hitherto received
4
via the Rhine. Then too the closing of the Dardanelles to Russia,
which had been Switzerland's principal source of wheat and barley
and an important supplier of maize and oats, demanded a complete
5
reorganization of the grain market. These difficulties are 
reflected in the grain import statistics for 1914*
1. Carlin-F0,12 September 1914, letter, FO 368-1131-48886/14.
2. Board of Trade-FO, 17 September 1914, letter, FO 368-1131-50514/14*
3. FO-Carlin, 18 September 1914, letter, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k).Schachtel 20. 
And passim in this Schachtel.
4. Pol.Dept.-Soci^te de Transports intemationaux.20 October 1914,
Pol.Dept. 2001 (k), Schachtel 14* Board of Trade-FO,21 January 1915, 
letter, FO 382-403-9685/15.
5. Bell.Blockade. Table xiii, Swiss imports of cereals, p.108. The 
process of reorganization had actually begun before 1914* The dis­
ruption caused by the Balkan Wars of 1912 induced the Swiss to begin 
to look to America for their grain.
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wheat rye oats barley corn
1212 5,292,278 167,872 1,771,595 259,107 1,215,454
1214 4,408,991 67,753 1,465,432 167,374 779,265
(all figures in quintals).^-
As the great German offensive ground to a halt at the Marne,
and Asquith*s government began finally to appreciate that the war, as
Kitchener had prophesied, would last a very long time, a powerful
counterattack was launched against the Central Empires* entrenched
economic positions. In early September Grant Duff, after consultation
with Sir Henry Angst, consul-general at Zflrich* suggested that the
Board of Trade employ an agent with knowledge of French and German
2
•to devise means of ousting German trade from Switzerland*. J.C.
Milligan, former vice-consul at Zdrich, was selected for this task,
and set immediately to work, assisted by a Swiss socialist, Kerr 
3
Wulfsohn.
The instructions from the Board of Trade forwarded to Milligan 
indicate the scope of the attack on German commerce envisaged at this 
opening phase of the commercial war. The main object of the enterprise 
was to capture trade formerly done with Germany and Austria-Hungary.
To achieve this goal, Milligan was to produce reports on the flow of 
German and Austrian trade to obtain samples of individual goods, and 
to report possible false markings on these items, so they would not be
1. KSppeli and Riesen, op.cit.. p.127.
2. Grant Buff-FO, 5 September 1914, telegram, FO 368-1152-46105/14.
3. Grant-Duff-FO, 15 September 1914, dispatch, FO 368-1132-53237/14.
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mistaken for genuine Swiss goods. He fcas to suggest the best methods 
for British manufacturers to adopt to increase their sale3 in 
Switzerland, not only as a measure against the Central Empires but 
absolutely, as an outlet for remunerative trade for Great Britain, 
already suffering from the loss of her German market.^
A precise knowledge of the cycles of Swiss trade, not to mention 
statistical data, was difficult to obtain in the Foreign Office at 
this stage of the war. witzerland had never merited a commercial 
attache in the British Legation at Berne. This funotion had been 
exercised in a rather desultory fashion by the attach^ in Paris whose 
efforts were, of course, principally directed to promoting British 
trade with France rather than producing detailed studies of Swiss 
economy, which was considered, as it were, within the Franco-German 
'sphere of interest*. It is not surprising then to see in the 
Foreign Office*s initial attitudes to Swiss trade a good deal of 
suspicion, confusion, and misconception which engendered in turn 
mistrust and occasional bitterness in Swiss industrial and commercial 
circles.
The first cause for British suspicion was the vast increase in 
the volume of grain and metal imports into Genoa where, as we have seen, 
the Swiss imports had been directed after the Rhine was closed to them. 
Three nations used Genoa as an import center. First of all, it was
1. FO-Grant Duff, 13 November 1 14, letter, FO 368-1132-63529/14* 
Enclosed is an instruction from the Board of Trade.
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the major port for heavy industry in north Italy. Switzerland too 
had always drawn some overseas supplies from its harbour, though 
never before to the extent necessary in the autumn of 1914*^  -And 
thirdly, transit trade from Genoa to Germany figures prominently 
in the rail traffic from the port across Lombardy, through the
2
Simplon and St. Gotthard tunnels and into Northern Switzerland.
A temporary reduction in this transit trade had occurred during the
summer, due to the employment of German rolling stock for the vast
troop movements in the first weeks of war, but its volume had
increased again as soon a9 the lines of the western front were 
3
established.
This transit traffic through Switzerland, together with the 
increase in Swiss metal purchases abroad, roused suspicion that 
Switzerland was becoming a warehouse for Germany’s war requirements. 
The absence of statistical evidence made it impossible to determine 
which goods served genuine Swiss needs and which were being 
purchased by Swiss houses for re-export to Germany. The change in 
blockade law contained in the Order-in-Council of 29 October 1914*
1. Cf.p. 18-
2. The St. Gotthard tunnel had been partly financed by Germany 
and Italy who had in turn been accorded minimum rates and a 
’most favoured clause* for their mutual transit traffic in the 
Gotthard conventions of 1869 and 1871.
3. Grant Duff-FO,18 November 1914, telegram, FO 368-1132-72674/14.
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forbidding consignments 'to order* but allowing all shipments, 
even of contraband, to go through to any named consignee in a 
neutral country, only aggravated the situation in the eyes of the 
Foreign Office by inviting 'collusive transactions between dummy 
neutral consignees and enemy agents*.^ Anonymous letters reported
large consignments, presumably of contraband goods, passing through
2
Gehoa and the Swiss tunnels to the enemy. These reports caused 
uneasiness in the Foreign Office, who were engaged at the time in 
the delicate business of weaning Italy from the Triple Alliance 
and simultaneously restricting her trade with Germany.
Italy's strategy of hovering between the groups of belligerents 
was causing the British government grave concern during the first 
months of the war, and the issue was complicated by economic as well 
as political factors. Italy was not a rich nation. %  far her 
largest export comprised silk tissues, followed by stamped cottons, 
and then by fresh fruit, wine, and oil. Although these exports 
went in about equal proportion to the Allies and to the Central 
Powers, Italy was entirely dependent on the Allies for indispensible 
imports. She drew almost all the coal for her industries, for 
example, exclusively from Great Britain. Had Italy sided with the 
Central spires, she would have been swiftly prostrated by Allied
1. Siney, op.cit.. p.28-29.
2. Grant-Duff-FO, 24 October 1914, telegram, FO 368- H 33-63O88/I4
1
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economic pressure, that is, simply by a British coal embargo, for
even if the Central Empires had been able to supply from the mines of
the Ruhr and Silesia Italy’s 10,000,000 ton annual requirement, the
coal could never have been delivered on the already oberburdened
German railways*^ On the other hand, it seemed that Italy could
scarcely afford to abandon that quarter of her export market which
went to the Central Unpires, by taking up arms against her former
partners in the Triple Alliance. Although on economic grounds then
strict neutrality had everything to recommend itself, political
end psychological factors such a§ the desire to strengthen the
monarchy, to expand territorially, and to achieve international
recognition were, as events proved, to triumph over sober economic
considerations, and eventually to draw Italy into the struggle as
2
a partner of the Entente.
The war had scarcely been declared when the Italian government 
put out feelers to probe the advantages of an alliance with the 
Entente. On 12 August 1914* the Marquis Imperial!, the Italian 
ambassador in London, called on Sir Edward Grey to assure him that 
the Italian government wished to remain neutral, but that they might 
be forced into belligerency, first because they feared a shift in 
the balance of power which would be disadvantageous to them, and 
secondly because they feared the Central Empires would never forgive
1. Bell, Blockade, p.97-99*
2. That these desires could not be fulfilled by adhesion to the Triple
Alliance is explained in detail in L. Albertini, The Origins of the
1914 (Oxford, 1965), p.296-565* The beat mot on Italian poli­
cy at this time was spoken by Paul Cambon, the French /contd./"
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them for having declared neutrality. Imperiali went on to give the 
conditions which the Italian cabinet hoped the British government 
would consider as a basis of co-operation between the Entente and 
Italy.
While the Foreign Office endeavoured to negotiate along the 
lines of these proposals, acting as middleman between Italy and
France and Hussia, disturbing reports were being received from 
Sir Rennell Rodd, the British ambassador in Rome, especially during 
the latter half of October, about the vast increase in contraband 
arriving in Italian ports. Many of these consignments stayed, of 
course, in Italy but others, after they were landed, were declared 
in transit, and forwarded to Switzerland or, an it was suspected, to 
Germany. It was no easy matter to determine how much of this 
abnormally large trade, especially in copper, was intended for 
Italian and Swiss needs, and how much was going into German 
consumption, and this for three reasons. (l) Immediately after the
reference 2 continued:
Ambassador in London: Nos bons amis, lea Italiens, attendant 
avec impatience le moment pour voler au secours des 
vainquers.
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opening of hostilities German agents had purchased in Italy
enormous quantities of metals and other contraband so that the great
shortage which resulted in Italy had to be made up. (2) The Italian
army was placing large contracts with its armament firms, which
therefore required abnormally large imports of metal. Indeed, it
was imperative that a potential ally of the Entente should be
unstintingly supplied with these needs. (3) Formerly Switzerland
had imported many metals from Germany in a half-finished state, but
now shortages in Germany forced her to purchase raw materials abroad,
importing them by way of Genoa. Again what proportion of these
metals was for genuine Swiss use, and what was being sent to cover
the shortages in Germany, defied analysis.1
The Admiralty, worried over this unusual metal trad?, ordered
several vessels carrying copper cargoes to Genoa to be detained at
Gibraltar until the ultimate destination of the shipments could be 
2
discovered. The Swiss minister in Italy, J.B. Pioda, reported the 
British and French ministers had hinted to the Italian government 
that British coal supplies to Italy might have to be reconsidered
unless the Italian government could see its way to forbidding the ex-
3
port of contraband to Germany. A few days later the question of 
embargoing coal came up again, when the British asked Italy to forbid
1. Bell, Blocks de. p.103-104.
2. Amold-Forster, Blockade, p. 38. puts the figure of copper seized 
at 10,563 tohs. ‘
3. Pioda-Hoffmann, 24 October 1914. letter, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k), 
Schachtel 17.
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the export of contraband to Switzerland as well, on the assumption
that this material was finding its way to Germany and Austria-Hungary
through the agency of friendly Swiss houses. The Italian prime
minister, Antonio Salandra, asked Pioda to have the Swiss government
intercede with Great Britain in this matter, for any reduction in
trade between the two countries Italy and Switzerland would work to
their mutual disadvantage.^
Federal councillor Hoffmann immediately telegraphed Carlin
in London,explaining to him that the English were threatening to
eliminate Italian-Swiss traffic in goods they considered contraband,
on the ground that this material was going in part to Germany ’dank
der Konnivenz schweizerischer Firmen*, and suggesting that the Federal
Council was prepared to consider forbidding the export of such
materials, although their rights as a neutral did not require them to
2
do so, in order to preserve legitimate Italian-Swiss traffic.
Carlin duly presented an aide memoire at the Foreign Office on 
28 October in which he reminded the foreign secretary that it had been 
the British government who had suggested Switzerland's using the 
railway from Genoa rather than the river from Rotterdam for her 
supplies, which accounted in great measure for the abnormal
1. Pioda-Hoffmann, 26 October 1914* letter, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k),
Schachtel 17*
2. Hoffmann-Carlin, 27 October 1914* telegram, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k), 
Schachtel 17*
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Mediterranean traffic, but stated that the Federal Council was 
disposed as a concession to forbid re-export to Germany and Austria- 
Hungary of articles on the British contraband list, on condition that 
Italian-Swiss trade was not in any way inhibited. With the aide memoire 
Carlin enclosed a list of goods the export of which had already been 
forbidden by the Swiss law.^ The Foreign Office replied a few days 
later that the British government were alive to Switzerland’s problems 
and that they would soon submit to the Swiss government proposals 
designed to obviate the necessity of interfering with Swiss overseas 
imports.^
Meanwhile Sir Rennell Rodd presented to the Italian minister for
foreign affairs two memoranda stating that it was not supposed for a
moment that the Italian authorities were anxious to facilitate an
illicit traffic which would supply Great Britain’s enemies with
ammunition, but that the British government wished to offer general
proposals for regulation of the swollen traffic over the Alps into 
3
Switzerland. The answer to the second memorandum, which had been 
presented on 8 November, took the surprising form of a Royal Decree 
issued on 15 November 1914» In its two articles this decree (a) made 
it illegal for an Italian importer to receive goods in his own name 
and then declare them in transit to Switzerland or Germany, and (b) 
declared that all goods arriving in Italy marked ’to order* (these
1. Carlin-Grey, 28 October 1914» aide memoire. FO 368-1132-64555/14*
2. FO-Carlin, 3 November 1914* note, ibid.
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unnamed consignments especially had been forwarded to the Central 
Empires after being unloaded in Genoa) would be appropriated to the 
use of the state,*
Obviously this was a gesture on the part of the Italian government 
to conform their laws to the Order-in-Council of 29 October 1914« %
the provisions of the Royal Decree, if rigourously enforced, only 
those cargoes addressed to a specific, named consignee in Italy or in 
Switzerland would be allowed to leave Genoa. Furthermore, the 
Italian government undertook to conform its lists of prohibited 
exports to the British contraband list, and to assure the Foreign 
Office that they would grant no licenses for dispensation from this 
prohibition in respect of copper, manganese, aluminium, haematite,
2
iron pyrites, ferro-silicates, nickel, lead, rubber, and petroleum.
The effect of the Royal Decree and the further assurances of the 
Italian government was to stop completely all direct contraband 
traffic from Italy to the Central Powers (though articles on the 
’free list' were still allowed through), and to eliminate all 
ambiguity about the identify of Swiss houses which might be forwarding 
contraband trade thus neutralized, the Foreign Office could direct 
its attention once again to Switzerland.
In early November the Foreign Office had forwarded to Grant 
Duff for his guidance a memorandum outlining the official British
1. Bell, Blockade, p.104.
2. Gazetta Uficiale, 13 November 1914* decree 1232. In effect, this 
Decree made ’continuous voyage' through Italy illegal.
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attitude to Swiss commerce at this stage of the war,'1' The
memorandum noted that the British and French governments had been
in consultation to enact uniform rules by which to minimize trade in
contraband articles without interfering with innocent commerce. The
legal basis of the contemplated measures was to be the Grder-in-
Council of 29 October, declaring confiscatable all shipments of
conditional contraband addressed ’to order* in a neutral land. A
suggested text of the British note to be submitted to the Swiss
government accompanied the memorandum to Grant Duff.
Meanwhile the Swiss minister in London, informed that
proposals were soon to be laid before his government,called at the
Foreign Office on 13 November I9I4 to give Edward Grey *the
strongest assurances* that Switzerland would observe her traditional
neutrality, not forgetting the friendly British attitude at the time
2
of the Sonderbund and of the dispute with Fruesia over Neuchfitel.
A few days later, on 18 November, the British minister in Berne
handed President Hoffmann the note verbale specifying in the exact
terms of the Foreign Office memorandum of 3 November the British
3
attitude toward the confederation in the present war. At the same 
time the French ambassador presented a similar note in the name of 
his government. The points made in these notes are worth examining 
in detail for they constitute the best summary of British policy toward 
Switzerland during the first year of the war.
1. Bell, Blockade, p.105.
2. FO-Grant Duff, 3 November 1914> dispatch, FO 368-1133-6693l/l4*
3. FO-Grant Duff, 14 November 1914, letter, FO 368-II33-71005/I4.
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(1) The Allies are anxious to regulate their right of visit, 
search, and detention in respect of ships carrying contraband to 
neutrals in such a way as to cause the least possible inconvenience. 
They are anxious, however, to distinguish between legitimate imports 
of the neutrals and those which will go to the enemy for carrying
on military and naval operations.
(2) A copy of the Crder-in-Council of 29 October is enclosed. 
There are additions to the list of absolute contraband, and conditional 
contraband to a non-named party ’will be dealt with specially*. The 
British government reserve the right to capture neutral ships carrying 
cargoes of conditional contraband to a neutral country if at any
time it appears that the enemy is drawing supplies from this country.
(3) But as long as the British government are assured that 
conditional contraband to a neutral represents a bona fide import to 
that country, and it is not part of a larger transaction whereby other 
goods already in the country can be released for export, they are 
willing to restrict their right of search to a mere verification of 
the ship*s papers, ^o secure such assurance, the Allied governments 
are anxious to arrive at a guarantee with the government of the
conf ederation•
(4) The guarantee will be worked out on the following lines:
(a) the neutral government will prohibit the export of all classes of 
goods contained in Allied contraband lists which they expect to see 
imported for bona fide home consumption, and (b) such goods, on
receipt by a consignee in Switzerland, will not be declared in transit
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but will fall under the prohibition of export in (a).
(5) In return, the allied gover/jnents undertake that 
veeee1b carrying conditional contraband to a named consignee will 
not be interfered with. On the (Other hand, goods of contraband 
character, in respect of which no satisfactory guarantee on non-re­
export can be obtained, will be considered as suspect and detained 
for investigation and, if necessary, for adjudication by a prize 
court•
(6) The allied governments are particularly concerned about 
oil3, petrol, copper, rubber, hides, leather, food, forage, and 
feeding stuffs. The inclusion of these commodities in the list of 
prohibited exports is essential, but the allies will interfere with 
foodstuffs only when they are manifestly destined for the enemy.
(7) The allied governments suggest that all vessels call at 
a port in the United Kingdom (or at Gibraltar or Sues) to be checked 
and to receive the signal which will allow them to pass unmolested 
through allied naval patrols.^ "
It is important to observe that this document alludes only 
to the re-export of contraband goods in the state in which they were 
received in Switzerland. Nothing is said about their re-export in 
an altered state. Steel bars and smelted copper brought up from 
Genoa could not be sent on to Germany, but if this same steel or 
copper were worked up into finished products, even for example, into
1. Grant buff-Hoffmann, 18 November 1914» note verbale. Pol.Dept. 
2001 (k), Schachtel 17.
\k 6?
steel shell casings or brass granade fuses, F?wiss manufacturers could 
export these articles to the Central Powers under the accepted law
of nations that finished articles constitute a legitimate export 
trade. Negotiations to establish sufficient guarantees against 
the re-export of products finished in Switzerland were to be 
inaugurated first on a private and then cn a semi-public basis only 
after the initial measures against the re-export of unaltered 
contraband were taken by the Federal Council.
President Hoffmann's 'long and ably drafted* reply to the 
joint British-French note of 18 November was delivered on 5 December, 
mid raade three main points: (l) By the terra3 of the Hague
convention, a neutral power i3 forbidden to promulgate prohibitions 
to export which would favour only one belligerent power. The Swiss 
government were satisfied that the Allies had not asked for such 
action and that they appreciated Switserland's need to import from 
both groups of belligerents and therefore to export to both. The 
Federal Council could prohibit exports only in their country's own 
interest, to preserve supplies for themselves. (2) The allegation 
that Switzerland was becoming 'one base d’approvisionnement pour 
l'Allemagne' is exposed as thoroughly false when examined in the 
light of the facts. The facilities of the port of Genoa, insufficient 
for supplying the needs of both Italy and Switzerland in any case, were 
presently choked with imports. Consequently, there were great delays 
in the delivery of goods, so that Switzerland was actually suffering 
from shortages of essentials. (5) As a neutral bound by
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international conventions, the Swiss government could not interfere 
with the transit trade between Italy and Germany. This was Italy*s 
concern not Switzerland’s, as an indication of their readiness to co­
operate with the Allied governments* however, the Federal Council would 
accept, as far as possible, the proposal to conform her list of 
prohibited exports to the Allied contraband list, but emphatically 
reserved the right to grant exceptions to these prohibitions and to 
issue export licenses ’dans dec cas excentionels ouand d*autre raoyens 
feraient defaut r oarer ^ dommage menacant les interlts vitaux 
du pays *
The list of articles the export of which had already been 
prohibited by the Federal Council was enclosed, as well as the 
statistics of Swiss imports, which show some notable reductions:
1913 1914 (to 25 Nov.)
grain 827,933 549,758
copper . 12,569 7»927
lead 7,084 4,506
tin 1,581 850
petroleum 62,943 37,603 (in tons)
The Foreign Office received this reply from the Federal Council 
with some disquiet. Robert Craigie, who was directly responsible for 
negotiating with the Swiss, minuted Grant luff’s telegram summarizing 
the reply with the remark, 'I am afraid that we shall never learn how
1. Hoffmann-Grant Duff, 5 December 1914, note, FO 568-1133*82371/14*
much is really going into Germany through Switzerland until an 
efficient system of observation on the frontier is established*.^ 
tiore disquieting still was the Swiss government *s reservation of the 
right tc grant exceptions to their own prohibitions of export. Taken 
to its logical extreme, this reservation could render the Swiss export 
prohibitions a dead letter. An unlimited number of licenses cculd 
theoretically be issued fcr the contraband goods needed in Germany 
with the result that the general prohibitions against their export 
would become meaningless, the barrier would be breached, arid 
contraband traffic would flow freely into the Central Powers. The 
Contraband Department regarded this reservation as entirely 
unacceptable.
Furthermore, no demands had yet been made regarding the export
of finished products manufactured from contraband raw material
supplied by the allies. Though raw materials might he prohibited of
export, the end products could be, and still were, forwarded to the
Central Powers without interference. This traffic included not only
goods of a specifically military nature, such as binoculars and
zeppelin parts, but also such homely utensils as copper frying pans
which it payed the German government to purchase in Switzerland and
2
melt dovrn in German factories for more martial uses.
1. Graigie’s minute on Grant Duff-FO, 7 December 1914* telegram,
FO 368-1133-79960/14. Bell (Blockade, p,113)> erroneously 
attributes this minute to Sir %re Crowe.
2. Grant Duff-PO, 24 October 1914* telegram, FO 368-1133*63088/14.
Grant Duff-FO,21 November 1914* dispatch, FO 328-1132-76106 '14.
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Having extracted the first concession from the Federal 
Council - that of general export prohibitions largely conformed to 
Allied contraband lists - the Foreign Office determined to increase 
the pressure on the Swiss government to close the two loopholes in 
these export prohibitions, by guaranteeing that no exceptions would 
be granted, and for the first time to embargo all manufactures from 
contraband material, even goods designed for ostensibly peaceful 
purposes. Grant Duff was therefore instructed to deal with the 
Swiss gover ment in the following sense. He was to express the 
satisfaction of his government that the Swiss list of prohibited 
exports conformed so closely to the Anglo-French list, but he was to 
observe that the government were worried about 'exceptional cases'.
The prohibition of export of the raw material itself was inadequate 
when copper, aluminium, nickel, and rubber finished products were 
being purohased by the German government with a view to melting them 
down for military purposes. The British government hoped the Swiss 
would see their way clear to prohibit absolutely the export of goods 
which can be reworked to military uses. Failing such a prohibition by 
the Swiss government, it would be necessary to devise some system by 
which firms receiving raw material will bind themselves not to export 
manufactured articles to Germany.*
Fortunately the British minister in Berne was sufficiently 
aware of the uses to which the Swiss industrial potential could be put
1. FO-Grant Duff, 20 December 1914, telegram, FO 568-1135-82371/14.
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to save the British government from being hoist on their own petard 
by insisting too rigourously on an absolute prohibition of export.
He immediately represented that if the federal government were to 
prohibit all export of articles made from raw materials (such as 
copper) imported from allied countrios, this embargo would be 
prejudicial equally to the Allies as to the Central Pov?ers.^ An 
absolute prohibition would preclude Allied purchases of munitions, 
precision instruments, locomotives, and a host of other manufactures 
of great value to the war effort. !!?here seemed little prospect, in 
any case, that the Swiss government could be induced to agree to so 
foolish an undertaking as embargoing practically the entire export 
trade of the nation. One wonders hew, with even the most 
rudimentary knowledge of economics, Foreign Office officials could 
seriously have suggested to the Swiss government a plan of such 
obvious economic infeasibility. How a nation which had to import 
all her coal and industrial .raw material, 80 percent of her grain, 
and a large proportion of other foodstuffs, could be expected to pay 
for these imports after she had renounced perhaps 2/3 of her thousand 
million franc export trade, is beyond comprehension.
Grant Duff’s representations and more realistic thinking in 
the Contraband Department during the early winter of 1914 gradually 
shifted the attention of the Foreign Office from dealing directly with 
the Swiss government to contacting individual Swiss firms in order
1. Grant Duff-FO, 22 December 1914t telegram, FO 368-1133-85811/14.
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to tighten the blockade. The Swiss government had adopted all
measures short of compromising neutrality and inviting economic
disaster. If they could give no absolute guarantee against re-export
of contraband materials ana manufactures, reasoned the Foreign Office,
what was to prevent individual firms from adopting these measures as
a condition for their receiving goods being delivered in such vast
quantities to Genoa? bn 24 December the foreign Office suggested to
Grant Duff that future blockade policy should be based on a system
of special guarantees from individual firms that they will not export
to the enemy, rather than on a general governmental guarantee.^ A
similar policy had recently been implemented in Holland to the mutual
satisfaction of the British and the Dutch governments. The subsequent
course of the allied blockade in Switzerland was to run along similar
lines, as will be shown in the following chapter.
Meanwhile however, a drop in the imports of copper had induced
several Swiss metal firms actually to petition the British government
to allow them to sign guarantees against re-export in order to bring
2
irax-)orts up to normal. Aubert Grenier and Co. of Cossonay, the 
largest importers of metals and rubber in Switzerland, who were in the 
position to control the ultimate destinecion of raw materials, offered 
in early December tc submit to any checks of the Board of Trade
1. FO-Grant Duff, 25 December 1914* telegram, ibid.
Grant Duff-FO, 27 December 1914> telegram, FO 36S-I153-87543/14*
2. Grant Duff-FO, 21 November 1?14, dispatch, FO 368-1152-76106/14*
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regarding lead,copper, rubber, and other imports,3' Mas chin enfabrik
Perlikon, in a request to buy contraband and restricted articles in
the United Kingdom to keep their Swiss works going, promised that
'Oerlikon would be prepared to undertake and guarantee not to send,
during the present war, any of the materials which it buys today in
2
Great Britain to Germany, Austria, or Turkey *. The Foreign Office 
welcomed this request provided that Oerlikon was prepared not to 
release materials in their possession in a raw or partially 
manufactured state by means of governmental dispensations, or in a 
state of manufacture which would bring it outside the Swiss 
prohibited list.
inis admirable plan to have individual firms provide guarantees 
against re-export was deceptive in its simplicity, 3o complex was 
the nature of Swis3 industry that it was impossible for many firms 
to contemplate binding their hands by this guarantee, even if they had 
wished to do so. Problems of supply, operation, and organization 
prevented most firm3 from working exclusively for one belligerent 
without calling down the retribution which was within the power of the 
other to mete out. It will perhaps be instructive at this point to 
consider the peculiarities of the Swiss industrial system which 
underlay this predicament.
1. J. Valloton (agent of A. Grenier and Co.) -FO, 7 December 1914* 
letter, FO 268-1153-82807/14.
2. D. Gchindler (agent of Oerlikon) -FO, 15 December 1914» letter,
FO 368-1135-83397/14.
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As has been noted,bwiss firms drew their raw materials and 
propellants inaescriminateiy from both groups of belligerents,
Shortages in Germany had forced Swiss businessmen in the early months 
of the war to seek contracts elsewhere for those raw and half-finished 
metals which had formerly been more conveniently purchased from 
German firms. This circumscanoe had the effect of bringing the 
affected dwiss firms more under the economic domination of the Allies. 
This domination was not, however, complete for studies had demonstrated 
the impracticality of supplying Gviss firms with Allied (i.e., British) 
coal with the result that the coal supply monopoly had to be left in 
the hands of the Germane. In the abstract the ikllies were faced with 
three choices; (a) to bring widespread ruin on Swiss industry by 
a complete embargo of all supplies, (b) to supply both raw stuffs 
and the required coal, and then absorb the entire output of Swiss 
industry, and (c) to compromise by allowing Swiss firms a certain 
leeway in their exports to obtain German coal. The first choice was 
as monstrous as the second was impractical; the Allied governments 
therefore selected the thira course of action, the details of which
were worked out in the summer of 1913•
ho less awkward than the problem of supply was that of the 
operational procedures of Swiss -ndustry. owiss industry had never 
been independently self-contained. Through a division of labour and
of operations it iiad integrated itself with the industries of the
surrounding nations, in particular with those of Trance and Germany,
so that the fact of national boundaries played an insignificant rdle
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in the manufacture of fihished articles. Frequently a partially
finished article would crons the frontier several times, being 
reworked in various ways until its completion. Just as it was 
imijrecise to regard such an article as of properly Swiss manufacture, 
so it was more precise to regard Swiss industry as central European 
rather than as exclusively Swiss. These industrial operations 
proceeded of course under an involved system of contracts, sub­
contracts, and trade agreements in an orderly, if at first somewhat 
mystifying way. The general term for these procedures was trafic 
de i-erfectionnement. which included two distinct operations, an active 
and a passive phase. When a Swiss firm purchased raw materials, sent 
them to be worked up in a foreign factory, which presumably could do 
the job more quickly and cheaply, enc then re-imported the partially
worked articles in order to finish them back in Switzerland, this was 
*
known as passif de perfectionnement. On the other hand, actlf de 
perfectionncnie-nt was called into operation when, for example, a semi­
finished product of a German factory was sent to Switzerland to be 
finely finished by, say, a rare and expensive grinding machine in a 
Winterthur factory, arid was afterwards re-exported to Germany• ^ Is 
such a product Swiss, or is it German? 'hat, in a word, constitutes 
the naturalization of a manufactured item?
1. Bell, Blockade, p.301.
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LVen more impatient of facile solution was the problem 
presented by the organization of Swiss industry. Many of the 
largest industrial and commercial firms hact been developed during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century by foreign interests, 
who controlled these firms in whole or in part. Generally speaking, 
French control was strong in the watch, condensed milk, chocolate, 
and construction firms of West Switzerland, while German influence 
predominated in the machine industry of the North-East. Further, 
organizations of genuinely Swiss origin often expanded across the 
border to France and Germany, opening factories on foreign soil, or 
acting as holding companies for a wide diversity of interests.
A case in point is presented by the Swiss engineering house, Brown, 
hoveri of Baden (Canton Aargau). fhe main plant at Baden produced 
engines, turbines, special castings, and other heavy industrial 
products for the manufacture of which they impprted copper from the 
United States, tin from the British Btraits Colonies, and steel and 
coal from Germany. But the same firm owned or enjoyed controlling 
interest in six other manufacturing houses in Switzerland, six 
firms in France, three in Germany, one in Austria, and Brown, Boveri
and Co., Ltd., of London. In all they maintained controlling interest__
in some thirty-two subsidiaries of one sort or another in five 
nations/’ in the manner of European cartels, the destiny of this
1. Fkipworth (assistant commercial attache)-Grant Buff, 27 March 1915» 
report on Brown, Boveri Company, FO 382-402- 36662/15.
72
great industrial empire was presided over by an interlocking 
directorate of some seventy members among whom were found Brown 
and Boveri, National Councillor Julius Frey, V/alther Kathenau, 
chairman of the Allgemeine E'lektizitats Gesellschaft. National 
Councillor iimst Schmidheiny, dans Bulzer, and F. jBarker of Surrey. 
Simultaneously the Brown, Boveri firms were producing turbines for 
Great Britain, chemicals for France, electric motors for Germany, 
and engine parts for Austria. Was this company friend or foeV A 
plan put forth to control the Swiss plants by sequestering the French 
and British affiliates was considered by the Allied governments, but 
rejected on legal grounds since the branches were manifestly French 
or British even though their shares were foreign held." Brown,
Boveri was not unique in the complexity of its supranational structure. 
All such firms were suspected by the Allies of commerce with the enemy.
All these factors intrinsic to the nature of Swiss industrial 
and commercial firms made it difficult for them to pledge their 
allegiance to Allied war aims. The firms had first to be examined 
and their relative dependence on each of the belligerent camps 
estimated before such undertakings could be entered upon. Negotiations 
would have been more difficult except for the appointment in January
1. Memorandum by R.H. Brand on the Brown, Boveri Company, 26 April
1915, FO 382-402-54146/15•
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1915 cf George A. Skipworth as assistant commercial attache for 
Switzerland.'* bkipworth had been an agent of Westinghouse Company, 
u good linguist, with a broad knowledge of Swiss commerce, who had 
showed great ability and resource in assisting with the repatriation
of British subjects stranded in Switzerland at the commencement of
2
the war. For the duration of the conflict he was to be Great 
Britain’s principal authority on the activities of Swiss firms, 
conscientious to report irregularities, but highly esteemed and well 
liked by the Swiss. His first task was to secure guarantees from 
either individual firms, or syndicates of firms engaged in similar 
enterprises, ’for whose bona fides and reliability the Swiss 
government would vouch*, that Allied materials would be consumed only 
in Switzerland or exported to the central powers only with the 
authorization of Allied governments.
Looking back over 1914, the contraband officials in the Foreign 
Office could well be satisfied with the progress made in containing 
dwiss exports to the Central Empires. Traffic on the Hhine had been 
stopped, Italy had placed severe restrictions on her trade with 
. . .    ,
1. Grant Duff-FO, 2 January 1915, telegram, FO 3&2-402-792/15.
2. FO-Treasury, 13 January lp, letter, FO 3^2-402-2673/15*
3. Grant Duff-Hoffmann, 14 January 1915, note vorbaie. FO 3&2-405-
8673/15. ...
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Switzerland, and the Swiss government had done much b,v prohibiting 
exports to accommodate to Allied blockade policy, Tie work of 
inducing Swiss firms to accept individual guarantees to restrict 
enemy trade even farther had begun. It was net to be an easy 
task.
S.S.S. ESTABLISHED
The delivery of Swiss imports through Genoa fell off 
appreciably after the publication of the Royal Decree of 13 
November 1914*^ In their anxiety to retain the good will of 
the Foreign Office, then championing their cause in the Allied 
camp, the Italian government were enforcing their contraband law 
with great rigour. Consequently enormous stocks of grain, coffee, 
oil, and metals consigned ’to order' in Switzerland crowded the 
quays and warehouses of the port. Although the Royal Decree 
prohibited the export of all goods consigned 'to order' only to 
keep them from reaching Germany, the prohibition was causing 
shortages in Switzerland. The Swiss government naturally took 
exception to what they considered the virtual inclusion of 
Switzerland in the Allied blockade, especially since consignment 
'to order' had always been a standard commercial practice, and 
there was little doubt, in view of domestic shortages, that goods 
so consigned would be used in Switzerland.
1. See Chapter II,pp. 5 "1-58-
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The Swiss Department of Public Economy therefore dispatched 
National Councillor Alfred Prey, president of the Schweizerischer 
Handel-und Industrieverein, to Rome to plead with the Italian 
authorities for sweet reasonableness in releasing these commodities. 
Prey arrived at the beginning of January, armed with statistics 
showing that Swiss imports for 1914 were less than those for 1913*
He demanded the release of all goods shipped before 13 November 1914 
(when the Decree was promulgated) and urged that all shipments 
actually in Italy by 31 December 1914 be exempted from the prohibition 
of export since no warning nor period of grace had been provided for
in the Decree’s text* The Swiss government, he added, were prepared
1
to guarantee the non-export of these goods.
The Italian government were in a quandary. The commercial 
advantages of maintaining or increasing trade with Switzerland were 
tempting, but the political repercussions in Great Britain had also 
to be considered. At a time when negotiations for joining the 
Allies required the utmost tact, Baron Sonnino, the foreign minister, 
was loath to chance offending the British government by making 
exceptions to the law enacted specifically to win British favour.
Nor had the British policy encouraged exceptions. During the 
previous November, the Italian government had expressed to the Swiss 
their willingness to release all goods afloat before the publication 
of the Royal Decree, if the British did not object. But since the 
Foreign Office had urged the export prohibition on the Italian
1. Rodd-F0,7 January 1915* telegram, FO 382-405-2127/15.
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government in the first place and were then pressing to make the 
Italian contraband embargo absolute, they had at the time deprecated 
allowing any exceptions and so losing their locus standi for the 
future. They had intimated to the Italian government that Italy and 
Switzerland must settle the matter together, but added ominously that 
what the Italian government decided was to be on their own 
responsibility.’*' In the circumstances, the Italian government 
naturally demurred, and the export situation worsened during the 
early winter.
%  January, however, a new mood had come over the Foreign
Office. The Swiss minister's continual and indignant representation
about British hindrance to Swiss trade, and reports of growing
irritation among Swiss businessmen who blamed the English for all
their woes, began to cause concern in the Contraband Department.
At the same time apprehension grew that Switzerland was 'really badly
off' and that care must be exercised not to starve her. Sir E|yre
Crowe maintained in his precise way that 'it is the Italians and not we
who are holding up the consignments for Switzerland which, being
consigned 'to order* to Genoa, there fall under the Italian prohibition
of export', but thought it wise in any case to have the British
ambassador give his 'good offices' to urge the Italian government to
2
meet the Swiss requirements 'in a generous spirit'. Rodd was
1. Rodd-FO, 7 January 1915. telegram, FO 582-405-2127/15.
2. FO-Rodd, 50 November 1914. telegram, Fo 568-1154-74518/14
5. Minute by Crowe on Grant Duff-P0,5 January 1915, telegram,
FO 582-405-1658/15.
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therefore instructed to recommend the Swiss proposals to the 
Italian government and to help Frey to come to a settlement 
satisfactory to the Swiss government.^
The encouragement of the British ambassador enabled Baron 
Sonnino to reach such an agreement with Alfred Frey during January. 
All goods which arrived in Italy by the end of 1914 were allowed 
forward to Switzerland. Cereals, petrol, and benzine were addressed 
to the federal authorities who gave firm assurances that no export
permit would be given for these commodities. A list of all Swiss
2
imports, their quantity and destination, was given to Rodd.
Just when the Foreign Office believed they had won the good 
will of both the Swiss and the Italians by their reasonable attitude 
in aiding this mutual commerce, and were hoping to utilize this 
advantage for obtaining further concessions from Switzerland, an 
event occurred which called into question the motivation and 
integrity of the British government, by giving the impression that 
they were taking away with the left hand what they gave with the 
right.
Reports began to circulate that American and Italian shipping 
firms were refusing to accept goods for delivery in Switzerland,
1. FO-Rodd, 9 January 1915, telegram, FO 582-405-2127/15.
2. Rodd-FO,22 January 1915, dispatch, FO 582-405-10075/15.
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even to named consignees. The alleged reason for this refusal 
was a British warning threatening all vessels shipping Swiss cargoes 
with detention by British Admiralty authorities at Gibraltar for 
having suspect goods on board. Belays are naturally costly in the 
shipping business and the possibility of having to discharge a cargo, 
or worse a partial cargo, for adjudication by a prize court sufficed 
to cause a rejection of Swiss business. The Banca Commercials in 
Rome had begun the movement by ordering its subsidiary, the Havigazione 
Generale, one of the largest shipping lines, to refuse all Swiss trade. 
The British ambassador suspected that the Banca Coinmerciale which, 
as intermediary for the extention of German trade in Italy, was 
menaced by the disabilities the new Italian laws imposed on German 
importers, had done so specifically to undermine British influence
2
and add fuel to the fires of general irritation against the blockade. 
Having received no notification of a British warning, Rodd assumed 
that rumours from the Navigazione Generale case accounted for the 
general refusal to take Swiss business. Dismissing the whole affair 
as a German propaganda stunt, he suggested the publication of a 
dementi in the press, exonerating the British government from all 
responsibility.
1. Rodd-FC, 5 January 1915* telegram, FO 582-405-1658/15*
F.Ritter (Swiss Minister in Washington) -W.J. Bryan (Secretary 
of State) 8 January 1915* letter, FR 1915 Supplement, p*303*
2. Rodd-FO, 51 December 1914* dispatch, FO 382-485-2416/15*
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The Foreign Office concurred, and issued a communique in
this sense which was widely reported in the pressUnfortunately,
unknown to the Foreign Office, the British government was fully
responsible. The head of the trade division of the Admiralty,
without informing the Foreign Office, had in fact warned steamship
lines in the Atlantic trade that all cargoes with a Swiss destination
would be subjected to the severest scrutiny, and shippers would be
2
well advised to refuse all such cargoes.
The embarrassment caused the Foreign Office when the facts 
were brought to light was extreme, especially in consequence of the 
denial they iiad issued to the international news services, and of 
Sir iidward Grey's firm assurance to Carlin that far from intending 
to injure the interests of Switzerland, the British government had
1. The article in the Swiss Journal de Geneve for 15 January 1915 
ran:
II parait que certaines lignes transatlantiques 
en Amerique et en Italie refusent d*entreprendre 
le transport de merchandises adressees h. des 
maisons suisses et que ce refus a ete attribud 
dans certains milieux a des mesures sv^lrles 
de la part des autorites anglaises. Cette 
demiere deduction est enti&rement sans fondement, 
car le gouvernement britanidque est au contraire 
de plus soucieux d'^viter tout ce qui pourrait 
entraver le transport d'articles reellement 
destines \ la Suisse mSme.
2. Bell, Blockade, p.303
absolutely nothing to do with the refusals of the shipping concerns. 
The naval representatives on the Contraband and Restrictions 
Committees, impatient of Foreign Office subtlety, and acting on 
the supposition that Switzerland was an enemy arsenal, had not 
informed the Foreign Office of the admiralty order. hVen after the 
expos£ they persisted in this harsh attitude to Switzerland for 
military reasons, entering into acrimonious debates with Cecil Hurst 
the Foreign Office representative on the Restrictions Committee, who 
argued equally fiercely for concessions to the Swiss for diplomatic
reasons, while 'the other members of the Committee looked on with
2
considerable amusement'•
These internecine struggles in the British government did not 
escape the notice of the .Swiss minister who reported in early 1915s 
*ich bin in der Ansicht bestgrkt. dass in alien diesen Fragen das 
Auswarti&e Amt selbst unter der Diktatur des Kriegsministeriums 
(Kitchener) und der Admiralitat (Churchill) zu leiden hat'.  ^ But 
the event, instructive as it may be in illustrating the uncertainty 
of early blockade policy and the lack of coordination between the
1. Carlin-Pol. Dept., 20 January 1915* dispatch, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k) 
Schachtel 54«
2. Minute by Hurst on aide memoire of Carlin, 3 February 1915*
FO 382-405-13200/15.
3. Carlin-Pol.Dept., 20 January 1915* dispatch, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k) 
Schachtel 54*
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interests of the individual government departments, was not 
calculated to inspire confidence in the straightforwardness of the 
British government and of the Foreign Office who were actually seeking 
a reasonable and negotiated solution to the Swiss problem through the 
efforts of George Skipworth, the newly appointed commercial 
representative,
The incident had the advantage from the British viewpoint, 
however, cf bringing home clearly to the Swiss the need for a speedy 
settlement of the import problem, for it showed how powerless they 
were to defend their commercial rights if the Allies determined to 
eliminate their supplies in the interest of the blockade. In their 
determination to keep contraband from the enemy, the military arm 
of the blockade both in Great Britain and France did not, or would 
not, recognize the special problems presented by the complex nature of 
Swiss industry. The respective foreign offices, with their 
particular interest in preserving the good will of the neutrals, 
naturally adopted a more understanding attitude, but the fact remained 
that supplies reaching Switzerland were dwindling, and genuine 
shortages of non-ferrous metals, cotton, and oil were being 
experienced.^
Since the Swiss government felt constrained by considerations 
of neutrality and free enterprise not to interfere directly in Swiss 
commerce, a solution to the import problem had to be sought along non-
1. National Councillor Cailler -V/alter Kunciman (Board of Trade), 21 
January 1915. letter, FO 382-403-9685/15.
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official lines. The foundation in Holland on 23 November 1914 of the
N.O.T. (hederlandsche Overzee Trust Kaatschappij) shed some light on
how this might be accomplished. The N.O.T. was a private organization
with a capitalization of 2.4 million guilders, recognized by both
grouts of belligerents as the sole importer, distributer, and
exporter of contraband goods in that nation. It was entirely the
creation of Dutch businessmen who accepted full responsibility for all
imports and guaranteed their non-export to the enenjy. No juridical
ties existed between the trust and the Dutch government, so that
neutrality was in no way compromised.^ The N.O.T. appeared to solve
the two problems of neutral commerce, for by winning the confidence of
blockade authorities it provided for ample imports, and at the same
time, since it was a private concern, it avoided the onus of
governmental interference in free enterprise. It transformed the
doctrine of continuous voyage from a disputed legal rule into a
workable contract between businessmen, and freed the Dutch government
from the invidious task of imposing restrictions on the nation's
commerce. As a businessman's arrangement for stopping enemy supplies,
the N.O.T. was regarded as the first practical plan of economic 
2
warfare.
1. Siney, op.cit..%40.
2. Bell, Blockade, p.72.
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On 7 December 1914 the members of the Zffrcher ilandelskainmer
suggested that an organization similar to the N.O.T. might be 
established in Switzerland to supervise the distribution of imports. 
The Swiss government was unwilling at first to take the initiative in 
organizing a trust, since they hoped for equally favourable results 
from individual agreements between Swiss firms or syndicates of 
firms and the Allied governments, which Skipworth was trying to 
arrange. It was felt in informed circles that the Federal Council 
’would be grateful if they could be overlooked in this matter as 
they would then have no accounts to render or complaints to hear 
from belligerents on the other side’.^"
Nevertheless, the Swiss minister in Great Britain stopped in 
at the Hague on his way back from a visit to Switzerland to observe 
the structure and working of the N.O.T. In a conversation with 
Sir Eyre Crowe on 19 January 1915 Carlih mentioned the N.O.T. in a 
general way and wondered, without committing his government, about 
the possibility of a similar organization for Switzerland. Crowe 
replied that the British government would welcome the establishment of
a Swiss import trust of any type which would aid commerce without
2
allowing contraband to reach the enemy. In fact, on 14 January,
1. Professor F.F. Roget (University of Geneva) - J.A. Spender, 12 
January 1915* letter (forwarded to the Foreign Office), FO 382-403'
12540/15.
2. Rotes by Sir Eyre Crowe on a conversation with the Swiss Minister 
on 19 January 1915- FO 382-405-7995/15.
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Grant Duff and Jean Beau (the French Ambassador) had presented a 
joint note verbale to the Swiss minister for foreign affairs observing 
that where absolute government prohibitions of export were impossible, 
their respective governments would be satisfied with proper guarantees 
either from individual firms or syndicates of houses engaged in similar 
enterprises. 1
The French ambassador favoured the establishment of a number of
independent syndicates, such as a Nitrate Trust or a Copper Trust,
which would be dealt with severally and which would accept responsibility
for tbe proper use of specific imports. It was assumed that these
syndicates would be ereated under the 'sponsorship' of the Swiss
2
government who would verify their operations. The British government 
felt, however, that the difficulties involved in the supervision of 
many syndicates would be greater than those involved in overseeing a 
single trust, and expressed their preference that negotiations be
opened for the creation of a general fiduciary organization on the
3
lines of the N.O.T. By early February the French came around to the 
Foreign Office view and were ready to co-operate with the British in
1. Grant Duff/Beau-Pol.Dept., 14 January 1915* joint note verbale,
FO 582-405-8675/15.
2. Carlin-FQ, 19 January 1915* letter, FO 582-405- 7226/15*
5* FO-Carlin, 26 January 1915* letter, ibid.
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the establishment of a general trust, Craigie believed the Swiss
government would favour private initiative in this matter so as to
preserve their own absolutely neutral position, though of course
nothing could be done ’without their approval and consent'.*
Although the Federal Council did in fact continue in their
cautious policy of allowing private concerns to take the lead in
negotiating trust organizations, they gave their full official
support to obtain non-ferrous metals, especially copper, whose shortage
threatened serious work stoppage and wholesale unemployment in Swiss
factories. In order to give the British government every possible
guarantee, the Swiss government began in January to purchase for their
own account the copper held up in Gibraltar on Admiralty orders since
2
the previous autumn. Consignments ve^e to be addressed to the 
Commissariat des Guerres de l'Arm^e Federale at Berne, and an absolute 
guarantee against re-export, even for temporary re-export for 
finishing in German factories, was granted.^ Eventually the Federal
1. Minute by Craigie on Roget-Spender, 2 February 1915* FO 382-403- 
12540/15.
2. Carlin-FO, 11 January 1915, letter, FO 382-403-4021/15.
Admiralty-FO, 23 January 1915, letter, FO 382-403-9184/15*
3. Carlin-FO, 3 February 1915, aide memoire.FO 382-405-13200/15*
Two Swiss army organizations were concerned with imports:
l) Commissariat des Guerres (Oberkriegskommissariat - O.K.K.) 
until May 1915* 2) Commissariat des Guerres de l'Armee Federale
(Armeekrie^.skommissariat j-A.K.K.) charged with the supply of other 
necessities for the arnjy on a war footing.
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Council was able to purchase 1385 tons of the metal in the United
States as a substitute for the original consignments which had since
the autumn been sold by the Prise Court at Gibraltar or requisitioned
for Allied military use. 1 AVen though a statistical report on the
copper trade by the assistant Commercial Attach^ in Berne confirmed
Sir Etyre Crowe in his impression 'that the suspicion against Swiss
dealings in regard to copper have been much exaggerated and are
2
largely unreasonable’, the subsequent delivery of the 1385 tons
provides a saga of delay, obstructionism, mutual suspicion, and 
3
frustration.
Government purchase of metal (and a few other commodities)^ 
was a temporary expedient. Meanwhile the Federal Council were 
lending their unofficial support to encouraging private fiduciary 
agreements between Swiss firms and the Allied authorities. In early 
March the iwiss minister in London forwarded to the Foreign Office 
a model charter for a syndicate of rubber and of metal firms whose
1. FG-Carlin, 2 March 1915* letter, FC 382-405-23095/15-
Car]in-FO, 7 April 1915* letter, FO 382-405-40620/15.
2. Minute by Crowe on G.P. Skipworth's report of 24 March 1915»FO 382-
405-36649/15.
3. Bell, Blockade, pp.% 2-303-
4. In January 1915 the Federal Council concluded an oil agreement with 
the French. Thereafter, petroleum was consigned to the Swiss 
government according to an exact ration.
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principal organizer appears to have been a Colonel Schindler, who
had met difficulties in purchasing copper for hi* own account#^
The charter of the metal syndicate a3 originally proposed 
contained 23 articles, establishing it as a corporation under Swiss
law, providing guarantees against re-export, and levying fines against
2
infractions of its rules. The Foreign Office found the jjiroposals
open to various criticisms since the guarantee against re-export
was not absolute, the fines seemed insufficient, and the seat of the
trust was to be located in Zurich, 'the center of German influence
in Switzerland'# Pending the revision of this charter, the Foreign
office proposed to the War Trade .Department the suspension of
3
licenses for further consignments of copper to Switzerland, and
instructed tue British ambassador in Paris to urge the French
government not to allow some 650 tons of copper through to
Switzerland, since 'nothing should be done which might indirectly
4
weaken our power of bargaining'. Licensing of rubber exports
1. Skipworth-Grant buff, 18 March 1915, letter, Fu 382-4C5-33993/15.
2. Carlin-FO, 1 Ilarch 1915. letter, containing the charter of the 
model syndicate, PC 382-405-23740/15•
3. FO-War Trade Department, 17 March 1915* letter, FO 382-405-31682/15# 
4# FO-Bertie, 23 March 1915, telegram, FO 382-405-32772/15#
f
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as well was temporarily suspended by the British government. In 
their reply to the Swiss government regarding the rubber and metal 
syndicate proposals, the Foreign Office made it plain that they would 
prefer not to confine future negotiations to dealing with individual 
commodities like rubber and metal, but to extend their scope so that 
all goods on British contraband or prohibited lists could be consigned 
to a general trust organization. To assist these negotiations, 8ir 
Francis Uppenheimer was being sent from the Hague to Berne
Sir Francis Oppenheiiaer nad been consul-general at Frankfurt, 
and later commercial attache at Berlin. "hen the war broke out he 
was assigned to the Hague as commercial attache, and there negotiated 
the instrument which established the B#C.T. At a meeting of tlie 
Contraband Committee in late February he was chosen to seek a similar 
agreement with the Swiss government, since negotiations in Berne
2
for a general trust under private auspices were making no progress. 
Cppenheimer left the Hague on 4 March, stopping in at London for 
talks with the Swiss minister and for instructions from the Foreign 
Office, and in Paris to confer with Jean Gout, vice president of 
the newly formed Comite de Restriction des Approvisionnements et du 
Commerce de llEnneiai1 which was entrusted with gathering information 
on enemy commerce and especially on Swiss trade with the Central Powers.^
1. FO-Lord Acton (Chared d1Affaires), 21 March 1915» telegram,
FO 382-405-2995/15.
2. FO-Sir A. Johnstone (British minister at the Hague), 26 February 
1915, telegram, FO 382-405-23661/15.
3. Siney, op.cit.. pp.72-3*
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Oppenheiroer gathered from his interview with Gout that the
attitude of the French government toward the idea of a general Swiss
fiduciary organization was favourable but unreasonably severe.
They envisaged, for example, a complete embargo on deliveries to Swiss
fir^s with any German connection whatsoever. Goods would be
forwarded only to French-Swiss firms, leaving German-Swiss firms to
fend for themselves as best they could. Goods in ti*ansit through
France from England to Switzerland were being detained by French
customs authorities who demanded that British exporters apply to them
for French export licenses. Oppenhcimer suspected that this was done
not only to keep contraband from Switzerland but to prevent 'British
firms obtaining a footing in Swiss markets in competition with the
French'. He was inclined to negotiate for the best possible
arrangements with the Swiss, if necessary independently of the French,
in the hope that when presented with a fait accompli the French
government would be induced to abandon some of their extreme demands,
1
and take a more benign attitude to British exports. The Foreign 
Office regarded this as a satisfactory procedure, and while they 
opened discussions with the French government to ensure freedom of 
transit for British goods, Oppenheimer went on alone to Berne to
1. Grant-Buff-FO, 9 April 1915, telegram, FO 382-405-41705/15.
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negotiate with the Swiss authorities.^
Meanwhile the Swiss Political Department had been besieged
with suggestions from commercial interests both in Switzerland and
in England to help conclude an agreement with the Allies to normalize
trade which was being stiffled by uncertainty and mistrust about the
2
ultimate destination of Swiss imports. Moreover, the Reprisals 
Order-in-Council of 11 March 1915. vhich stated the Allied intention 
to stop all German trade, imports and exports alike, without reference 
to its contraband or non-contraband character, presaged, if anything, 
a harsher line on neutral commerce in the months to come. Copper and 
rubber imports had ceased pending the formation of acceptable 
syndicates, and many shipping firms persisted in their refusal to 
carry Swiss goods.^ The French had begun to detain even British 
shipments. Faced with the threat of widespread paralysis of Swiss 
industry and the apparent incompetence of private concerns to 
negotiate a general settlement, Federal Councillor Hoffmann, the 
chief of the Political Department, had little choice but to appoint 
a representative to discover what terms the British had to offer.
The choice fell on National Councillor Alfred Frey, who had negotiated 
the agreement with Italy during January. In the present negotiations
1. FO-Grant Duff, 20 April 1915. telegram, ibid.
2. e.g., M. Lachenal-Bbl.Dept., 4 February 1915* letter, Pol.Dept.
2001 (k), Schachtel 14• Messrs Heymans (London)-Carlin,17 February
1915* letter, ibid.
3. Rodd-FO, 26 April 1915. dispatch, FO 382-406-50163/15•
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he was authorized only to ’discuss* Oppenheimer's proposals and to 
submit the results of these discussions to the Political Department. 
This cautious policy of the Swiss foreign secretary was dictated, of 
course, by fear of appearing unneutral, or of favouring a segment of 
Swiss business.
Meetings between Frey and Oppenheimer began on 12 April. Sir
Francis presented a private informal expos^, intended to serve as a
point de depart for subsequent discussion, and Frey submitted a list
of fourteen Swiss citizens who could be regarded as candidates for
the board of the proposed trust organization. During the course of
the subsequent meetings which took place over a two week period,
Oppenheimer called on Sir Henry Angst, the British consul general
at Zurich, to discuss the list of candidates, and Frey conferred
with the Political Department and with leading Swiss businessmen about
the British proposals which he had received ’more favourably than 
2
expected*.
Oppenheimer*s plan envisaged a trust organization in two 
tiers. The supreme superintending authority, known as the Societl 
de Surveillance, was to comprise seven private individuals whose 
'absolute good faith and integrity' were to be guaranteed by the 
Federal Council, but which was to be of a private character. A 
representative of the British government, to whom the books of the
1. Oppenheimer, op.cit. pp.253#256.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 19 April 1915, dispatch, FO 382-406-46201/15.
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organization were to be open, should enjoy a certain measure of 
supervision in the society’s activity. The Society was to meet at 
least twice weekly in Berne and perform a threefold function:
(l) to supervise the Swiss import trade by acting as the unique 
consignee of all goods imported into Switzerland, and to oversee 
the distribution of all these supplies, (2) to advise the Federal 
Council in methods of trade supervision (prohibition of exports, 
frontier control, gathering of statistics, and so forth), (5) to 
suggest punitive measures for violations of commercial laws, 3uch as 
smuggling, to be meted out by the federal authorities.
Under the Societe de Surveillance were to be a group of 
syndicats induetriels, organized along the lines of the Metal 
Syndicate, which had just come into being after a revision of the 
originally proposed charter. All Swiss firms should join the 
proper syndicate according to the type of materials they required.
The director of each syndicate would distribute these materials pro 
rata to its members. Each syndicate was to deposit a cautionary sum, 
representing several times the value of goods in hand, with the 
superintending Societe. The funds would be deposited in the 
National Bank and the interest would be used to meet the operating 
expenses of the Societe de Surveillance. In the event of a breach 
of export regulations by a firm, the sum it deposited was to be 
confiscated and the firm prosecuted for fraud.^
1. Memorandum by Oppenheimer enclosed in Grant Duff-FO, 19 April 1915* 
ibid. Societe Suisse de Surveillance Economique.1915-1921.
Rapport Interieur (Berne,1921), p.20.
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The Germans were invited to use the services of the proposed
trust, as was the case with the N.O.T. in Holland, but they preferred
their own recently devised system of barter by which they exported
goods to Switzerland only in exchange for specified imports from
that country, and so declined to join."*- TheGerman government appear
to have applied their system scrupulously and had recently extended
its scope by refusing to allow German firms to supply Swiss
manufacturers with certain raw materials or finished parts, unless
the Swiss firms undertook not to export to the Allies goods to which
the Germans objected. A committee of Swiss manufacturers of machines
joumied to Berlin to plead for less harsh treatment at the very time
2
when the Oppenheimer-Frey negotiations were in progress. The 
Foreign Office regarded the German demands as playing into their 
hands and saw them as a strong inducement for the Swiss to come to 
terms with Sir Francis Oppenheimer.
In the course of their discussions Oppenheimer and Frey 
decided that in the interests of impartial neutrality no British 
representative would sit on the supervisory board which should not, 
however, be entirely private as was the N.O.T., but semi-official in 
so far as its members were actually to be appointed by the Federal 
Council.^ All policy decisions, excepting routine business, were
1. Sir Francis Oppenheimer, Stranger Within (London, i960), p.256. 
He quotes J. Jastrow, Volkerrecht und Wirtschaftskrieg (Breslau,
1917), p.32.
2. Grant-Duff-FC, 15 April 1915, telegram, FO 382-4O6-44666/I5.
3. Oppenheimer, op.cit.. pp.255-56.
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likewise to be submitted for the approval of the Federal Council. 
Oppenheimer was confident - he later admitted over-confident - that 
within the syndicates jealousy between members of conflicting racial 
sympathies would facilitate the necessary supervision."*" More 
intricate was the problem of the continuance of transit trade from 
Italy, and of finishing traffic (trafic de oerfectionnement) with 
Germany. A partial solution to the transit trade difficulty was 
provided by the secret treaty of London of 26 April in which Italy 
pledged to enter the war against Austria-Hungary, but the trafic 
de perfectionneraent demanded much patient explanation to allay Allied 
suspicions that under this guise their goods were used to the 
benefit of the German war effort.
For the information of the Foreign Office, Oppenheimer 
produced a lengthy study of this traffic in which he showed that 
imported raw materials such as copper were of little value to 
Switzerland unless linked to manufacturing in Germany. He strongly 
advocated permitting the continuation of the improvement trade under 
strict limitations of time (three months in Germany) for working the 
articles and narrow tolerances (ten percent) for wastage. Mutual 
profit minimized the danger of seizure by the Germans, while the 
limited amounts involved took away the force of the objection that
1. Ibid., p.255
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1
such traffic would provide valuable employment for German workmen. 
Eventually the contraband committee conceded the principle of 
improvement traffic, and its regulations were written in the final 
draft of the bye-laws of the Society.
On 26 April, after a final conversation with Frey, Oppenheimer 
submitted three documents for the consideration of the Federal 
Council. They were the constituti n of the Soci&tl Suisse de 
Econornique.as the trust was to be called, a list of its bye-laws,
and the constitution of the metal syndicate, to be used as a model
2
for all other syndicates." Frey passed on Oppenheimer*s proposals 
to Federal Councillor Edmund Schulthess, the head of the Department 
of Public Economy, and to Hoffmann, the foreign minister, who 
tentatively agreed to the terras on behalf of the Federal Council on 
9 May.^
In a long and detailed report, dated 11 May, the Swiss 
Political Department recounted for the benefit of the Federal 
Council the history of the events leading to the Oppenheiraer-Frey 
negotiations, and explained why the acceptance agreed upon was
1. Report of Sir Francis Oppenheimer on Trafic de Perfectionnement, 
^ May 1915, FO 382-**G 6-5^5/15.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 28 April 1915, telegram, FO 332-**06-50836/15.
3. GrantDuff-FO, 9 May 1915, telegram, FO 332-^6- 571 W l 5
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advisable. The report stated frankly that since the trust did 
violence to the right of choice and diminished economic freedom, no 
member of the Federal Council could be found to agme to it if times 
were ’normal*. Under the present circumstances the Political 
Department was convinced that there was no alternative to its 
acceptance since the Allies ruled the seas, the harbours, and the 
railway lines. The proposed organization, objectionable as it might 
be, would cause less inconvenience in the long run than individual 
contracts to which Swiss firms had been hitherto forced to submit.
These contracts stipulated the presence of Allied inspectors on the 
premises of Swiss factories, and rut account books at their disposal. 
More seriously they favoured French controlled organizations in 
western Switzerland to the prejudice of firms owned by Germans or by 
German speaking Swiss
The trust ought not to be regarded as set up against the 
interests of Germany and of Austria-Hungary who would be accorded 
similar privileges if requested. These governments had been kept 
au courant of the negotiations and r alized that their own position 
would not be improved if Switzerland refused to accept the proposed 
trust, for Switzerland would be deprived of necessary raw materials
1. e.g. Gebr. Volkart (Winterthur)-Pol.Dept., 28 May 1915$ letter, Pol. 
Dept. 2001 (k), Schachtel 7« This firm claimed that officials in 
Port Said were discriminating between Deutschweizer and Welschsch- 
weizer firms. An investigation was begun, but Carlin reported in 
September that *1* enquete ... n*a men£ ci ai/cim r&sultat*.
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and other imports, without the slightest advantage accruing to the
Central iiimpir s.^
The Federal Council agreed to accept the suggested trust
2>
organization in all its essential points, but pledged the Political
Department in further negotiations to insist on a system of exchan es
of Allied goods with the Central iSrapires, and on upholding international
tre ties regarding transit trade. They also felt it essential, in the
interests of wartime neutrality and of post-war economy, to continue
3
to keep Germany informed of ail the details on these negotiations.
On 13 Hay the draft constitution of the proposed trust, its bye- 
laws, and the statutes of the metal trust were reviewed by a sub­
committee of the Restriction of Fneray Supplies Committee under Sir 
Francis Hopwood. Several minor revisions were made by this sub­
committee, including a b,ye-law to furnish the Allied governments with 
a monthly statement of the society's operations, but the draft was
regarded as generally satisfactory. It was then submitted to the
k
Cabinet for their approval. Sir Francis Gppenheimer, after
1. Report of the Political Department on the proposed trust organi­
zation, 11 May 1915, SVG SSS G3 1915-1919, Schachteln 1-3.
2. Pol.Dept.-Darlin, 19 May 19&5, telegram, FG 382-406-63146/15*
3* Prot col of the Meeting of the Federal Council, 18 May 1915* RVD
333 G3 1915-1919, Schachtel 1-3.
4. Draft constitution, etc., and minutes of the sub-committee, 13 May
1913, FO 382-406-59183/13.
stopping briefly in Paris to inform J. Gout (Comit£ de Restriction) 
of the progress of the negotiations and leave a copy of its results 
for French approval,^ had r turned to London to report on conditions 
in Switzerland and to answer possible objections to the proposed 
trust.
The Cabinet was satisfied with the limited blockade expressed 
in terms of the Swiss trust agreement, but in Paris a different 
wind was blowing. The French government’s thinking was evolving 
toward an integral blockade which would not only completely eliminate 
Swiss trade with Germany (except for purely domestic products) but 
also embargo all enemy owned firms established in Switzerland, even 
those in no way engaged in exporting to the Central Powers. Moreover, 
as Lord Granville, counsellor of the British Embassy in Paris, gathered 
from a private conversation with the French minister for foreign 
affairs, French susceptibilities in certain quarters had been offended 
by the negotiations being conducted entirely by the British government, 
and the results being communicated to the French government to take or 
leave. This method of procedure was considered correct in Holland, 
but special French interest in Sv/itzerland render d it quite unacceptable 
there. Sir Francis Bertie (The British Ambassador in Paris) therefore
I. F.L.Bertie (Viscount Bertie of Thame) The jPiary of Lord Bertie of 
-Thame IQlk-l918, ed. A.G. Lennox (London, 1^4;,1, 16*f.
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suggested considering the French revisions pari passu with any
emendations the British government might wish to a d to the draft
treaty, and c inducting the discussions in Paris rather than in London
as an anodyne for the French.^ " Sir lyre Crowe suspected French
opposition to the scheme was inspired by an unnamed official of the
French Embassy ifa Berne who had 'private interests to serve' and would
personally benefit by the working of a rival French scheme which
2
favoured French Swiss firms.
Accordingly, Sir Francis Oppenheiaer returned to Paris at the
end of Hay. In the course of the subsequent meetings he got the
impression that the principal opponent of the draft was the minister
of war, but was confident th t his opposition would be outweighed by
theComitfe de Restriction who inclined to accept the scheme, though with
3
certain modifications." Both he and Lord Sranville urged on the French
gover iment the desirability of concluding the trust agreement at the
earliest possible moment, and presenting it in its completed form
to the Italians who had entered the war against Austria-Hungary on
23 Hay and whose inclusion in the discussions would cause further 
if
dexay. The Foreign Office supported this plan, and the Italian 
government for their part immediately pledged to accept the trust
1. Bertie-FO, 27 May 1915, telegr m, FO 382-*406-63l8S/l5.
2. ibid., minute of Crowe.
3. Bertie-FO, 28 May 1915, telegram, FC 382-^6-6832^15.
*t. Bertie-FO, 30 May 1915, telegr .m, FO 382-^6-68971/15.
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scheme in principle, although they reserved the right to propose
amendments of detail.^
The French authorities pressed in the Paris meetings for several
alterations to lend greater stringency to the draft. The most important
of these were a precision of the rationing principle under which
supplies for Switzerland were to be limited to average normal
quantities minus average exports to the Central Powers, and a
stipulation that the Federal Council scrupulously guarantee all
2
engagements of the trust. On the other hand, the French consented
to abandon their objection to the inclusion of non-Swiss members (i.e.,
German firms established on Swiss soil) in the various syndicates, and
to accept the principle of trafic de perfectionnement. The emended
scheme was approved by the French government,^ who then assigned
G. Crozier, with plenipotentiary powers to accompany Sir Francis
Oppenheimer to Berne to open negotiations with the Swiss government on the 
k
final text.
1. Bertie-FO, 9 June 1915* telegram, FO 3S2-*»c6-75055/15*
2. Report of Sir Francis Oppenheimer to the Foreign Office on the 
negotiations with the French Restrictions Committee, 11 June 1915. 
FO 382-^06-77606/15.
cf. Bell, Blockade, p*307.
3. Bertie-FO, I k  June 1915. telegram, FO 382-^+06-77735/15*
k. 3SS - HI, p.23.
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In Switzerland news in the press of the earlier negotiations 
between Oppenheimer and Frey had caused much unrest. The Zurich 
papers particularly questioned w ether Switzerland was abandoning her 
independence in order to maintain the economy of the land. In the 
Swiss parliament on 18 Juhe 1915 Councillor of State Winiger put 
a question to the minister for foreign affairs about the organization 
and propriety of the trust which Hoffmann answered with great skill.
The trust was being established, he stated, to provide their highly 
industrialized land with the materials necessary for continued 
productivity, and far from doing injury to Swiss independence, the 
trust, designed as a 1 zuverlassi -;e, vertrauenswurdige, ausschliesslich 
rationale *1011^ 0110', would preserve it by eliminating foreign 
influence in Swiss commerce and industry. Furthermore, far from 
prejudicing German and German-Swiss interests, the trust would 
terminate the present unequal distribution of goods between the major 
racial groups in the confederation.
Hoffmann*s speech resulted in a general, though temporary, 
subsidin of criticism, though both the German and French speaking 
Swiss watched the progress of the Allied negotiations during the 
summer with jealous attention.
Oppenheimer andCrozier handed the new draft constitution of the 
trust and its by-laws to National Councillor Frey on 19 June. A few 
days later the Italian representative, Commander Antonio dell*Abbadessa,
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arrived in Berne to enter the joint negotiationsDiscussions were
carried out during most of the summer in a spirit of mutual suspicion
which resulted in a long deadlock and threatened on several occasions
a complete breakdown. The sources of the difficulty can conveniently
be considered under four headings: Swiss insistence on the principle
of exchange with the Central Empires, Allied alterations to the first
draft in the matter of rationing, the attitude of Italy, and the
reaction of the German government.
Exchan es. As a condition for delivering material to
Switzerland, the German government had early insisted on a system
of exchan e or barter whereby German goods were exported only if
specified Swiss goods were given in return. To regulate this traffic,
the Swiss Political Department established a Bureau of Compensations
2
under the direction of National Councillor Ernst Schmidheiny. In 
their discussion of this question during the negotiations for the 
first draft of the trust scheme, Oppenheimer and Frey had agreed 
that only materials deriving from domestic industries could be used 
for compensation with Germany. As domestic trades they considered 
the production of chocolate, condensed milk and cheese, agricultural 
produce, watches, and various types of textiles.^ The German and
1. Grant Duff-FO, 29 June 1915» tele ;ram, FG 382-*K)6-863^i/15«
2. SS3 - RI, p„26.
3. Bell.Blockade, p.3^5*
10*t
Austrian ministers in Berne put severe pressure on the Federal Council 
to enlarge the list of compensatory articles, and they were aided in this 
by the Swiss General Staff who, it appears, preferred to bring Swiss 
industry within the orbit of the German economic system for reasons of 
military expediency*
In the course of the joint negotiations, Frey inferred that 
necessities of state were above any obligations to the trust organization, 
and now demanded that non-domestic goods be included among those 
allowed for exchanged This was tantamount to demanding that the 
Allies supply German war needs through Swiss middlemen. Frey was, of 
course,merely following the wishes of the Federal Council in this 
matter, which they had made clear in May when they accepted the first 
draft of the trust scheme. As Oppenheimer's answer left no doubt as 
to the views of the Allies on this subject, Hoffmann declined to have
exchanges discussed with the Allied delegates, and took the matter up
2
with the Allied ministers in Berne* By-passing the delegates by 
an appeal to the Allied governments accomplished little, since the 
delegates were their governments' chief advisors on Swiss trade in any 
case. This initial unfortunate exchange caused ill feelings on both 
sides, while the compensation problem remained unsolved until an 
acceptable compromise was at last devised*
1. Grant Duff-FO, 19 June 1915, tele ram, FO-332-^7-97737/15.
2* Bell, Blockade, pp.270-72.
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Rationing. The French licensing committee (Commission de 
P6rogations), observing the vast increase in applications for export 
licenses during the Spring of 1915» concluded that any abnormal 
increase in a neutral’s imports must indicate an increase in that 
neutral's exports to the enemy. Viewing the problem from the angle 
of gross import statistics, rather than of specific consignments to 
individual firms, they decided that its solution lay in rationing 
the neutral to its normal overall import. Since presumably the normal 
import would be entirely absorbed in the neutral market, exports to 
the enemy would cease.
The principle of rationing was accepted in an Anglo-French 
conference on economic warfare which met in Paris in early June 1915*^ 
and was written into the revised draft of the by-laws of the Swiss 
trust organization. The Swiss government felt that the rationing 
clauses constituted a radical alteration in the nature of the trust,
and that Swiss public opinion would hot permit this curtailment of
2
their commercial liberty. They were, however, in no position to 
dictate policy to the Allies who dominated all the means of transporta­
tion to Switzerland. The Allied delegates were unyielding in their 
insistence, so the principle of rationing had reluctantly to be 
conceded. The ration was to be calculated on the average import less
1. Bell, Blockade, pp.270-72•
2. Carlin- FO, 1 July 1915, memoirs, FO 582-^6-87528/15.
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normal exports to the Central Powers, and was to be delivered to 
Switzerland on a quarterly basis. The actual figures for the ration 
of individual commodities were to be established by a commission to 
sit for this purpose in Paris during the subsequent autumn.
1tsily. The entry of Italy into the war against Austria-Hungary 
between the writing of the first draft by Oppenheimer and the 
beginning of joint negotiations had unexpected results.1 After 
committing themselves to the Allied cause in the secret Treaty of 
London (26 April 1915)* the Italians had hastened to secure their 
commercial interests by concluding an accord with the Swiss on 8 May. 
This agreement differs notably from other wartime understandings 
between Switzerland and the Allies in that, rather than rationing 
supplies to Switserland, it actually guaranteed the delivery of
a specified amount of Italian domestic produce and of articles in
2
transit. Italy pledged to provide agreed quantities of meats and 
fish, and the Swiss undertook to export cattle, cellulose, old iron,
1. Italy’s joining the conflict had come as no surprise to the Swiss 
government. As early as January 1915 Hoffmann had enquired
of the Italian minister in Berne about this possibility and its 
effect on Swiss supplies through Genoa. The answer, from Baron 
Sonnino, the foreign minister, assured Hoffmann that the royal 
government would view with the most friendly good will the supply 
of Switzerland through Genoa, and would interfere in this traffic 
only for pressing military needs ’in der abstrakten Hypothese 
eines Krieges*. Sonnino-Hoffmann, 26 January 1915* telegram,
Pol.Dept. 2001 (k).Schachtel 17* Sonnino cautiously added,
•Es handelt sich naturlich um eine Hypothese deren Verwicklichung 
jetzt weder vorgesehen noch vorzusehen ist’.
2. SSS - HI, p.70.
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and wood* Demands for further exports v/ere to be entertained by the 
respective governments *avec la plus grande bienveillance1 Obviously 
with this background, a predisposition on the part of the Italian 
delegates to take a harsh line with the Swiss was not to be 
anticipated.
This became clear at the first meeting when dell1Abbadessa
advocated the continuation of parcel post deliveries from Italy to
Switzerland and insisted on silk being omitted from the prohibited
list in deference to the national interest of Italy, just as tea had
2
been omitted in deference to the English* Silk had brought in 530 
million lire in 191*4, more than tl^ wce the revenue of Italy*s second 
largest export,^ so not unnaturally the Italian delegate had been 
instructed to do nothing to prejudice its continued free export.
The British and French delegates wanted silk consigned to the trust 
organization to prevent its being re-exported to Germany where it 
could be put to military use, but dell*Abbadessa remained adqmant*
The British minister suspected Swiss intrigue was responsible for the
1. Text of the Swiss-Italian Agreement of 8 May 1915* 191*4-1918
(Abkommenen mit Italien), Schachteln 11 and 12*
2* Grant Duff-FO, 2*4 June 1915$ telegram,FO 382~*406-83665/15*
3. Bell,Blockade, p*97*
*4. Grant Duff-FO, 12 July 1915, telegram, FO 382-*407-938l8/15*
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uncompromising attitude of the Italian government regarding silk,
but he could offer no concrete proof*'*'
The French government as well entertained suspicions about
their new ally* The French ambassador in Rome had been informed
that owing to treaty obligations transit trade with Switzerland
could not be prohibited, but rumours were rife that contraband from
Italy was passing by this means to Germany (with whom Italy was hot
then at war)* Craigie's judgment was harsh* ’Italy is, in my
humble opinion, the weakest link in the chain we have drawn round
Germany and more dangerous, in many respects, than a neutral state
2
over whose imports we exercise proper control** Edward Grey 
determined to ’revert to the ante-war procedure’ of limiting 
Italian imports, if an assurance that no more contraband would reach 
Germany via Italy was not forthcoming from Rorae*^  Surely it was a 
unique aberration in interallied relations to be forced to threaten 
a partner with blockade* Such suspicions continued, however, until 
Italy declared war on Germany in 1916*
1. Grant Duff-FO, 17 July 19151 telegram, FO 382-407-96356/15.
2* Minute by Craigie on Bertie-FO, 29 August 1915*telegram,
FO 382-407-12156/15.
3. Minute by E, Grey, ibid*
4* e.g., minutes on Johnstone-FO, 28 October 1915t telegram,
FO 382-409'161085/15. Crowe writes: 'I am afraid it is only too
probable that the Italians are acting in close understanding with our 
chief enemy* • Johnstone had reported that a Herr Hertz, president 
of the German Commission for Relief and War Provision, had concluded 
important contracts for oils and oil-seeds to be shipped from Italy 
to Germany.
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Ultimately the Italian delegate came to agree with the general 
formula of the trust organization, but reserved the right to consider 
special cases like silk, wine, and fruit which became the subject of 
an understanding among the Allies during the autumn.^ Italian demands
during the negotiations in the summer had caused much delay, however, 
for they encouraged the Federal Council to play on these divergent 
interests of the Allies in hope of gaining further concessions for 
Switzerland.
As a poor nation with an unfavourable balance of trade, Italy's
efforts to preserve her export trade can only be regarded as
commendable, however frustrating they v/ere to her allies, but on the
other hand it would be unreasonable to expect Great Britain and France
to turn a blind eye to Italy's abetting their enemy in the slaughter
on the western front. The issue was clouded by interallied commercial
rivalry since all three nations were striving to replace their lost
markets by commercial penetration of neutral nations. Although the
British were by no means uninterested, competition for the Swiss
market was particularly keen between France and Italy who had similar
2
goods to export. In the final settlement, as we shall see, a 
certain leniency was shown to Italy in deference to her precarious
1. Bertie-FO, 10 September 1915» telegram, FO 382-*K)8-129376/l5»
2. Oppenheimer, op.cit., p.26C.
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economic situation, Hoffmann was wise to have attempted individual 
settlements with the Allies so as to play off one against the other, 
as the case of Italy shows, and it is fortunate from the Allied 
point of view that Oppenheimer took a strong stand against this 
proposal at the beginning of n e g o t i a t i o n s E v e n  joint negotiations 
had their difficulties,
Germany, If Italy's position was bothersome,Germany's was 
menacing. The German legation exercised an arrogant, even brutal 
diplomacy which caused much distress among the officials of the Swiss 
foreign ministry, and gave them pause in accepting the Allied 
proposals. In the end the German attitude proved self-defeating, but 
meanwhile it brought severe pressure on the Swiss government to break 
off negotiations with the Allies.
As a result of a painful interview between Hoffmann and Baron 
Romberg in which the German minister threatened to have the coal 
supply cut off if the trust scheme was accepted, the Foreign Office 
instituted an enquiry into the feasibility of Great Britain's covering 
the Swiss requirement. Representatives of the Home Office, the 
Admiralty, the Board of Trade, and of several coal concerns, meeting 
in the Home Office on 28 July, were questioned by Owen O'Malley about 
the possibility of supplying British coal should the Germans make good 
their threat.
1, ibid., p.256,
Ill
It appeared that North Country coal was adequate for Swiss
needs.~ The normal Swiss imports of coal briquettes and coke was
calculated at 3t800,000 tons per annum, but since her industry was
not working at full capacity it appeared unlikely she would require
more than 2,000,000 tons (6,000 tons a day). It was decided to offer
5,000 tons a day. The Director of Transports from the Admiralty
gave his assurance that adequate ships would be found to transport
this amount to Bordeaux and Genoa if sufficient rolling stock were
available on the French and Italian railways to transport the coal to 
2
Switzerland. The French reported that their rails were capable of 
supplying this amount of transport if the need should arise.^
1. The Admiralty was in a position to buy it at 18/- a ton at the
collieries. With insurance, and freight charges by ship and
rail from Newcastle to Berne the total cost per toh was
estimated:
via Bordeaux - 43/6
via Marseilles - 45/6
via Genoa - 45/6
According to Sir Francis Oppenheimer the average price of German
coal in Berne was 33/6 a ton. The difference (reckoned at 10/6 
a ton) could be subsidized by the Allied governments for 
approximately £>^23^000 per 1,000,000 tons.
2. Report by 0. O’Malley on the committee meeting in the Home Office, 
28 July 19151 £0 382-407-103764/15.
3. Bertie-FO, 14 September 1915, dispatch, FO 382-408-134846/15.
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)
The communication of the results of these deliberations to
theSwiss government created a distinctly favourable impression. In
contrast, the Germans continued to exhibit unremitting severity* In
July their new trade regulations were announced. To apply for an
export license for goods from Germany (Ausfuhrbewilligung) the German
authorities required of a Swiss importer not only submission of
account books and inspection of workshops, but a vexatious guarantee
iii the form of a sum equal at least to the value of the goods applied
for, and the payment of a tax for processing the application*1
News of the German terms, and especially of the exaction of a
bank deposit, was welcomed by the Cohtraband Department and by the
Allied delegates in Berne, for they anticipated that the imposition
of this ’unwisely stringent guarantee' could only make the Allied
2
demands seem reasonable in comparison. This appears to have been 
the case for the British minister noted in early August that a 
'lively press campaign is proceeding and modifying public opinion in 
favour of the Allies'*"’
These four aspects of the Swiss problem, the questions of 
exchanges and rationing, and the attitudes of Italy and Germany, 
delqyed the acceptance of the Allied proposals for three months during
1* Grant Duff-FO, 30 July 1915, dispatch (containing application forms 
from the Treuhandstelle Zurich), FO 382-V;7-105928/15*
2* ibid*. minutes.
3* Grant Duff-FO, 13 August 1915* telegram, FO 382-to7-lll6lVl5.
113
the summer of 1913* The final acceptance of the scheme by the 
Federal Council might have been hastened had they known the alternatives 
being prepared in case of rejection. In mid-July, when negotiations 
had entered their critical stage, tnere was considerable disenchantment 
in the Allied camp with Hoffmann, and tempers were frayed. The British 
minister was certain that the Germans were doing their best to frustrate 
the scheme at the eleventh hour, and felt the attitude of the minister 
for foreign affairs was * devoid of all moral courage and can only be 
described as tricky*.^ Sir Francis Oppenheimer noted that *Mr.
2
Hoffmann’s sympathies with the Central Powers were an open secret*.
The delegates decided at this point that unless they received 
satisfactory counter-proposals from Hoffmann they would present their 
final wording to the Swiss government. The Swiss protested that 
they could not commit themselves without knowing exactly which goods 
were to be consigned to the trust, but the delegates, out of patience 
with even this seemingly reasonable objection, presented to Hoffmann 
their final redaction in a note verbale delivered through the Allied
1. Grant Duff-FO, 11 July 1915, telegram, FO 382-^7-92989/15.
2. Oppenheimer,op.cit., p.255» Much retroactive obloquy was heaped on
Hoffmann after his attempt to negotiate peace between Germany and 
Russia in 1917. His defenders regard him as a *Kalter Spieler* 
who, regardless of his personal sympathies which favoured the 
Central limpires, succeeded (till the end) in getting the better of
both sides.
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ministers on 17 July.**"
G.P. Skipworth had meanwhile evolved a contingency plan in case
the negotiations broke down. Basically the plan was to set up in
Berne according to Swiss law a British firm which would regulate all
trade from Great Britain and push British interests. Its staff of
experts would enquire into the dealings of its customers who could buy
or not according to their pleasure. Orders from suspect firms would
2be refused outright. The Foreign Office knew that this plan, if
worked in cooperation with the Empire and with France, would achieve
the desired end of eliminating overseas exports to Germany. They
were prepared, if other means failed, to accept the odium of
establishing an alien ’ministry of blockade' on Swiss soil.
Fortunately this proved unnecessary. The stalemate in the
trust negotiations was broken by mutual concessions in the matter
of exchanges (which, it will be recalled, were being considered
separately from these negotiations). A memorandum presented to the
Foreign Office by the Swiss minister on 6 August on the question of
exchanges provided an excuse for recalling the Allied delegates to
discuss the situation, 'it being made clear at Berne that there is
3
no question of the negotiations being broken off'. The Allied
1. SSS - HI. §.26.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 27 July 1915, dispatch, FO 382-^07-10^253/15.
Naturally this plan could work only with implicit French co-operation. 
The French recognized British commercial predominance in Holland, and 
the British felt constrained to recognize theirs in Switzerland. 
Nevertheless, by reason of their powerful organization and vigourous 
prosecution of blockade policy, the British exercised considerable, if 
not preponderant, influence in Switzerland as well until the end of 
the war.
3* Carlin,FO, 6 August 1915, memorandum (and minutes), FO 382-**07- 
10807^ 15.
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delegates were accordingly recalled^ while the French—Swiss press
c ntinued to urge n the Federal Council the acceptance of the 
2proposed trust.
The compromise was arrived at in the following way. Toward the
end of Jul. , Hoffmann had presented the French ambassador with a
note trerbale in which he gave a list of the goods needed from
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and enumerated the articles from the
3
Allies to be given in exchange. Merchandise imported from the 
Central Powers to Switzerland amounted to 21,875,000 francs a month. 
The value of coal imports, which the Allies appear to have thought was 
one of the articles to be given in exchange, but which was actually 
given unconditionally, was 8,750,000 francs a month. Sugar, lignite, 
potash, hematite ore, cellulose, etc., accounted for the rest.
1. On 15 August a conference was held in London between the highest 
ranking officials of the British and French blockade authorities.
The S.3.3. was approved in this meeting, lenys Cochin writes of 
this conference: Aprbs cette conference de Londres on peut dire 
que les bases du blocus moderne Staient enfin trouvSes. Toutes 
les mesures que les Allies prirent postlrieurement ne furent que 
le d£veloppement et l1intensification de ces principes: 1° 
suppression en fait de la distinction entre la contrabands 
absolute et la contrabande conditionelle; 2°arret I. distance de 
tout le commerce ennemi par mer; 3°surveillance par les neutres 
eux-memes des produits que les Allies laissent parvenir dans leurs 
ports sur la base du 'contingenteraent'.
2. e.g., the editorial in the Journal de Genfeve, 17 August 1915* 
'hsp£rons cependant que les negotiations entam£es h Berne depuis 
plusieurs semaines franchiront heureuseraent le point most (sic=mort) 
oh elles sont demeur^es'.
3. Hoffmann-Beau, 20 July 1915, note verbale, FC 3^2-^07-101675/15.
k. 'Swiss and the Allies', The Times, l*f August 1915* Sir Francis
Oppenheimer was the author of this article.
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These imports were exchanged mostly for finished re-exports or for 
Swiss domestic products, but now the German authorities, probably as 
a test case,^ demanded as compensation goods which could only be 
supplied directly by the Allies* 'They stipulated the exchange of
rice, maize, vegetables, chestnuts, cotton, sulfur, jute, hemp, and
2
gambier of a value of 3>521,000 francs a month* The Allies refused*
This put Hoffmann in a difficult position, for he had just been
notified by the German minister ‘after a stormy interview* that if
theSwiss yielded to the Allies as regards exchange, Germany would cut
g
off the coal supply* The Allied ministers in Berne harboured no
illusions about the strength of the Germans* economic position, and
suggested a compromise to their governments.
In the loreign Office, Craigie thought the principle of exchanges
might be conceded, provided that the amounts of rice, etc., were
5
reduced to a level where they have no effect on the war* Oppenheimer 
too believed the time had come to relax their severity toward the
g
Swiss application*' Accordingly, a note verbale was presented to the
1* Minutes on Grant Duff-FO, 18 July 1915i FO 332-407-97025/15*
2* Carlin-FO, 6 August 1915i memorandum, FO 332-**07-10807<i/15* The
3wi>s government had refused an offer of sugar from Italy and of 
hematite ore from Spain. They wanted rice to obtain these materials 
from Germany and Austria-Hungary. This was regarded in the Foreign 
Office as *very suspicious*, cf. Oppenheimer, 'Swiss and the 
Allies', The Times, 14 August 1915*
3* Grant Duff-FO,25 July telegram, Fo 332-407-101164/15*
4. Grant Duff-FO, 4 August 1 15* telegram, FC^  382-407-106815/15*
5* ibid*, Craigie's minute.
6. FO-Bertie, 28 August 1915* telegram, FO 332-i*07-121l80/15*
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Swiss government on l** September, making slight concessions in the
quest! "n of exchanges*^ This broke the ice, and an agreement was
swiftly .arrived at* The Swiss withdrew their demand that rice be
used for exchanges, and agreed that merchandise imported into
Switzerland through the intermediary of the trust organization would
not become the subject of exchanges with another country* For their
part the Allies agreed to allow for exchange with the Central Powers
38^8 waggons (J»5,000 tons) of miscellaneous Allied goods already-
purchased in Switzerland by German and Austrian agents and stored
there for enemy accounts, and to give special consideration to the
subject of exchanges outside the framework of the trust organization,
if the Federal Council should request it in the future.
Reassured by the terms of the compromise that future exchanges
would not be absolutely excluded even if the trust were accepted,
the Federal Council finally abandoned its objection to the trust
scheme. The decision to do so was influenced somewhat by the fact
that the Federal Assembly wa3 to convene on 20 September, and questions
about the negotiations, if the Allied proposals were rejected out of
hand, especially from the French-Swiss members might cause the
2government considerable embarrassment. 3esides, the features of the 
plan which had at first seemed most objectionable had been ironed out
l.Lord Acton (Charg6)-FC, lA- -September 1915? dispatch, FO 382-^ *08- 
13^230/15.
2• Grant Duff-FO,23 August 1915* telegram, FO 382-te7-il789Vl5.
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in the course of the negotiations. The Allies did not demand the 
presence of their own representatives on the trust board, but only 
that representatives !auprfes de la SociStS1 be kept informed of its 
decisions.^ They conceded, in the interest of the neutrality and 
independence of the Federal Council, that no guarantees should be 
exacted of that body for the operations of the trust. They argued 
convincingly that the requirement of monthly reports put no real 
restraint on the liberty of Swiss commerce in domestic goods. Most 
importantly they convinced the Federal Council of the reasonableness 
of a rationing procedure calculated on normal imports, which had at 
first been condemned as *un chanKement radical de tout le systbme*.
The high-handed attitude of the German authorities, a growing 
popular support of the trust (prodded by Allied delays in delivery of 
Swiss imports), and the suspicion that an alternative plan would 
be even more exacting, all recommended the acceptance of the Allied 
scheme.
Its acceptance was indicated in a note verbale of the minister 
for foreign affairs delivered to the Allied ministers on 22 September 
1915* This note made the following points. (1) The steps taken 
by the Allies in the economic war against the Central Powers are not in
1. These were the four commercial attaches of the Allied Legations in 
Berne.
2. Carlin-FO, 1 July 1915. memoire, FO 332-406-87528/15.
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accord with the rights pssessed by Switzerland as a neutral st^te 
according to international law* (2) 2ven though they recognized no 
justification in law for the restraints placed on the commercial 
freedom of Switzerland the federal government appreciated the present 
disposition, of the Allied governments and have resolved to take into 
consideration the special circumstances of the situation. (3) In 
giving their approval to the scheme, however* the federal government 
were constrained to make the following reservations.
a) It is understood that the Allies will endeavour to secure 
for Switzerland the import of commodities not only on the list of 
goods to be consigned to the trust, but also on. the free list.
b) It is further understood that in the negotiations which 
follow regarding the subject of subsequent exchanges, the Allied 
governments will be animated by a spirit of justice and generous good 
will.
c) Should the requirements of Swiss industry render necessary 
an extension of the trafic de perfectionnement, the Federal Council
reserve to themselves the ri^ht to formulate demands on this subject.
d) In the formation of syndicates it ^ust be borne in mind 
that some will be composed of persons of small means who will be 
unable to furnish financial securities to the extent of the Metal 
Syndicate.^-
1. Hoffmann-Grant ihiff, 22 September 11-15% note varb^le. FO 3^2-
<(08-139391/15.
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The first two points were made, of course, for the sake of 
neutrality and to avoid establishing a precedent for foreign 
interference in Swiss economic matters* The third point was 
intended to provide a basis for subsequent negotiation should the 
agreement prove onerous to different commercial interests, and to 
lend a benevolent tone to future discussion of exchanges with the 
Central Powers*
In their formal reply the Allied governments expressed 
satisfaction with the note verbale of 22 -September confirming the 
establishment of the trust and assured the federal government that 
all subsequent negotiations would be conducted in a spirit of "large 
bienveillance1*^~ Further particulars were included in a confidential 
letter to Hoffmann signed by Beau, Grant Duff, and Faulucci de 
Calboli, the Italian minister in Berne* In return for facilitating 
transport for Swiss commerce, the Allies anticipated a strict 
compliance with the rules of the trust, especially with those 
concerned with the trafic de perfectionnement* and accepted the 
federal government1s offer to hand to the Allied representatives each 
month a list of the exchanges effected with the Central Powers. A 
list of the stocks imported into Switzerland before 30 June 1915 
(the 38*f8 waggons mentioned in thfe "exchange compromise") was appended*
1* Allied ministers in Berne-Pol.Dept., ^ October 1915i note verbale*
FO 382-^8-1^6620/15.
2. Allied ministers in Berne-Hoffmann, b October 1915* Confidential letter, 
ibid. Allied ministers in Berne-Hoffmann, k October 1915i note 
verbale regarding exchanges, ibid*
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Two documents establish the purpose, function and organization 
of the trust, The Statutes of the Soci£t£ 3uis3e de Surveillance 
Iconomique and its Bye-law3 (2%; 1 e.r.ent iu16r•i eur). In the constitutional 
statutes, the purpose of the society (referred to as the 5,3,5.) is 
described as representing and favouri g national economic interests in 
face of wartime difficulties by a system of guaranteed supervision 
of Allied exports. The Federal Council placed a fund of 100,000 francs 
at the disposition of the society end approved the composition of its 
general assembly, all of whose members were to be Swiss nationals.
The function of the general assembly was defined, as well as that of the 
committee (con,it&) elected by the general assembly to evolve organi­
zational procedures and to supervise their execution. A director 
nominated by the general assembly would assume responsibility for the 
operation of the committee.
The first meeting of the general assembly of the S.S.S., summoned 
by Hoffmann in the Federal Palace on 11 October, was attended by 
thirteen of its fifteen members. In his introductory speech Hoffmann 
conceded that the Allies had shown themselves alive to the difficulties 
of Switzerland’s economic position and were disposed to deal with them 
in a most accommodating fashion. He urged the assembly to take a 
similarly spacious view of Swiss needs and to do all they could within 
the framework of the S.S.S, to maintain Swiss industry at a high level 
of production and to meet the import requirements of Swiss commerce in 
an ample way. The bye-laws of theS.S.S., he cautioned, could not
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be the subject of discussion. Since they had been agreed upon 
during the course of discussions with the Allied governments* they 
had the force of an international treaty.
Alfred Frey warned the assembly that in spite of all their 
good will they could expect within a short time to be the most 
maligned citizens of their country. Theirs was to be a thankless 
task. He appealed to their patriotism to see the work through to 
the end, and to make no concession to alien pressures without most 
carefully weighing the consequences."
The assembly then proceded to elect the committee of the J-’.S.S. 
who would summon subsequent meetings and act as liaison between the 
trust and the Federal Council. As president they elected Johann 
Hirter, former president of the National Bank* then president of the 
Berne Chamber of Commerce. Councillor of State Chuard, chief of the 
Vaud Department of Commerce, was to be vice president, and the third 
member was National Councillor von Arx, president of the Council for 
the Administration of the Federal Railways. These gentlemen 
represented powerful financial, commercial, industrial, and agricultural 
interests, and as members of the Swiss parliament they presumably 
exercised sorne political influence as well.
Henri Grobet-Roussy was nominated Director of the S.S.S, His 
responsibility was the day-to-day management of the trust’s activities
1. o.o.o. -HI, pp.if7-^9.
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which included, of course, maintaining contact with the Allied 
governments through their rc presentatives in 3erne. The general 
secretary was Alfred Bonzun, vice chancellor of the Confederation, and 
Udouard Steinmeta became chief inspector.
The committee called for a constitutive meeting on 27 October 
1 15, and this date marks the oCficial foundation of the 3.S.S., although 
operations did not begin until 16 November.
A curious reversal by the British and the Swiss governments 
cf their attitudes toward the nature of the trust organization had 
occurred during the ten months between its first suggestion and its 
final acceptance. In January 1)13» the Foreign Office, recognizing 
the Federal Jouncil's claim to non-involvement, had sought to form 
purely private agreements with Swiss commercial houses to control the 
flow of Swiss imports. Their aim had been to establish a trust along 
the lines of the N.O.T., and dir Francis Oppenheimer was dispatched to 
Berne for that specific purpose. When private enterprise had 
failed to achieve a satisfactory settlement, the Federal Council 
instigated ’semi-official* discussions on the trust scheme, but only 
with reluctance, as a last resort. During the discussions carried on 
initially with Oppenheimer, anu then during the summer with the Allied 
representatives, the Swiss government began to involve themselves in 
the planning and organization of the trust more deeply than the Foreign 
Office had originally dared hope.
The organization finally agreed upon was far different from what
\12k
either government had anticipated at the beginning. Although the 
S.3.3. was registered as a private firm, and regarded by its critics 
at most as a semi-official organization, these were but terms to drape 
the unmentionable reality with a cloak of respectability. To all 
intents and purposes the S.3,3, was a branch of the government 
operating under the guise of a citizens* trust, A comparison with 
the entirely private N.O.T, established in Holland will bring this out 
cleE*rly,
The initiative £>r the N.O.T. came from an enterprising group 
of businessmen who raised capital for the organization on the Dutch 
financial market. Discussion for the 3.3,3, was carried out under 
the aegis of the Federal Council, who provided the organization with 
its initial capital outlay (100,000 fr.). While the administration 
and operation of the N.O.T. were genuinely private, the names of the 
candidates for the general assembly of the S.S.S. were put forward by 
the Federal Council, to whom application had to be made to alter the 
society*s statutes. Finally, while the N.O.T, supervised the import 
of both Allied and German goods, the S.S.S. dealt only with the Allies.
Foreign and domestic pressures forced this change of attitude 
toward tne trust —  from non-involvement to official support —  on 
the Federal Council. The pressure exerted by both groups of belligerents 
has already been recounted. The manifest advantages of coming to terms 
with the Allies, and the simultaneous menacings of the Central Powers, 
drove the Swiss government to secure for the confederation whatever
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advantage they could, even at the price of abdicating their 
traditional laissez-faire attitude toward commerce.
Domestically the jealous rivalry of the German and tfelsch Swiss, 
which incidentally found reflection in the composition of the 
Federal Council itself, recommended the establishment of an impartial 
organization administered by impartial officials. Governing a country 
lacking the racial homogeneity of Holland, the Federal Council was 
forced to take the issue in hand to forestall the ascendency of one 
group over the other. The attitude of the French government gave every 
indication that a private trust would be weighted heavily to the 
advantage of the French Swiss. An organization, the composition of 
v/hose assembly was subject to governmental review, regulated by a 
constitution and a set of bye-laws which might not be altered without 
reference to the Federal Council, would serve as a corrective to this 
tendency and, by protecting the interests of the German Swiss, would 
ensure equitable treatment for both major racial groups.
On the other hand, the S.S.S. did retain certain characteristics 
of a private enterprise, at least in its financial transactions (after 
the initial capitalization by the federal government), and in its 
dayfcto-day operations. There was therefore some justification for
calling it semi-official for it stood halfway between the 
completely private N.O.T., and the completely official Treuhandstelle 
Zurich, set up to handle German imports into the Confederation. The
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nature of this organization, established by the Political Department, 
and the negotiations with the German government, about which so little 
lias been said, form the subject of the next chapter*
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IV
NORTHERN NEIGHBOUR: GERMANY
The outbreak of hostilities in August 191^ found Germany 
uninterested in and unprepared to wage an economic war. So firm 
was the Prussian General Staff’s faith in the effectiveness of the 
Schlieffen Plan to gain the swift military victory over France 
which would bring the war to a successful conclusion within a 
matter of months that they regarded planning for a long and dreary 
economic war as a species of heresy. Even if Great Britain entered 
the conflict and foolishly reiused to abandon the struggle after the 
fall of France, the General Staff anticipated only minor inconveniences 
from a blockade. The Central Empire would, after all, command the 
enormous resources of all Europe, and Great Britain would presumably 
be forced by economic necessity to withdraw the blockade long before 
European stockpiles were depleted.
As a precautionary measure, however, in August 191^ General 
Erich von Falkenhayn, then Prussian Minister of War, asked the 
director of the Allgemeine Blektrizitats Gesellschaft.Walther 
Rathenau, to head a War Raw Materials Department (Kri egsrohstoffabteilung) 
attached to the Ministry of War. The function of this department was
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to secure, even by requisition, and to distribute supplies essential 
to industry in a war economy.1 Its policy with regard to the 
neutrals was to endeavour to maintain trade as resolutely as the 
British were trying to stop it. The organization within the War Raw 
Materials Department concerned with purchasing goods abroad, known as 
the Central Purchasing Agency (Zentraleinkaufsgesellschaft), dispatched 
agents to neutral lands to buy up useful domestic products and as many 
imports from overseas as the neutrals could spare. To derive
maximum advantage to the war effort from Germany's constantly
/
diminishing export potential and to prevent a dissipation of the
Reichsmark's strength on purchases of luxury products, a system of
compensations was developed by this organization by which German
products would be exported only in return for specified consignments
2
of goods of particular, usually military, value.
Germany was in a good position to bargain for such articles in 
Switzerland, for that country depended in large measure for its 
economic stability on its northern neighbor. Germany had succeeded 
during the latter half of the Nineteenth Century in ousting France from 
her hitherto predominant position in the Swiss economy, becoming in 
the period immediately preceding the war Switzerland's most important 
supplier of goods as well as her best customer. This relation is
1. F.P.Chambers, The War Behind the War 191^*1918 (London, 1939)» pp.1^6- 
1^ 7 •
2. Bell.Blockade, pp.150-151*
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shown clearly in the statistics for 1913 when Switzerland drew 
33 percent of her total imports from Germany, and sent back 22 percent 
of her exports.^ Germany was not, of course, similarly dependent on 
Switzerland, for in the same year her trade with the confederation 
represented only 2 percent of her own total imports and 5 percent of 
her exports. Theoretically it was possible, without serious harm to her 
own economy, for Germany to break off at any time all commercial 
relations with Switzerland, thereby reducing the latter country to 
economic ruin. In practice, however, the prospect of obtaining 
scarce commodities from and through Switzerland by means of barter, 
the need to maintain the stability of the Reichsmark under the strain 
of an unfavourable balance of trade, and the opportunity, especially 
when victory seemed within the grasp of the Central Powers in the 
Spring of 1918, of bringing Switzerland even further under her 
economic domination, induced Germany to maintain Swiss trade as far 
as possible at a high level, rather than risk the political and 
military consequences of abandoning Switzerland to Allied economic 
control.
German exports were indispensible for the Swiss machine 
industry. She filled 70 percent of Swiss iron and steel requirements 
(**70,000 tons in 1913) and about half her copper needs either from
1. Rufener, op.cit. pp*52,53. This represented for Switzerland a 
trade deficit of 325,000,000 francs.
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German mines or, because the Swiss found it convenient to use the 
services of German middlemen rather than deal directly with American 
smelting firms, in transshipment from the United States.'*' Germany 
dominated the coal market to an even greater degree than the metal 
market. This was due to the policy of the Coal Syndicate of Rhineland- 
aestphalia to offer better quality coal to Switzerland at lower prices
than they asked even in Germany, in order systematically to eliminate
2
French and Belgian competitors. Switzerland needed about 10,000 
tons of coal a day (3f235«GOO tons in 1913) % of which Germany supplied 
about 9^ percent before the war (2,844,900 tons in 1913)*"^ After 
the occupation of Belgium and the provinces of northeast France in 
August and September 1914, Germany's domination was complete: for 
practical purposes she was the sole supplier of coal to the 
confederation.
Switzerland also depended on Germany for machines, precision
instruments, half-finished manufactures, pharmaceuticals, zinc,
dyes, fertilizers, sugar, and potatoes. In return for these goods she
exported condensed milk, chocolate, cheeses, cotton and silks, watches,
4
various luxury products, and machinery. In broad terms then,
1. T.Geering, Handel und Industrie der Schweiz unter dem Einfluss des 
Welkrieps (Basel, 192$), pp.l35i 143*
2. Pfenninger, op.cit. p.37*
3* Geering, op.cit., pp.91*93.
4. Pfenninger, op.cit., pp.4^-46.
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Switzerland depended on the Central Powers for her industrial raw 
materials, and on the Allies and neutrals for her food.
Following the declaration of war, the German government issued
on 31 July 191^ the usual prohibitions on export of goods needed for
the nation*s own use. Export traffic was temporarily disrupted by
massive troop movements on the railways during the first weeks of the
war, but by 2k August the line to Switzerland on the right (east)
bank of the Rhine was again in operation.~ Coal and raw material
deliveries from Germany fell off slightly in 191^ di*e to transport
difficulties, but Swiss stockpiles were sufficient to sustain the loss
and production was not affected. Indeed certain Swiss industries
such as cherticals, shoes, and tool manufactures enjoyed a remarkable
boom because of the elimination of Allied competition in the German
market. Agents of the Central Purchasing Agency were active in
Switzerland during this period, buying up at high prices cotton, wool,
2
and copper to cover actual or potential shortages in the Reich.
1. The railway through Alsace was closed until 29 March 1915 because 
of military operations in the area. Rhine River traffic was 
declared open immediately, but the river fleet did not go into 
operation until April 1916. Pfenninger, op.cit., pp.22-23*
2. Grant Duff-FO, 21 November 191^, dispatch, FO 368-1132-76106/1^.
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Since copper was especially desirable for its military uses, 
the available supplies in Switzerland, which had not been great to 
begin with, were soon depleted by German purchases. Large Swiss 
orders placed overseas in the autumn of 191*f to replenish these stocks 
aroused, as we have seen, the suspicions of the Allied naval authorities 
at Gibraltar, who detained a number of ships making for Genoa laden 
with copper for Swiss importers. It was primarily to obtain a share 
of this copper that Germany and Austria-Hungary had inaugurated their 
exchange system, under which for specified quantities of their own 
exports they expected to receive a stipulated amount of that metal.
By means of compensation demands, severe pressure was exerted on the 
Swiss government to obtain concessions from the Allied (in practice, 
British) governments for large shipments of copper, but the British, of 
course, refused to be coerced into supplying their enemy with this 
valuable metal.
In the autumn of 191^ the Austrian government demanded 100 
waggons of Austrian malt, and the German government set down similar 
conditions in return for their allowing the export of oil and 
manufactures in the half-finished and finished state. By this time, 
with copper imports impossible to obtain, Switzerland herself was 
suffering from a shortage of the metal. Federal Councillor Edmund 
Schulthess, head of the Handels-Industrie-, und Landwirtschafts- 
departement/  informed the Austrian and German governments that
1. On 1 January 1915 the name of this department was changed to the 
Eidgenossisches Volkswirtschaftsdepartement (abbreviated EVD), the 
Department of Public Economy. Schulthess remained its head.
I
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licenses for the export of copper could no longer be considered. He 
offered, however, other commodities in place of copper, which, after 
several discussions with the Austrian (Baron Maximilian von Gagern) 
and the German (Baron Gisbert von Romberg) Ministers, were accepted 
by the export licensing commissions in those countries.1 Thereafter 
the nice art of barter evolved rapidly into a science with its own 
rules and measures until, by the spring of 1915» elaborate system
of exchange values and counter-values had been established and agreed
2
Upon by the three nations.
To give a unified direction to the exchange system the Swiss 
Political Department established on l*f March 1915 a controlling 
organization known as the Compensation Bureau under the leadership
3
of National Councillor Ernst Schmidheiny.
1. Schulthess-von Gagern, 27 December 191^* note, Pol.Dept. 2001 (k), 
Schachtel 92. Schulthess-vpn Romberg, 3 December 191*S note,
Pol.Dept, 2001 (k), Schachtel 92. Raw cotton and wool were also 
mentioned as possible future exchanges.
2. EVD-von Gagern, 16 April 1915* letter, Pol.Dept.2001 (k), Schachtel 
92.
Sugar for example, which Austria-Hungary was able and willing to 
supply in large quantities, would be delivered against many 
compensatory goods according to a neat formula:
1 waggon rice (10,000 kg.) = 5 waggons sugar
1 waggon cheese = 6 1/k waggons sugar
1 waggon old copper = 10 waggons sugar
1 waggon aluminium « 15 waggons sugar, etc.
3. Memorandum by 0. O’Malley, 17 May 1915* J[2 3&2-*f26-6ll^2/l5*
13^
Fortunately for the Swiss economy, the German government had 
decided to allow the export of coal and of many types of iron without 
requiring the import of Swiss goods in exchange, although these two 
items comprised the largest single imports of the confederation. At 
the beginning of the war theGermans had too much coal and iron, and so 
were anxious to maintain their exports to old customers and, if 
possible, even to increase it in order to replace their lost markets 
in the now belligerent nations. Coal was particularly abundant and 
the surplus was swollen even further by deliveries from the Belgian 
and French mines in the occupied provinces which became operational 
(under new management) during the winter 191 *+-15* Coal and iron were 
therefore delivered to Switaerland amply, regularly, and without 
compensation for the first two years of the war.
Although the German government's policy was to encourage both 
export and import trade with the limitrophe neutrals, they were 
naturally unwilling to 3ee German exports aid the Allied war effort. 
Some time elapsed before measures were adopted effectively to end the 
transshipment of German products through Switzerland to the Entente 
powers, but by the spring of 1915 the German Export License Bureau 
began to deny requests by Swiss concerns for certain exports of raw 
materials and manufactures, and for the use of finishing trade 
facilities in Germany until the Swiss government undertook to prohibit 
the re-export to the Allies of certain classes of goods of military 
value. The German government v/as kept advised of the direction and
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extent of this traffic by the Military Commerce Division
(militarische Handelsabteilung) attached in 1915 to the office of
the commercial representative at the German Legation in Berne#^
The German officers in this division, under the leadership of a
Captain Schmitz, were diligent if not scrupulous in applying norms
of what constituted military goods. Their rigour caused a committee
of Swiss machine manufacturers to journey to Berlin in April 1915 to
plead with the German government authorities for less harsh treatment
and to have the inspection and control of their activities placed 
2
in Swiss hands* The committee met with little success#
Consequently, during May 1915 National Councillor E# Schmidheiny, 
the newly appointed director of the Compensation Bureau, was 
dispatched to Berlin by the Political Department to work out 
details of further exchanges, and also to secure the delivery from 
Germany of goods of potential military value, the re-export of which 
had in fact been prohibited by the Swiss government# In these 
discussions the German officials showed themselves as little 
satisfied with the Swiss export prohibitions as the Allies had been, 
sind demanded that individual firms furnish specific guarantees against 
the re-export of German goods (raw materials, half-finished, and 
finished manufactures)#
1# Pfenninger, op#cit.t p#27#
2# Grant Duff-FO, 15 April 1915* telegram, FO 382-406-44666/15#
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As a basis for further negotiation, it was decided in the 
course of these discussions to make a fundamental distinction 
between medical supplies and manufactures, both of which could be 
considered *of military value*. Schmidheiny felt the Swiss 
government would be prepared to receive in their own name and grant 
no licenses for re-export to the Entente of medical goods (medicaments, 
surgical instruments, and the like) received from Germany. With 
regard to industrial products, Schmidheiny suggested that Germany 
join the S.S.S. organization which was being negotiated in Berne just 
at that time by Sir Francis Oppenheimer and Alfred Frey, and which 
would ultimately guarantee proper disposal of German exports. Both 
Germany and the Allies had been consigning their goods to the N.O.T. 
in Holland since the previous November, to their apparent mutual 
convenience and satisfaction. Although this suggestion was 
favourably received in the various ministries in Berlin, it was 
finally rejected by Privy Councillor Johannes, director of the 
commercial section of the Auswartiges Amt, on the grounds that it was 
* unsympatisch* to place German goods under the control of an 
organization of English origin." (The N.O.T., it will be recalled, 
was entirely the creation of Dutch businessmen.)
Bather than receive imports from Germany through the
1. Auszug aus dem Protokoll der Verhandlung mit der deutschen 
Begierung vom 26, Mai 191f>» Pol.Dept.2001 (k), Schachtel 92.
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instrumentality of a general trust like the S.S.S., Swiss firms 
were to continue to apply on an individual basis for export licenses 
from the German government. Although the licenses were to be issued 
by the German government, this was to be done through the agency of 
a Swiss trust officer (Vertrauensmann or Treuhander) who, after 
satisfying himself of the good faith of the applicant, would send the 
application on to Berlin, and when it was approved, issue the license 
to the Swiss importer. On his return to Berne, Schmidheiny was to 
negotiate further with the proper officials of the German Legation 
there regarding the details of the scheme and the choice of the 
Trust Officer.
The proposed organization for 6he import of medical supplies 
(Schweizerisches Gesundheitsamt) w%s immediately established at 
Berne under the control of the Department of Public Economy. The 
import of industrial products, especially chemicals, machines, and 
half-finished articles, was placed under the control of the Political 
Department. A Swiss Trust Officer would distribute German export 
licenses after he had consulted with his technical advisors, a group of 
Swiss officers sympathetic to the German cause, to ascertain the good 
faith of the applicant. Councillor of State Dr. Usteri was 
entrusted with the office of Treuhander, and his bureau, established 
in Zurich as a division of the Political Department, was known as the 
Schweizerisches Politisches Departement, Treuhandstelle Zurich fur 
die Sinfuhr deutscher .varen in die Schweiz.^
1. Auszug aus dem Protokoll der Sitzung des schw. Bundesrates.
1 Kontrollmassnahmen fur den deutschen Warenimport*, 12 June 1915* Pol
Dept. 2001 (k). Schachtel 92.
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In subsequent correspondence between Federal Councillor 
Hoffmann and Dr, Usteri, the specific functions of the Treuhandstelle 
were decided upon. The importer had to provide a bank guarantee, and 
allow inspectors to visit factory working areas and warehouses to see 
if the conditions of import were being fulfilled,1 Dr.Usteri bad 
the power to decide who would receive export licenses from the German 
Legation, and under what conditions. The purpose of setting down 
these conditions was fundamentally to prevent the export of war 
material to the Allies in so far as it was produced from German raw 
materials. The general rule was that goods imported into Switzerland 
from Germany should remain there. The interpretation of this rule was 
at the beginning very broad for although no German raw materials 
obtained through the agency of the Treuhandstelle could be directly 
re-exported, articles manufactured from these materials could be sent 
to the Lntente nations provided they were not unequivocal war goods, 
i.e., weapons or shells. In effect, raw materials worked up into a 
reasonably peaceable manufacture, or at least not into an overt 
instrument of war, shed their prohibition of export and could be re­
exported to the Allies. Thus articles of semi-military value, such 
as lorry wheels, were regarded as legitimate exports even if they 
were certainly destined for military vehicles. It was only in 1917 
that the German government demanded that peace goods made with German
1. Grant Duff-FO, 30 July 1915, dispatch, FO 382-^07-105928/15. This 
dispatch contains a copy of the application for a German export 
license, with the conditions of guarantee.
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raw, half-finished, or finished materials no longer be shipped to
the Allies without the express allowance in each case of the
„ 1
militarische Handelsabteilung of the German Legation*
The Treuhandstelle was organized only to issue German export
permits* It did not deal with the import of medical supplies, coal,
iron, or steel, nor did it concern itself with the surveillance of
Swiss exports or of goods in transit* Consequently its function and
powers were considerably narrower than those of the S.S.S. functioned
as the unique consignee for all Allied 'prohibited exports', as an
agency for distributing these goods according to a set ration, and as
the overseer of Swiss exports to the Central Powers. Since the
Treuhandstelle was in no sense an instrument of blockade, however,
none of these three functions found a parallel in its operations. The
relative simplicity of its purpose and organization allowed the
Treuhands telle to begin its operations almost immediately* On 15
August 1915 Aus r.ria-Hungary entered the scheme by empowering this
2
organization to issue export licenses for Austrian goods too.
In contrast to the notoriety given to the negotiations 
establishing the S.3.S., the Treuhands telle was set up in great 
secrecy. In a conversation with Sir Francis Oppenheimer about Swiss
1. Pfenninger, op.cit.. p.33*
2. M.Cornaz, Zmn Problem der //irtschaftsneutralitSt (Die Handels- 
vertrage der Schweiz im ersten Weltkrieg) (2urich, 1952), p.21 •
Ik)
commerce with Germany on 17 June 1915, Schmidheiny made reference to 
the consignment of medical supplies to the Gesundheitsarat but appears
not to have alluded to the general export license bureau set up in
_ l
Zurich. At a meeting on 23 July with the French, British, and
Italian representatives negotiating the 5.3.S., Hoffmann referred
to the Treuhandstelle 'in the most casual manner'. When questioned
sharply on this point by the British minister in Berne, Hoffmann
replied that sufficient public notice had been given to the Allies
in his reply to a question put by Councillor of State Winiger in
the Swiss parliament on 18 June. The only reference to this matter
which could be found in that very long speech was:
Wir sind rait unserem nordlichen Nachbar in 
Hinsicht auf die Sicherstellung der loyalen 
Einhaltung der an die Sinfuhr in die Schweiz 
geknupften Verpflichtungen zu einer befriedig-
enden Losung gelangt. I
Grant Duff rejected with some heat the claim that this constituted
sufficient notice qnd demanded 'a written confession from Mr. Hoffmann
3
th^t he did not mention the arrangement to me till late in July*•
This manner of exposure did little to reassure the Foreign Office of
the forthrightness of the Swiss government in general and of Hoffmann 
in particular. **
1. Memorandum by Sir Francis Oppenheimer, 22 June 1913* FQ 382-425-
81963/15.
2. Reply of Hoffmann to a question by Standerat Winiger, 18 June 1915$
stenographic report.
3. Grant Duff-FO, 31 August 1915, dispatch, FO 382-403-122995/15.
*f. Minute by Craigie, ibid.
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For the first two years of war, commerce between Switzerland 
and Germany proceeded as normally as could be expected under the 
circumstances. Control measures exercised by the Germans were light 
and were accepted, or at least tolerated, by the Swiss as one of 
the bothers of war, while the Germans for their part appeared 
satisfied with the receipt of such products as they could obtain 
in Switzerland. In the spring of 1916, however, the effectiveness 
of Allied blockade measures began to make itself felt in Switzerland, 
and was reflected in a sharp decrease in the export of compensatory 
goods to Germany. As Swiss trade with Germany was mutually profitable, 
their governments were united in thei# desire to maintain the flow of 
goods between these nations.
After an initial rebuff in April 1916 by the Allies to a Swiss 
proposal to allow further products to be used in barter with the 
Central Powers, the Germans began to exercise severe economic 
coercion on the confederation to induce them to press the case with 
tne Allies for further exchange privileges. The chief weapon in 
German hands for this manoeuvre was their export of iron and coal on 
which the Swiss had become entirely dependent for their economic 
stability. The German government expected by threatening to cutt off 
these exports that the Allied blockade authorities would, however 
reluctantly, accede to the Swiss demands. Their expectations were 
blighted. In the face of unyielding determination on the part of the 
Allies, the German and the Swiss governments were compelled to reconsider
Ik?,
their general commercial relations and, after several weeks of 
negotiation, signed for the first time during the war a comprehensive 
economic agreement regulating their mutual trade. They were forced 
to this expedient only after every effort to draw supplies through 
the blockade ring had failed.
Because of the surplus, as has been noted, iron and coal were 
never used by the Germans as an instrument of barter, but were 
delivered without demand for compensation. This arrangement was 
confirmed on 26 May 1915 hy an agreement between Switzerland, Germany, 
and Austria-Hungary, in which the three nations pledged themselves to 
grant export licenses without compensatory demands for ’spare* 
(entbehrlich) goods,^ The German government considered iron and coal 
•spare*, so export licenses were freely granted, and these materials 
fell outside the control of the Treuhandstelle. This does not mean, 
however, that no control was exercised over the destiny of these 
exports.
The responsibility for the proper use of iron fell in the 
first instance on German iron exporters. They set down conditions 
under which their iron could be used, and to which Swiss importers 
must subscribe if they wished to continue to receive deliveries.
In the face of an increased Swiss demand for iron to fill large 
foreign contracts, which coincided, incidentally, with a decreased
1, Pfenninger, op.cit,, p,3^»
German capacity to supply the metal which was being consumed by the 
military at a rate unimaginable before the war, the War Raw Materials 
Department of the Prussian Ministry of j/ar had eventually to intervene. 
A series of fundamental principles (grundsatsliche Richtlinien)for the 
use of German raw materials was published, which the officials of 
the German Legation in Berne had the most important firms in the Swiss 
metal industry sign as a guarantee that the principles would be 
observed.1 Likewise smaller manufacturering firms had to observe 
similar conditions (Bestiamungen uber die hirfuhr deutscher Waren 
in die Schweiz)for the use of German metals which ensured that no 
war material found its way to the Allies. These conditions were 
gradually made more stringent until in the summer of 1916 they were 
extended to cover metals which merely passed in transit through 
Germany (from,e.g., Sweden to Switzerland). Finally on 11 July 1916 
the Military Commerce Division of the German Legation issued a 
circular demanding that all Swiss users of 3erman iron sign a pledge 
to have no further dealings with Swiss industrial firms on the 
German black list.
This was going too far. Swiss metal users, regarding this 
condition as a meddling in their private affairs and an inducement 
to break faith with their fellow countrymen with whom, after all, they
1. Among these firms were Brown, Boveri, and Co., Oerlikon, Sulzer, 
Georg Fischer iClektrostahlwerke, Aubert Grenier, Sscher, Wyss and 
Co., etc. Grant Duff-FO, 24 December 191D» dispatch (from 
Skipworth), FO 382-429-202073/15.
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did most of their business, found this condition entirely 
unacceptable, A group of iron importers and the Association of 
Swiss Machine Manufacturers attempted to reason with the German 
officials, but these efforts not only met with failure but elicited 
more exacting demands. The German officials for their part felt 
justified in their unbending attitude since they had information 
that the black listed firms were supplying the J^IUqs with valuable 
w ir goods. Finally representatives of the associations of metal 
importers, machine manufacturers, and iron firms, meeting on 1 August 
1916 under the chairmanship of an official of the Political Department, 
decided to put further negotiations on the official diplomatic plane. 
But the result of the Political Department’s overtures to the German 
government was equally unfortunate: the Germans answered with a 
general reduction in the export of metal, which amounted almost to 
an embargo.' The deadlock was broken only in the comprehensive 
commercial agreement of 2 September 1916.
Vith regard to coal deliveries, no real difficulties were 
experienced until the autumn of 1919* In the Spring of that year 
the German government had formed in Kssen a Coal hxport Authority 
(Kohienausfunrsteile .vest) to supply coal to Switzerland, Holland, 
Italy, and occupied France at the level of their normal consumption.
1. For the question of the metal users' dealings with the German 
government, cf. Pfenninger, op.cit.« pp*33-37*
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The purpose of this organization was not to ration, but to fill
neutral requirements as far as possible,^
In October 1915 the British minister in Borne reported that the
Coal Export Authority had placed an embargo on coal to Swiss firms
2manufacturing munitions for the Entente.' Since the Allies were at 
this time receiving 5/6 of the total munition output of Switzerland, 
against 1/6 delivered to the Central Powers, and were anxious to 
maintain this proportion to prevent the extension of German orders,"^
the Foreign Office had Grant Duff present Hoffmann with an indignant
knote in which it was pointed out that during the negotiations for the 
3,3.3. no compensations for coal were provided since the supply from 
Germany was presumably assured. The S.S.S, was intended to serve all 
Swiss firms and was not based on the premise that certain firms would 
be able without reference to the Swiss government to make and execute 
rivate contracts with the German government. It was with surprise and 
disappointment that riis Majesty's government heard of coal embargoes 
for certain firms, and wondered if the Swiss government were prepared 
to tolerate this treatment at the hands of the German government, and
1. Imperial German Legation Berne-Political Department, 9 March 1915, 
n°te, Pol*Dept. 2001 (k), Schachtel 9*
2. Grant Duff-FO, 20 October 1915, telegram, FO 382-*f28-153839/l5. cf,
also the 'confidential report of M. Piaton* (French Military Attach^, 
Berne), 29 October 1915, £> 382-^28-153839/15.
3* Grant Duff-FO,17 June 1915, telegram, and FO-Grant Duff, 30 July 
1915, telegram, FO 382-^26-79618/15.
it. FO-Grant Duff, 23 October 1915, telegram, FO 382-^28-153839/15.
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ventured to enquire what steps they would take.
In his reply Hoffmann claimed that the report of the embargo was 
much exaggerated, as coal had not been refused to Basle chemical 
factories furnishing aniline dyes to Great Britain,x though it was 
true that a whole group of arms manufacturers was threatened with a 
refusal of coal if they continued to work for the Allies, These 
manufacturers, however, required relatively little coal and were 
besides abundantly supplied for a very long time ahead, so there was 
no need for immediate concern. Customs returns for September, October, 
and November 1915 showed that coal was proceeding into Switzerland in 
an absolutely normal manner and the German government had not 
officially informed the Swiss government of any prohibition. It was
absolutely false that the Germans had demanded compensation for coal,
2and were unlikely to do so.
Nevertheless, the Foreign Office felt it wise to re-open the 
enquiry instituted during the negotiations for the S.3.S. in July 1915 
about the possibility of providing coal, at least for firms working for
3
the Allies, in the event of a German coal embargo. The wisdom of these
1. It was suspected that the embargo was established merely to eliminate
competition with German chemical firms. Pfenninger, op«cit., p*39*
2. Hoffmann-Grant Duff, 9 December 1915, note, FO 382-**29-l87959/15«
3. The problem lay not with the supply of coalavailable at British
collieries, but with transporting it to Switzerland. Admiralty-FO,
11 December 1915, letter, FO 382-^29-189878/15.
preparations was soon confirmed when the German Legation in Berne at
last announced that firms supplying military goods to the Allies
would receive no more coal from Germany. ^ G.A. Skipworth, the
assistant commercial attach^ in Berne, reported that 53 Swiss firms
had been placed on the German black list and stringent measures were
2
being taken against them. Those measures proved relatively 
ineffective however, in so far as the boycotted firms were able to 
obtain the necessary coal from the stocks of other Swiss firms which 
were able to import freely from Germany.
When these procedures were brought to their attention, the 
German authorities concluded that the Establishment of a responsible 
coal distributing organization in Switzerland could no longer be put 
off if the measures against the black-listed firms were to have any 
meaning. The formation of the desired authority was left to the 
Federal Council, who after consultation with Dr. TJsteri of the 
Treuhandstelle and Johann Hirter of the S.3.S., arranged for the 
establishment by the largest consumers (municipal authorities, gas 
works, industrial concerns, etc.) of a private Swiss coal import 
company which was entered in the Commercial Register of Basle on
1. Grant Duff-FG, 24 December 1915, dispatch, FC 3o2-4lO-|935lVl5*
2. Grant Duff-FO, 2k December 1915, dispatch, FO 332-429-202073/15.
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January 1916 as the 'Zentralstelle fur die Kohlenversorgung der 
Schweiz1.1 With the consent of the Department of Public Economy, 
this organization began its operation on 1 February 1916 as the sole 
distributor of coal from Germany and Belgium. All re-export was 
forbidden and use in the production of war material for Germany's 
enemies was put under heavy penalty. Passing coal to a blacklisted
firm was considered a breach of contract and was likewise subject
2
to heavy fine*
Ironically, the establishment of his organization was followed 
by a falling off in the quantity os well as in the quality of coal 
imports, due mainly to labour and transport difficulties in Germany* 
Swiss stocks consequently diminished and by August 1916 the 
Esntralstelle had to suspend all deliveries to industrial firms with 
a four month supply in order to help their weaker colleagues. To 
secure the delivery of at least a minimal coal supply was a further 
inducement for the Swiss government to enter into the comprehensive 
economic agreement with Germany on 2 September 1916*
The difficulties, delays, and inconveniences of the iron and 
coal supply were but skirmishes in the diplomatic battle over 
exchange goods joined in the Spring of 1916 by the German, Swiss, 
and Allied governments. It will be recalled that Switzerland was
1* Pfenninger, op.cit., p*39*
2. Geering, op.cit., p.95*
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permitted, under the terms of the 3,S„3, agreement, to exchange only 
her domestic products for German and Austrian goods, though as a 
special concession she had also been allowed (k October 1915) to 
barter some *4000 waggons of material imported from the Allies and 
already purchased by the Central Powers before the establishment of 
allied controls. During 1916 no less than 500 million francs worth 
of goods imported from the Allies was re-exported to Germany,^ and most 
of the **C00 waggons had been delivered by April 1916. The Federal 
Council, watching with apprehension the supply of exchangeable goods 
melting away, and seeing no replacements with which to obtain further 
necessities from the Central Powers, envisaged economic paralysis 
creeping over the confederation.
Accordingly, on 5 April 1916 Hoffmann summoned the Allied 
ministers to the Federal Palace in Berne to present them with a note 
verbale in which he recalled that the Allied note of k October 1915 
had given the Federal Council authority to use as compensation the 
large stocks of goods in Switzerland owned by the Central Powers, but 
noted that the stocks had been nearly depleted. Reassured by the 
Allied intention expressed in the note of October to interpret
1. F. Fuoter,Die Schweiz seit 1848 (Zurich, 1928), p,26l. At this
time many types of goods could still be imported without consignment 
to the S.3.S., and there were besidew considerable stocks of goods 
imported into Switzerland before theS.S.S. came into operation. These
could be legally purchased by agents of the Einkaufsgesellschaft, 
cf. Com ission permanente Internationale de contingents (o.P.I.C) 
report 220, 50 March 1916, FG 382-1068-67110/l£I
'!
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the regulations of the 3.3.S. in a spirit of large bienveillance 
and the allowance for further negotiation in this matter provided for 
in the confidential letter of the same day, the Federal Council was 
encouraged to request the Allies to allow additional goods for exchange. 
A list of Switzerland*s requirements from Ger-iany and Austria-Hungary, 
was appended,"^ and the Allies were requested either to designate 
what types of goods they would permit to pass through the intermediary 
of theG.S.G. to the Central Fowers to obtain these requirements, or to 
consent to forwarding to Germany and Austria-Hungary stocks of goods 
amassed by the representatives of their central purchasing agencies 
since the opening of the 3.3.3.
A long minute by Owen O’Malley of the Swiss section of the 
Contraband Department summed up the attitude of the British, blockade 
authorities to this request. The written undertakings admitted 
a wide range of interpretations, he thought; at the lowest, absolute
1. From Germany: iron and steel, meachines, zinc, nickel, aniline
dyes, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, potatoes, etc. From Austria-
Hungary: wood, cellulose, aluminium sulfate, manganese, 
potassium, graphite, steel, sugar, etc. The Swiss wished also to 
obtain war material for its own forces: eleven Krupp 12 cm. 
howitzers, ordered before the war and not yet delivered, shells, 
optical equipment, etc. to a value of 10 million francs, from 
Germany. She also hoped to obtain 100 remounts from Austria.
Grant Duff-FO, 4 April 1316, FC 37I-2?66a-8^2/1$,
2. Hoffraann-Grant Duff, 3 April 1916, uvte verbale, F0 382-1061-67073/16*
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refusal, and at the highest, acceding to the request. If the latter, 
the Allies should demand complete statistics of the exchanges (customs 
statistics were not published in Switzerland in i?15-l6) and absolute 
proof that the goods in question were obtainable nowhere else than 
in Germany. Apart from setting a precedent which might haunt the 
future and encourage the Germans to demand similar privileges from 
other neutrals, allowing the exchange would in itself be highly 
advantageous to Germany,
Germany wouii gain in two ways for she would obtain the goods 
she needed and would be able to sell her own products to the value 
of 65 million francs. It was to her advantage to export these goods to 
Switzerland to obtain hard franco regardless of whether she also 
received goods in return. 'It is therefore not improbable that if 
we make it absolutely clear to the Swiss (and through them to the 
Germans) that we are going to re-fuse, Germany will in the end allow 
the goods to be exported to Switzerland -all the same'. Besides, the 
prizicipal article Switzerland wanted was metal, and their not obtaining 
it would cause distress particularly to the German-Swiss who would be 
more likely to blame the Germans than the Allies for withholding this 
raw material.^
\
^hile deliberations on how to handle the Swiss request dragged 
on in and among the blockade departments in London and Paris, the final
1. Minute by 0. O'Malley on F0 382-1072-765*0/16.
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exchange goods were being exported from Switzerland, The Political
Department attempted on several occasions to hasten the Allied
decision through its ministers in the Allied capitals, but was
informed that the request had raised "questions of considerable
magnitude" which the Allies u.ust consider at length and conjointly.
A special sub-committee of the War Trade Advisory Committee was
called together to decide what line the British should take in a
general Allied conference on blockade measures to be held in Paris
during June. This sub-committee recommended that (a) no compensation
should be allowed for goods of wnich Germany had the practical
monopoly of production, (in practice, iron and coal) because granting
this concession would expose the Allies to an unanswerable request
for equal treatment from the other neutrals, (b) Swit2erland
should obtain from the Central Powers only what was required to
keep Swiss industry at a pre-war level of production, (c) Switzerland
should be forced to buy elsewhere, even at higher cost, if the goods
are obtainable, anu (d) no raw materials for munitions should be
2
allowed to Germany.
Robert Craigie was accordingly dispatched to Paris with
1. Hoffmann-Grant Duff, 11 Kay 1916, note, and FO-Grant Duff, 20 May 
1916, telegram, F0 382-1072-93757/16. Also, Carlin-FO, 12 June 
1916, aide memoire, FO 3&2-1072-113925/16.
2. keport of the Sub-Committee of the *.'ar Trade Advisory Committee 
on "Swiss Exchanges with tho Enemy', 25 May 1916, FO 382-1072- 
100877/16,
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instructions reflecting these suggestions of the sub-committee, but 
he found the Parisian blockade authorities far less amenable to the 
Swiss proposals than their British colleagues. The French professed 
to regard S.S.S. control of consignable goods as practically non- 
existant and were in no mood to accord any concession to the Swiss.
Meanwhile, Romberg presented the Swiss Federal Council with a 
note, dated 8 Juhe 1916, of a very threatening nature. This note 
demanded that the Swiss export food to help feed German workers 
producing goods for Switzerland, and made it clear that deliveries of 
German exports would depend in future on the amount of imports they 
received from the neutrals. Switzerland was 16.5 million francs in 
arrears in delivering compensatory goods, and if the German owned 
stocks in Switzerland were not released to cover this 'credit*, 
all German exports would cease within 1^ days.^
The substance of this harsh note was communicated simultaneously 
to the Allied ministers in Berne by the head of the Political 
Department, and to the allied blockade officials in Paris by Grobet- 
Roussy, the director of the S.S.S,, who was there to plead for 
additional exchange material. The note was greeted with surprising sang 
froid in the allied camp. O'Malley thought the Germans would lose 
more than they would gain by carrying out their threat, since they would 
cut themselves off from a valuable source of aluminium, ferro-silicon,
1. NB IV (9 September 1916), p. 10
15*f
calcium carbide, electrical machinery, and agricultural products* 
Besides, he wrote, 'it is not out of the question that Switzerland may 
have allowed Germany to deliver the note to force our hands'. There 
should be no question of acceding 'to this summary and unjustifiable 
demand*
The British minister in Berne reported 'there is no doubt as 
to its menacing tone but the coolness with which the Swiss Minister 
for Foreign Affairs discussed the matter with my colleagues and 
myself gave us the impression that the note was deliberately arranged 
between the Federal Council and the German government*. He could not 
judge whether this was an exercise of German power, or merely a bluff 
prearranged by Edmund ochulthess, the head of the Department of Public 
Economy, but felt Switzerland might be forced to throw in her lot 
with the Central Powers, for although no reasonable Swiss had the 
slightest desire to fight either side, it was difficult to say what 
starving workmen would do. The commercial attach^ shared this 
fear, for he saw the Swiss caught on the horns of a dilemma. If 
they acceded to the German demands, the Allies would cut off their 
food supply, and then they must throw in their lot with the Germains 
in order to exist. If they acceded to the Allies' demamds, the 
effect would be the same because the Germans would then embargo coal
1. Minute by O'Malley on Bertie-FO, 15 June 1916, telegram,
FO 382-1072-115^15/16. At Lord Robert Cecil's suggestion this file
was shown to Sir Edward Grey who minuted *1 agree*.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 23 June 1916, dispatch, FC 382-1072-123003/16.
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and iron, thus destroying Switzerland's purchasing power to obtain 
foodstuffs from the Allies. In either alternative the Swiss must 
join the Central Powers.^"
Sir Eyre Crowe was convinced the staff in Berne had formed an 
incorrect diagnosis of the Swiss political situation. Since it was 
to Germany's economic advantage to continue to export coal and iron, 
the German note was probably a bluff directed not at Switzerland, but 
at the Allies. Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister of Blockade, shared 
this opinion.
Nevertheless, it was thought prudent to investigate the
military consequences of a refusal of the Swiss demands since this
might induce the Germans to invade the confederation or conversely
force the confederation to side with Germany. The Italian government
was particularly nervous in this regard. They had been informed by
the Swiss in November 191^, at the time of the publication of the
Royal Decree curtailing transit trade with Germany, that if the Swiss
could not obtain industrial supplies in Germany, it was a case of
either starving or going to war. In the manner of arcane prophesy,
this oracle did not specify against which side, but the Italians
suspected it would be against the allies and this would mean in
2
practice against Italy. The fear of a sudden German rush through
1. Skipworth-Grant Duff, 22 June 1915* report, ibid.
2. Rodd-F0,19 June 1916, telegram, FO 382-1072-118303/16.
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Switzerland to turn the Italian line in the Trentino and the Julian 
Alps drove the Italian array to frantic preparation of defenses in 
the Swiss alpine passes during the spring and summer of 1916.1
After consultation with French Army Intelligence, however,
General Joffre was able to report that the question of Swiss exchanges 
should be considered as purely economic, and that military consideration 
need not intervene. He argued that the Swiss army covered the south 
wing of both the French and the German armies, and that Germany had 
neither the manpower nor the equipment to try to envelop the French 
right flank by violating Swiss neutrality which the Swiss army would 
most assuredly defend. Presumably this held good in regard of the 
Italian flank as well. Joffre saw no reason, from a military point 
of view, for ameliorating the economic position of the Swiss or for 
relaxing the blockade, the efficacy of which was shown by the German 
ultimatum.^
There was also the possibility that Switzerland would voluntarily 
associate herself with the Central Powers. But only one consideration 
could possibly induce Switzerland to assume the responsibility of a 
German alliance: that such a step would enable Germany decisively and 
rapidly to turn the tide of war in her favour. This could in no case 
be the result of a Swiss offensive against Italy, because nothing
1. Italy finally declared war on Germany on 27 August 1916.
2. Bertie-FO, 28 June 1916, telegram, FO 582-1072-12^987/16.
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that could happen in North Italy could bring a swift and decisive 
issue for German arms. The only hope for such a victory would lie 
in sending large German armies through Switzerland with Swiss support 
to threaten the French army in the flank and rear south of Belfort, which 
would make it worth Switzerland's while to incur the dangers, both 
internal and external, of joining Germany in the war. 'If this is 
the situation', Crowe concluded, 'then the Italian apprehension of a 
Swiss invasion need not be taken too tragically'," The French too, 
on the strength of Joffre's report had discounted the danger of a 
German-Swiss offensive against their territory.
Nor were the possible political consequences of a refusal of 
the German demands by the Swiss ignored by the representatives of 
the Allied governments who had been meeting daily in Paris during 
June, discussing every aspect of blockade policy toward Switzerland.
The delegates were united in their determination to show the Germans 
that it would not pay 'to bully' the neutrals. They felt it should 
be made clear to the Swiss that if they were driven to desperation it 
would be by German and not by Allied pressure, since the Allies were 
allowing the Swiss to import everything they wahted for their own 
use, setting down stipulations orily against re-export, Germany, on 
the other hand, threatened to prevent imports to the Swiss for their 
own use. If either side were oppressing them, surely it was the 
German,
1. Minute by Crowe, ibid.
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In the light of these considerations, the Allied representatives 
decided on a firm course of action.'*' In answer to the Swiss note 
of 3 April 1916 requesting further compensatory articles, a joint note 
was presented to the Swiss government on 19 June, stating that by the 
terms of the confidential letter of k October 1915 the Allies were
neither verbally nor morally obliged to give the Swiss goods for the
2
purpose of exchange. Cohsequently the Allies would not countenance 
the use of their exports to aid the enemy, although as a sign of their 
good will they were prepared to discuss the question of allowing wine,
f ,Y*1
fruit, and certain types of silk to be used in the transit trade.
This uncompromising statement set the tone of the conferences held 
in Paris on 2*f,29, and 30 June 1916 between the Allies and a 
prestigious delegation of Swiss leaders.^
The vice president of the French ComitS de Restriction, Jean 
Gout, delivered the address of welcome to the Swiss delegates at the 
first conference. He said the conference was to be restricted to a 
discussion of the Swiss note of 3 April and deprecated any discussion 
of the German note of 8 June. Charles Lardy, the Swiss minister in 
Paris, acting as spokesman, replied that the German ultimatum had 
produced a bad effect in Switzerland and stated that the Federal
1. e.g. Cambon-FO, 26 June 1916, letter, FO 382-1072-12320^/16.
2. NB.IV (9 Se tember 1916), p.9.
3. The Swiss representatives were: Minister Lardy, National Councillors 
Ador, Chuard, Frey, Schmidheiny, Buser, the head of the Swiss 
Statistical Department, and Dr. Laur, of the Bauernsekretariat.
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Council had returned a firm r e p l y T h e y  did not wish the present 
discussions to be influenced unduly by the element of menace in the 
German communication. Switzerland wqis nevertheless in a precarious 
economic position, owing to largely increased receipts from Germany 
and decreased revenue resulting from their inability to export, 
which necessitated their turning to the Allies for the means of 
settling present debts, and continuing to draw further stocks from the 
Central Powers. Though the system of exchanges was no less repugnant 
to the Swiss tnan it was to the Allies, it was an unavoidable economic 
necessity.
lafith regard to German owned stocks in Switzerland, they were,
relative to German needs, so small that they could not appreciably
affect the outcome of the war. Furthermore, the Allies themselves
had an interest in seeing that German exports were not cut off from
Switzerland, as they were drawing large consignments of munitions from
the confederation, whose economic health was to Allied advantage.
Gout indicated he was unimpressed by these arguments, summarizing
them as an attempt to blackmail the Allies into using their own means
of land and maritime transport to supply Germany. Nor were Swiss
munition deliveries a matter to weigh heavily with the Allies, since
these contracts were placed primarily to benefit Swiss industry, and
> 2
could be just as well placed elsewhere.
1. On 21 June 1916. _NB. IV (9 September 1916), pp.11-12.
2. Craigie-F0,2*f June 1916, ’Report of the Conference on Swiss exchanges, 
held in Paris, 2k June 1916’, FO 382-1072-123858/16.
l6o
As the Allies remained adamant, granting no concession to
the Swiss exchange system during this and the subsequent conferences,
the Swiss delegates withdrew to consult their government. Before they
left Lardy read a statement expressing disappointment at allied
intransigence, in the name of his colleagues:
lie ont le regret de constater que leur mission
congernant l'obtention de nouvelles marchandises 
ou la mise k la disposition du gouvernement 
f£d£ral des stocks constitute en Suisse par les 
Empires centraux n*a pu aboutir, 1
This expression of regret had little effect on the resolve of
the Allies. On k July 1916 a joint note was delivered to the Swiss
Political Department through the Allied ministers in Berne, which made
the Allied position abundantly clear. Even prior to the Paris
discussions the Allies had felt justified in returning to the Swiss
2
government a fin de non recevoir, in spite of Switzerland*s debt of 
16.5 million francs to Germany, since among the stocks requested 
for exchange purposes were articles of the first importance for the 
conduct of the war by the Central Powers, The Allies had not 
altered their resolve to oppose the release of these goods.^
1. 3ertie-F0,30 June 1916, dispatch froraCraigie, FO 382-1072-12663/16, an 
Bertie-FO, 3 July 1916, dispatch, FO 332-1072-127893/16.
2. An expression used to describe the diplomatic practice of 
rejecting an official complaiht without examining into its merits.
3. Allied Ministers-Political Department, k July 1916, joint note,
FO 382-1073/13172Vl6.
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In the matter of compensation, the Foreign Office continued 
to regard it
'as most undesirable that an impression should 
be left on the mind of the Swiss government 
that, whenever pressure is brought upon them by 
the Central Powers, it is open to them to evade, 
without unpleasant consequences to themselves, 
their obligations toward the Allied Governments 
by putting forward the plea of 'force roa.ieure* * • 1
Meanwhile, the German government had been caught off guard
by the violent reaction evoked in Switzerland by their 'ultimatum' of
8 June in which they had threatened the Swiss with an embargo of coal
and iron. Their demands not only caused dismay and consternation
in Swiss industrial circles but began a sharp anti-German campaign in
the Swiss press. The German minister, distressed by this turn of
events, hastily informed Hoffmann that while maintaining their demands
for compensation, the German government did not intend to hold to the
2
stipulated time limit. The situation was not in fact so perilous as 
the Allies had at first feared, for it turned out that the Swiss 
Federal Railway possessed sufficient stocks of coal for six months, and 
the factories working for the Allies had enough for eight months*
1. FO-Bertie, 18 July 1916, letter ,F0 382-1072-127^2Vl6. The occasion 
of this observation was the discovery that 'in a clear and 
deliberate breach' of theS.S.S. statutes, that organization had 
allowed the exchange with Austria-Hungary of lubricating oil and
sulfur for the urpose of obtaining mineral oil through Austria from 
Rumania.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 7 July 1916, telegram. FO 332-10?3-1320l8/l6.
Craigie's minute: 'This strengthens the impression that we are 
merely in face of a severe case of German-Swiss bluff*'
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The real problem was iron. In any case, as Boraberg had said, these
supplies continued to flow into Switzerland even after the two week
time limit had expired.
Not only had the German threat failed to achieve its purpose,
but it was seen to be something of a diplomatic blunder. In his
dismay, Romberg realized he must act quickly to restore Swiss
confidence in German reliability and to regain some of the prestige
lost in this regrettable incident. He therefore invited a group of
Swiss industrialists and financiers to the Schweizerhof Hotel in
Berne on k July 1916 to a meeting presided over by Captain Schmitz,
the chief of the Military Commercial Section of the German Legation.
Dismissing at the start as groundless rumour all talk of Germany’s
cutting off exports of iron and coal to Switzerland, Schmitz claimed
to have information that the Swiss were exporting 800C tons a month
of munitions to France and Italy. None the less, the German
government did not wish to harm Swiss trade, but to be helpful to it.
He proposed, however, certain suggestions for the proper use of iron
imports, to which the Swiss replied by agreeing in principle to set
2
up a five man board to watch over exports to the Allied. A report 
on this meeting from the French Consul in Basle noted it was conducted
1. Craigie-FO, 1 July 1916, Report on the Allied-Swiss Conferences 
in Paris, FO 382-1073-132737/16.
2. Protocol of t£e Schweizerhof Meeting, 6 July 1916, BVP GSS GS 
1913-1919, Schachtel 20.
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in a ’conciliante et meme cordiale'mood. Craigie was convinced that 
the Germans were badly frightened at the results of their own action."*" 
Nevertheless, the German government did not abandon their 
demand for Allied goods, or at least for the release of the goods 
they had purchased since the formation of the S.S.S, through the 
agents of the Central Purchasing Agency, and which were under its
statutes unexportable. The value of the latter goods amounted to
2
approximately **0 million francs. During July, Schmidheiny in 
consultation with the Federal Council and with officials of the 
German Legation attempted to evolve an acceptable formula ensuring 
the continued flow of exchange material from the Allies. The Federal 
Council decided to request again the release of the stocks owned by 
the Central Powers and to request further material under the title 
of ’system of restitutions*. By this system, analogous to the
1. Grant-Duff-F0,l8 July 1916, report from Skipworth, FO 382-1073- 
143161/16. Crowe’s laconic comment on Craigie*s minute was, 
’That, I think, is the moral*.
2. The list of Austro-German stocks in Switzerland in June 1916 
includes 417 waggons of foodstuffs (6,058,000 francs),
221 waggons of fodder (538,000 francs), 77 waggons of 
industrial goods like oils, parafin, etc. (2,558,000 francs), 
in addition to 45,000 bales of cotton (27,000,000 francs),
7 waggons of flax (300,000 francs), 4 waggons of copper 
(80,000 francs), 2 waggons of lead (129,000 francs) and 
*K)00 kilos of nickel (80,000 francs). FO 382-IO73-I56879/I6.
*trafic de perfectionnernent1, in which metals were exported to 
Germany, worked up, and re-exported to Switzerland under Article 13 
of the R^glement int^rieur of theS.S.S., the Swiss hoped to supply 
stipulated quantities of raw materials (e.g., raw cotton) and receive 
in return manufactured goods with an equal quantity of the same raw 
materials in them. Over a short period this system would work in 
favour of the Central Powers. If the Swiss forwarded to the Germans, 
for example, one hundred tons of raw cotton, and received in return 
sheets containing one hundred tons of cotton, the Germans could 
immediately use the raw cotton in the manufacture of explosives, while 
the export of the sheets (presumably kept in stock) would serve to 
maintain the value of the Reichsmark."
The Swiss delegates returned to Paris with these new proposals 
to meet with the Allied representatives on 3*8, and 9 August. Gout 
received the proposals from Lardy and assured him the Allies would 
give them careful consideration, but observed that the system of
restitution seemed to be the compensations scheme under a different
2name.
The Foreign Office rejected the Swiss proposals summarily.
1. Bell, Blockade, p.311* Naturally over a longer period stocks 
of manufactured articles would be depleted and the same material 
would have to be re-exported to Switzerland. The system would 
then lose its advantage for the Central Powers.
2. Bertie-FC1, 3 August 1916, telegram, fo /10 .
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’The Allies cannot seriously be expected to 
allow the export of nearly *t0 million francs 
worth of goods including large quantities of 
cotton*•
They saw the system of restitution as an excuse to give Germany raw
material in exchange for stocks which it was essential for her to
dispose of anyway, and were unaware of any reason why concessions on
such a scale should even be seriously considered.^
The French and, after initial resistance, the Italians accepted
the Foreign Office view in this matter in an Allied meeting on 7 August.
On the following day the Swiss were informed of the rejection of their
proposals: the question of enemy stocks was not to be reopened, and
the restitution scheme could not be considered. Traffic in silk, wine,
and fruit, however, would not be interfered with, and if the Germans
cut off the coal supply the Allies would try to supply 35^0 tons a day
2
from a Mediterranean port.
In the final meeting with the Swiss delegates on 9 August, Lord 
Granville, Counsellor of the British Kmbassy in Paris, maintained 
the hard line the Foreign Office had chosen to adopt by mentioning 
the intention of the Allies to make representation to the 
Political Department about alleged abuses in the S.S.S. and 
demand guarantees against their recurrence.^ The Swiss delegates,
1. FO-Bertie, 6 August 1916, telegram, ibid.
2. Bertie-FO, 8 August 1916, telegram, FO 382-1073-155368/16.
Craigie's minute: *Satisfactory'• Switzerland needed in all 
10,000 tons of coal a day.
3. Bertie-FO, 9 August 1916, with the report of Lord Granville,
FO 382-1073-1561^8/16. Craigie: 'Switzerland must now decide 
whether they will work with us or destroy the S.S.S.*.
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recognizing the futility of further discussion, took formal note of 
the Allied declarations, and observing that they regarded their 
mission as a complete failure, returned to Berne.
Grant Duff lost no time in ascertaining the official reaction 
to the Allied sj:and on compensations. On 10 August he called on 
Hoffmann, who characterized the result of the Paris discussions as a 
great disappointment and expressed the view that the Allies should 
hcive allowed at least goods of no military value to be used for 
exchange. Now it was the turn of the Central Powers to vent their 
wrath on Switzerland. The "Germans had already cut the coal supply 
by 90 percent, and exports of iron had practically ceased. Hoffmann 
could not decide whether the situation was really ^serious or whether 
this was merely temporary pressure from the Germans to lend weight 
to their demands. Grant Duff, on the ground that the best defense
was an offense, suggested withholding Swiss aluminium exports to
-  1 Germany.
The Foreign Office was not to be intimidated by the report
of the German coal and iron embargo. Craigie wrote: 'The critical
period fsf Switzerland has now arrived, though, so quickly has this
followed the breakup of the Paris Conference, that i^may possibly
2
still be a concerted German-owiss move'. Grant Duff was instructed
1. Grant Duff-FO, 11 August 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1073-159i*08/l6.
2. Craigie's minute on Grant Duff-FO,10 August 1916$ telegram,
12 382-1073-156965/ 16-
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to inform the Swiss government that they were to be under no 
illusion as to the possibility of the Allies yielding to this kind 
of pressure. The Allies presumed that the Swiss would now cut off 
exports to Germany of iron alloys and carbides. In any case the 
Allies would continue to watch carefully all Swiss exports to the 
Central Powers to remove all temptation to hedge on the regulations 
of the S.S.S.^
Meanwhile, the director of the 3.3.3, confirmed to Skipworth 
t t coal exports from Germany had been stopped for four, days and 
the Kohlenzentrale in Basle had been informed they would in future
receive only 10 percent of the normal supply. The German Legation
in Berne, when asked, claimed not to understand the matter. The
Federal Council was meeting in emergency session, and Hoffmann
had advocated the reduction in Swiss exports to Germany as suggested
2
by the Foreign Office. '
A detailed report on the coal situation was prepared by 
Johann Hirter, the President of the S.S.3.^ Since the be inning 
of August, he reported, no coal had come from the fihur, and exports 
from the Saar were being received in greatly reduced quantities:
10 percent of the necessary coal, and no coke at all. The Federal 
Council was debating the suspension of electro-metal exports to Germany 
since Germany looked to Switzerland for the production of ferro-
1. FO-Grant Duff, 12 August 1916, ibid.
2. Grant Duff-PO, 11 August 1916, telegram, FC 332-1073-15821Vl6.
3. Hirter was, curiously enough, not only president of the 3.S.S. but 
a representative of the Coal Syndicate of Rhineland-Westphalia.
Sir Francis Oppenheimer referred to him as *the coal king of 
Switzerland*. Oppenheimer-O’Malley, 22 June 1916, letter, FO 382-
1072-12249/16. —
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silicon, calcium carbide, and especially aluminium# These metals
represented Switzerland*s most useful bargaining tool#'' Uven before
August, iron deliveries had fallen off sharply (June: 29*765 tons,
July: 331^ tens, to August 15: 0 tons). Hirter believed the decrease
in German exports was due not only to a desire to bring pressure on
2
Switzerland, but to a shortage of manpower in Germany.
Criticism in the Swiss press now, curiously enough, turned
from the Germans to the Allies, who received the major share of the
blame for the deterioratihg economic situation because of their
uncompromising stand in Paris. The most extreme critics advocated
Switzerland's throwing in her lot with Germany, obtaining her wheat
from Rumania, and returning to Germany the Allied prisoners interned
in Switzerland. More moderate commentators admitted that the
German note of 8 June was the real cause of the present situation,
but felt that Allied intransigence had played into German hands, by
forcing Switzerland to deal from a position of weakness with the
Germans. The Allied policy was not regarded as directed specifically
against the Swiss, but they were in fact the principal suffers
3
from the blockade.
1. Hirter's Report, * Question des Charbons', August 1916, FO 332-
1073-139^+08/16. Switzerland supplied Germany with 800-1500 tons 
of aluminium a month.
2. Grant Duff-F0,17 August 1916, dispatch, containing a report of an
interview between Beau and Hoffmann oh 10 August 1916, FO 382-1073-
I61A26/I6.
3. Grant Duff-FO, Ik August 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1073-163713/16.
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Swiss diplomatic resources had been exhausted in the 
unsuccessful effort to elicit Allied concessions, so there was no 
choice other than to enter into negotiations with the Germans. 
Considering Switzerland's unenviable position, she came out 
remarkably well from these negotiations.
The first conference was held in Berne on 1? August 1916, 
and the representatives met almost daily until 2 September.
An air of friendliness characterized the proceedings, and within a 
few days Hoffmann reported to the British minister that coal
deliveries from Germany had increased to about 60 percent of
2
normal.” discussions terminated on 2 September with the signing 
of the general commercial agreement. The text of the agreement 
was published officially and at once,Although a clause providing 
for a credit to Germany of 50 million francs was for a time 
kept secret.
1. The German representatives were: Dr.Schmitt of the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, Herr Mathys of the Ministry of the 
Interior, Lieut. Henneberg of the Ministry for War, and Herr 
Poerschke, the Assessor. For Switzerland: Alfred Frey,
E. Schmidheiny, and J. Kappeli of the Department of Agriculture 
and Commerce.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 25 August 1916, telegram, FO 382-1073-166652/16.
3. A statement was issued to the press immediately after the 
signature of the Agreement. The text is to be found in BVD- 
Abkommenen mit Deutschland 1914-1918, dchachteln 5 and 6.
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by this instrument which was to regulate commerce between 
the two nations for a period, of nine uionths (to 30 April 1917), 
the system of compensation was abolished and each state pledged 
itself freely to issue export licenses for its domestic products.
For certain types of domestic goods, however, an obligation not 
only to license but actually to deliver the export was assumed by 
the respective governments.
The Germans rationed coal deliveries to 253*000 tons a month, 
but pledged themselves actually to deliver that amount, and to make 
up the difference in the following mont 1 if one month's delivery 
was short. This ration was considered sufficient to cover Swiss 
coal needs. Iron end steel were not similarly to be rationed but 
were to be exported in sufficient quantities 'zur Deckung des 
schweizerischen Bedarfs'• For their part the Swiss agreed to 
establish an Iron Import Authority (Sentralstelle fur die 
&isenversor,n;ung) which would (a) determine Swiss iron and steel 
needs, (b) distribute their imports (c) control their use, i.e., 
ensure that they were not used for the production of allied war 
material. Subsequent to the establishment of this control, earlier 
pledges (grundsatzliche Richtlinien and Bestinimunnen) signed by 
Swiss metal importers and manufacturers lapsed, the German blacklist 
was eliminated, and all embargoes against blacklisted firms were 
lifted.
The Germans conceded that the Swiss were bound to observe 
the statutes of the S.C.S., which had the force of an international
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agreement, and therefore abandoned their insistance on. the 
delivery of the enormous stores accumulated by the agents of the 
Central Purchasing Agency and stockpiled in Switzerland. The Swiss 
on the other liand undertook not to sequester or requisition these 
stocks during the course of the war, and to deliver them promptly 
when peace came.
Until this time the Treuhandstelle* s control over the ultimate 
destination of imports from Germany was weak. Although the 
organization demanded pledges and guarantees before allowing 
delivery from Germany, it possessed no machinery for control over 
exports from Switzerland to the Entente lands. There were reasons 
to suspect that some war material was finding its way to allied 
armies which ultimately derived from German mines and factories.
In an attempt to eliminate 2*>sf>ihle irregularities in this regard, 
an Ausfuhrkommission II (originally suggested in the Schweizerhof 
raeetixig during July) was organized to scrutinize exports on the 
French and Italian frontiers, just as the 3.3.3.*s Ausfuhrkommission I 
did at the German and Austrian frontiers. Five officials comprised 
this organization: one each from the Political Department, the 
Department of Public Economy, and the Customs Department, and two 
from the ireuhandstelle. They were, of course, all Swiss. Again 
the object of these measures was merely to prevent the re-export 
of war materials manufactured from German exports or by factories 
using German coal, and not to impose a ’blockade* on the Allies.
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Consequently goods of a non-military nature produced from German 
materials could still be exported legally to the Entente lands.
Private loans by Swiss banks to German firms had been a 
regular feature of Swiss financial activity in the first years of 
the war. When the extent of these transactions was brought to 
the attention of the French government, they had demanded and, 
by bringing severe pressure to bear on the Swiss government, 
received a credit of 5° million francs. Now the Germans demanded 
in this agreement equal treatment in order to ease the strain on 
the mark and to expand their purchasing capacity in the confederation.
A loan of this amount would in addition cancel the Swiss debt to 
Germany of 16*5 million francs, accumulated principally in 
supplying Swiss army needs in the unequal compensation trade during 
1915-16. The loan was agreed upon in principle by the negotiators 
and provided in the following months by a consortium of Swiss banks 
to a group of German financial houses. To avoid counter demands 
from the Allies for further credits, however,this clause was kept 
secret.
With the signing of the agreement of 2 September 1916, commercial 
relations between Switzerland and Germany were stabilized for the 
next nine months, and the supply of raw material to Switzerland was 
theoretically assured. The agreement terminated a diplomatic 
battle which the Allies and the Central Powers had fought, as it were, 
on Swiss soil, and in which the Swiss government had been ignorainiously
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reduced to the status of liaison officers, plying between the 
opx>osing camps with proposals and ultimata, but incapable of 
affecting to their own advantage the outcome of the struggle*
The Germans appeared to possess the more powerful weapons in 
their control of iron and coal, but the Allies showed greater 
acumen in diplomatic manoeuvre. Sir 3yre Crowe and Owen O’Malley 
proved particularly resourceful in analysing the political temper 
of the Swiss and in playing the game of 1 brinkmanship1 with icy 
confi dence.
The German grasp of the climate of Swiss public opinion, on 
the other hand, was weak, and resulted in their blundering seriously 
oil the side of harshness where an accommodating policy might have 
achieved more satisfactory results. Indeed it was to Switzerland’s 
advantage to implement the German policy of exchanges, for had 
further compensations been allowed, Swiss trade would correspondingly 
have profited, while conversely the Allied blockade policy must 
unavoidably have worked to the disadvantage of her economy. The 
German ’ultimatum* of 8 June was a mistake for it was based on the 
false premise that the Allies would be intimidated, and did not 
anticipate the adverse reaction of the Swiss themselves. As a 
result the Allies won a distinct diplomatic victory in the Paris 
negotiations during the summer, since they were able not only to 
tighten the blockade but to do so without irrevocably irritating 
the Swiss public who had been distracted by the foolish ’iron and 
coal ultimatum*•
17**
The Swiss government too, once they were free to negotiate 
to their own account with the Germans, came off surprisingly well 
in view of the weakness of their position and the complete domination 
of their economy by the belligerent powers. It is a tribute to 
her negotiators that she found herself in a better economic position 
after 2. September 1916 than before. By the terms of the agreement 
she was freed from the onus of compensation and the blacklisting 
of her firms, and although rationed in the matter of coal, was 
furnished with an adequate and presumably assured supply, The loan, 
which was conceded under the customary terms of interest and 
repayment, cannot be regarded as a great hardship.
Considered dispassionately, the agreement should have earned 
tne congratulations of the Allies for the success of the Swiss in 
obtaining, from their position of weakness, these concessions from 
the Germans. Unfortunately, the Allies were incapable at this 
stage of the war of regarding the Gerrnan-Gwiss agreement at all 
benignly, and took exception to its provisions which they regarded 
as too favourable to the Germans. This Allied reaction is rather 
surprising in view of their success in overcoming various operational 
difficulties in the functioning of the S.G.G. which had caused 
considerable criticism since the organization' 3 founding eleven 
months previously and which had been solved only during the 
conferences in Paris during the eurl^ summer.
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V
INTERALLIED INTRIGUE
An unwillingness to abandon exchange trade with the Central 
Empires and to agree to the system of rationing which the Allies had 
first insisted upon after the initial talks between Sir Francis 
Oppenheimer and Alfred Frey was responsible for the delay until 
October 1915 in the acceptance by the Federal Council of the S.S.S. to 
which they had agreed in principle in the Spring of that year. When 
the compromise in the matter of exchanges gave promise of final accept­
ance by the Swiss of the trust-rationing scheme, an Allied conference 
was called to decide on the best method of imposing the rationing system. 
Two principles were evolved in this conference which met in Paris from 
4-7 September 1915* (a) a permanent bureau for rationing Switzerland 
was to fix the amounts of rationed commodities, and (b) this bureau was 
to see that the quotas, fixed on a quarterly basis, were not exceeded.
The conference decided not to apportion the ration pro rata among 
the Allies, but to open the quarterly ration to free competition among 
the three nations. Thus rather than restricting each nation to 
licensing only one-third of the quarterly ration of a given commodity, 
each government could permit the general export of that commodity until 
the central rationing bureau, which tabulated the export statistics, 
announced that no more licenses were to be issued in that quarter. Various
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technical provisions were designed to obviate any unseemly scrambling
among the Allies to fill orders, although this problem in practice
solved itself, since the several nations generally supplied different
commodities and only occasionally engaged in direct competition. As
regards commodities which the Swiss purchased from other neutrals,
mutually acceptable quotas were to be worked out, and French and Italian
customs officials were to see that these rations were observed. Sir
Francis Oppenheimer who represented Great Britain at this conference
expressed the hope that 'the bureau may eventually develop into something
very much more important; beginning with the rationing of Switzerland it
will probably become the central rationing bureau for all neutral 
1
nations•.
In the interim between the close of this general conference and
2
the final acceptance of the S.S.S. by the Federal Council, the Allies 
selected representatives to sit on the permanent rationing board in Paris, 
and made preparations for determining the limits of the Swiss rations.
1. Memorandum by Sir Francis Oppenheimer on the Rationing Conference 
in Paris 4-7 September 1915* 9 October 1915* £0 382-408-130756/15* 
Sir Francis' prediction never came true. Till the end of the war 
the rationing of the northern neutrals was effected through a series 
of private agreements emanating from London rather than from the 
interallied commission in Paris, which confined itself to Swiss 
rations.
2. On 4 October 1915* The formal acceptance of the confidential 
letter from Beau, Paulucci, and Grant Duff ('le Gouvemement 
federal se declare d1accord avec tous les points enumeres dans la 
lettre susmentione'e') is found in Grant Duff-FO, 8 October 1915* 
dispatch, F0 382-408-149055/15*
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Although Sir Francis Oppenheimer seemed the obvious choice to represent 
the United Kingdom at the conference to determine the Swiss rations,
Sir Alan Johnstone, the British minister in the Hague, urgently 
required his services in the Netherlands. After tying up several loose
1
ends in Berne, Sir Francis therefore returned to Holland in October 1915- 
In his place Robert Craigie was sent out by the Foreign Office to 
represent the British government during the negotiations which began on 
16 October 1915* A.H. LeChene of Customs, an assistant collector of 
the port of London, was to accompany him and to remain in Paris as the
permanent British representative on the rationing committee once it was
2
formed.
With his shrewd eye for business, Sir Francis Oppenheimer had left 
a lengthy memorandum on the importance of the composition of the rationing 
office in Paris. While the Russian government had sent no representative 
to the negotiations in Berne during the summer, as an ally they were in 
theory entitled to a voice in the rationing of Switzerland, though in
1. As Sir Francis was leaving his hotel in Berne for the last time, 
an urgent message arrived from Hoffmann enquiring whether it would 
be possible to change the name of the S.S.S. to Association Suisse 
de Surveillance. Since in Whitehall jargon such organizations 
were customarily referred to by their initials, Oppenheimer advised 
against the change. As it was, the wags were soon referring to 
the S.S.S. as Souverainete suisse suspendue. Oppenheimer’s other 
interest, the N.O.T., shared a similar fate, as the German word 
Not = need, distress, misery, or peril. cf. Oppenheimer,
Stranger Within, p.264. Also, Hoffmann-Oppenheimer,  ^October 
1915» letter, FO 582-408-156785/15-
2. Sir N. Highmore-Craigie, 15 September 1915» letter, FO 382-408- 
130816/15.
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1
practice they exported nothing to that country. Sir Francis insisted 
on the presence of a Russian in the rationing bureau.
’As far as the Russians are concerned, the supply of 
commodities to Switzerland will be of practical value 
only after the Dardanelles have been forced, but I think 
it will serve our purposes if we could get a Russian 
representative from the start. The French and the 
Italians will act on the presumption that their interests 
predominate in Switzerland and there is some danger that 
our interests may be outvoted. If we get a Russian 
representative we shall have at least an equality of 
voices as I have in view a member of the Russian Legation 
in Berne who is a personal friend of mine and who will 
support me whenever the British Delegate may need his
support. His name is Boris Tukhtiaew'. 2
In spite of the efforts of Sir George Buchannan, the British
Ambassador in Petrograd, to obtain the services of Tukhtiaew, the
Russian minister in Berne (Basile de Bacheracht) resisted giving him up
✓
and suggested instead a M. Felkner, lately Russian commercial attache 
for South Germany. Felkner was personally known to Oppenheimer, who,
considering him most inefficient and ’strongly under the influence of
the French delegate at Berne1, urged resisting his candidature at 
Petrograd ’as it would entirely thwart our purpose of Russian partici­
pation* ?
1. The closing of the Straits had put an end to trade between Russia 
and Switzerland.
2. Oppenheimer-Crowe, 20 September 1915» letter, FO 582-408-135022/15.
3. Grant Duff-FO, 8 October 1915 > telegram, FO 382-408-146768/15.
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Buchannan finally succeeded in convincing the Imperial Russian
government of the importance of the matter and obtained the appointment
as their representative to the conference and on the permanent rationing
board of Michel Batschev, an agent for the Russian Ministry of Commerce 
1
in Marseilles, who was considered sufficiently favourable to British 
interests.
Evidently the French and the Italians regarded Batschev as rather 
too favourable to the British, for after a few days of the conference, 
during which the Russian had adopted the British view on most questions, 
Gout suggested privately to that gentleman that he absent himself when 
the Swiss delegates were present since the Russian government had taken 
no part in the original S.S.S. negotiations. The Russian Ambassador
found this suggestion ’discourteous’, and Craigie was incensed, suspecting
2
that the incident was due to ’Italian intrigue*. Lord Granville 
accordingly spoke in private to Gout who apologized, and made a point
3
of requesting Batschev to attend all future meetings.
The formal meetings of the committee to determine Swiss quotas
4
took place almost daily between 20 October and 9 November 1915- Which 
dommodities were to be consigned to the S.S.S. and therefore to fall under
1. Buchannan-FO, 22 October 1915, telegram, FO 382-408-156550/15*
2. Granville-FO, 27 October 1915, telegram, FO 382-408-159278/15*
3. Granville-FO, 23 October 1915, telegram, FO 382-408-159996/15*
4. The representatives present were:
England - R.L. Craigie, A.H. LeChene.
Italy - Commander dell1 Abbadessa, G. Pacci, L. Natta.
Russia - M. Batschev^
France - Admiral Lefevre (president of the Comite de Restriction').
M. Moulie, M. Pean. --------------------
?resxlent"- j.HGout°bet'E°USSy’ A ' Pr6y’ J " Bonzon-
l8o
the ration was the committee’s first consideration, and although the 
British and French representatives quickly agreed that a conflation 
of their own lists of prohibited exports would provide the most 
wonvenient basis for the consignment-rationing list, the Italians 
objected that this would be prejudicial to their own economy. They
pressed for the exclusion of wine, green vegetables, and chlorate of
1
soda. Wine was consequently excepted, though the other two commo­
dities had to be consigned to the S.S.S., the one because of its
nutritive value, the other because it could be used as an ingredient
2
of high explosive.
After deciding on the types of goods to be consigned to the
S.S.S., the committee turned their attention to fixing the quotas for 
these goods. Following the practice of the French commission des 
derogations, Switzerland was to be allowed her normal import, based on 
the 1911-13 average, less her average exports to the Central Powers.
This formula was accepted by the French, British, and Russians, but 
again the Italians, who favoured supplying the Swiss with their average
5
imports without considering the factor of exports to the Central Powers, 
objected so strongly that the Foreign Office was forced, among other
1. Bertie-FO, 24 October 1915* telegram, FO 382-408-157040/15•
2. Granville-FO, 27 October 1915* dispatch, FO 382-409-160035/15*
3. Bertie-FO, 29 October 1915* report by Craigie on the progress
of the negotiations, F0 382-409-161513/15*
l8l
expedients, to resort to exerting pressure in Rome to override these
objections. Rodd was instructed to observe to Baron Sonnino, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, that although he had ’explained the
technical reasons that make it difficult for Italy to declare war on
Germany, and we have not pressed this point even when advancing money,
but have treated Italy as a full ally1, the Italian delegates were
nevertheless manifesting a desire to increase exports to Switzerland
which might well find their way to the enemy. The supply of German
needs by Italy was causing His Majesty’s government 'the greatest 
1
anxiety’. The allusion to financial assistance from Great Britain 
did not escape Sonnino, and the Italian delegates were soon adopting 
a more co-operative attitude in fixing quotas according to the suggested 
formula.
Even when the rationing principle was accepted, however, its 
application to individual commodities proved difficult. Customs 
statistics were available, but the inevitable dislocation of trade 
caused by the war complicated matters for not only were former sources 
of supply abandoned, and new ones developed, but the needs of Swiss 
wartime industries, which heavily favoured the Allies, had to be 
judiciously provided for. 'Harmless' trade with Germany was allowed 
to proceed normally, and the sale of luxury products to drain the
1. FO-Rodd, 5 November 1915, telegram, FO 382-409-161085/15
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financial resources of the Central Powers was actually to be encouraged.
After weeks of deliberation on the complex factors involved, the
commission produced a schedule of several hundred commodities to be
1
consigned to the S.S.S. along with their quotas. As these quotas 
were arrived at in consultation with the Swiss delegates, there was 
relatively little objection on their part to their final acceptance.
In any case, provision was made for revision - higher or lower - of 
the rations if need should arise in future. The schedules were 
officially announced to the Swiss government on 9 November 191b*
The final question considered, after drawing up the list of
consignable commodities, and establishing the rations, was that of a
2
permanent body to administer the rations. Early in Hie discussions 
it became evident that it was the intention of the Italian delegate, 
Commander de111Abbadessa, to press for the establishment at Berne of 
a committee consisting of special delegates appointed by the Allied 
governments to discuss and advise on all matters relating to the working 
of the 3.S.S. and that, in his opinion, the Paris commission should 
dissolve after the actual rationing figures for Switzerland had been 
decided upon. If a bureau were established in Paris, dell'Bbbadessa
1. A complete list of the articles to be consigned to the S.S.S. is
found in The Board of Trade Journal, 18 November 191b*
2. The representatives ultimately chosen for this body were Batschev,
Natta, Moulie, and James Meadows Smith. Craigie-PO, 27 October
1915, letter, FO 382-408-159049/lb*
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maintained it should be of a purely statistical character, and its
work should consist merely in tabulating end distributing data
1
submitted by the S.S.S. 2nd the Allied governments.
There were serious objections to dell'Abbadessa*s proposal.
In discussions with Sir Francis Oppenheimer, during his last visit to 
Paris in October, the Allied representatives had concluded that a 
rationing commission and not merely a statistical bureau should be 
established there. If the rationing of Switzerland was to be worked 
out without constant delays and misunderstandings, it was necessary 
that the implementation of Allied blockade policy be prompt and 
uniform, and a central representative body exercising an advisory 
function seemed essential for this purpose. Moreover, while he was 
in Berne, Sir Francis received the impression that the French Ambassa­
dor (Beau), and particularly Captain Piaton, the miltary attache", 
were likely to favour French commercial interests to the detriment of 
the British. Skipworth (the British commercial re]resentative) was, 
besides, new to his job, and Sir Francis felt it ’inexpedient* to invest 
him with too much power. Finally, dell*Abbadessa appeared likely to be
appointed to the proposed Berne commission and experience had shown
2
•he was a somewhat dangerous individual'. For these reasons the 
Foreign Office insisted on a combined statistical and advisory commission
1. Craigie-Grey, 23 November 1913* report, FO 382-409-170389/15•
2. Craigie-Waterlow, 23 February 1917 > letter, FO 382-1568-44894/17•
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being established at Paris, where they could through the large and
capable staff of the British Embassy exercise better control over
Swiss blockade policy than they could in Berne.
To this end Craigie enlisted the aid of the Russian delegate
in conjunction with whom he drew up a draft for a commission to be
located in Paris. At first the French delegation showed an inclina-
1
tion to agree with the Italian proposal, but after a certain amount
of private discussion and negotiation, came over to the British view.
When dell'Abbadessa was confronted with united opposition to his Berne
scheme, he showed a disposition to accept control from Paris with
certain modifications which would make this plan more palatable to his 
2
government. In private dell’Abbadessa confided to J. Meadows Smith 
of the Paris Chamber of Commerce, who had replaced LeChene as the
3
permanent British representative to the rationing commission, that the
Italian government opposed the Paris commission because it was ’too
political’, and that the principal opposition came not from the Italian
Ministry of Finance but from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs who feared
4
to exacerbate relations with Germany.
When the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs learned of the 
trend of negotiations in Paris, he had his Ambassador in London, the
1. Memorandum by Craigie, 18 November 1915» FO 382-409-173224/15•
2. Bertie-FO, 30 November 1915» dispatch, FO 382-410-183884/15•
3. Meadows Smith remained on the commission until 1918.
4. Bertie-FO, 15 December 1915» Memorandum by Meadows Smith,
FO 382-410-192491/15.
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Marquis Imperiali, leave a note at the Foreign Office pointing out that
(a) the Paris commission would be a duplicate of the commission of Allied
commercial attaches aupres de la S.S.S. in Berne, (b) the Paris commission
would have a political rather than a technical character, and (c) a
commission in Berne would be better adapted from local knowledge to
1
discuss promptly and thoroughly any difficulty which might arise.
With the Russian and French delegates in agreement, however, the Foreign
Office had no difficulty in maintaining their stand in favour of the
2
Paris commission.
The organization known as the Commission permanente intemationale 
des Contingents (C.P.I.C,) was therefore established in Paris on 15 
December 1915* Its purpose was (a) to ascertain whether the import 
quotas of 9 November 1915 were being observed and to inform the Allied 
licensing authorities when the quarterly ration was nearly filled so 
they could suspend the issuance of further licenses for that quarter,
(b) to indicate measures to be taken in case of non-observation of the 
quota, (c) to give advice on future adjustment of rations, (d) to receive 
and evaluate reports on the activity of the S.S.S., (e) to provide the
5
Allied governments with their expert opinion on blockade matters.
1. Imperiali-Grey, 4 December 1915» note, FC 582-410-184825/l5«
2. dell'Abbadessa enlisted the support of Grobet-Roussy for the 
commission to sit in Berne, and claimed he would attend no more 
meetings in Paris. This bluff failed. Grant Duff was instructed 
to make it clear to Grobet-Roussy that there was no chance of British 
acquiescence in the Beme scheme. Grant Duff-FO, 8 January 1918, 
telegram and reply, FO 582-1058-4886/16.
5. Reglement de la Commission permanente intemationale des Contingents,
I5 ^ ^ 30F 1785857I5"------- -----  ------------------------------ -----
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The daily business of the four man commission was to collect
statistical data and other information, and they were to meet once a
month in plenary session.
With tiie establishment of the C.P.I.C. in Paris, the machinery
for the Swiss segment of the blockade of the Central Powers was completed.
The O.S.8. itself went into operation on 16 November 1915» although it
took some time for the various Allied committees to process the first
applications for consignment as proper forms were not at first available
and decisions on special cases, such as consignment to Swiss government
monopolies, had to be made by the proper authorities. To lessen the
pressure of work on the society in its initial stages, the Board of
Trade decided to issue licenses for consignment to the S.S.3. only on
1
15 .December 1915* On that day Skipworth ceased to issue guarantee
forms which had hitherto been necessary for the import of ’prohibited*
2
goods into Cwitzerland. Goods which were not on the list of consign- 
ables to the S.S.S. could still be shipped directly to the importer in
3
Switzerland, accompanied only by a license of the '^ar Trade Department, 
although the number of *free* goods of this sort diminished notably during 
the following year as the blockade ring was drawn tighter. Goods such 
as wheat, rice, and oil which had formerly been consigned directly to
1. The Board of Trade Journal, 2 December 1915* Actually the date was 
later changed to 20 December 1915* cf» FO-Bertie, 14 December 1915, 
FO 382-410-190767/15.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 21 December 1915> telegram, FO 382-431-196089/15.
3. e.g. cinnamon, cf. FO 382-429-190044/15 (13 December 1915).
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1
Swiss government monopolies were now to pass through the S.S.S.
The S.S.S, eventually grew to enormous size, employing by the
2
end of the war some 500 persons, 420 in Berne and 80 in foreign lands. 
Foreign, bureaus were established in Paris, Bordeaux, Cette, Marseilles,
Le Havre, Rome, Genoa, Washington, and London. The London Office was 
administered by Arthur Palliser, a British businessman who had great 
sympathy for the Swiss oauBe.
It will perhaps be instructive at this point to outline the steps 
to be followed by a Swiss in importing a commodity consignable to the
S.S.S, Let us say a textile firm in St. Gall wishes to purchase ten 
quintals of cotton tissue from a cloth manufacturer in Manchester.
After the details of the purchase - price, quantity, etc. - have been 
settled between the firms, the customer in St. Gall obtains a certificate 
from the S.S.S. stating they will accept the consignment of ten quintals 
of cotton cloth. The S.S.S. issued such certificates only to reputable 
firms which were members of the Syndicate of Cotton User3. The importer 
in St. Gall fills out this certificate and returns it to the S.S.S. in 
Berne, who forward it in duplicate to the S.S.S. office in London.
1. Carlin-Grey, 2 December 1915» letter, FO 382-410-184034/15*
Oil had been elaborately rationed by private agreement with 
France, signed on 26 January 1915* This scheme was also 
subsumed under the S.S.S. cf. the exchange of notes between
Berne and Paris, 17 May 1915 > FO 332-415-70602/l5> and the 
Memorandum by Craigie, 16 December 1915» F0 382-415-192640/13.
2. S.S.S. R.I., p.93.
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There Palliserfs staff files one copy, forwarding the second to the
exporter in Manchester. Tne exporter sends this certificate along
with his application for an export license to the Licensing Committee
of the War Trade Department* On receipt of the export license, the
Manchester exporter informs the S.S.S* through the London office, on
a special form, of the number of the War Trade License, tne date of
shipment, the name of the chipping agents, and the port of discharge,
and receives in return a ’pink slip'. The cotton, accompanied by an
S.3.S. ’pink slip* is then allowed by customs officials at Marseilles
and Pontarlier to pass on in the name of the S.S.S. to the importer in 
1
St. Gall.
Mc-anwhile, the Licensing Committee of the War Trade Department 
has sent to tho C.P.I.C. in Paris a monthly report on the amount of 
cotton cloth licensed for export from Great Britain, including presu­
mably the shipment to St. Gall. Rationing is done on a quarterly basis.
2
When 75 cent (reduced in April 1916 to 50 per cent) of the proportional 
ration has been filled, the C.P.I.C. informs the competent authorities 
in Rome, Paris, and London, in the latter case, the War Trade Department.
The War Trade Department then orders the Licensing Committee to suspend 
licenses for the present quarter. The C.P.I.C. tried to remedy 
excesses in the actual imports of rationed goods by suspension of 
licensing rather than by stoppage of goods actually en route or arrived
1. Memorandum of Admiral Slade, 16 December 1915 > £0 382-410-192478/15•
2. War Trade Department-FO, 5 April I916, letter, FO 382-1061-65890/16. 
Experience had shown that the other fifty per cent was usually filled
by the other allies.
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at the frontier, which caused congestion of storage accommodations
1
and heavy demurrage on steamers and railways. As far as possible, 
tney desired to place an embargo on goods before they were shipped to
save duplication of work for the liecnsing committees who were in any
2
case inundated with applications for export.
At the same time the commercial attaches of the Allied missions 
in home were in constant communication with the S.S.S. authorities and 
were meeting frequently both by themselves and with Grobet-Roussy to 
discuss questions relating to the working and control of the S.S.S.
The rapport between the attaches and Grobet was good and served to 
remove much of the unpleasantness necessarily associated with the 
presentation of occasionally harsh demands from the Allied blockade 
authorities and conversely to dull the edge of complaints from the 
Swiss side.
After a century of free wheeling economy, it was not to be 
expected that the controls imposed on Swiss trade by the S.S.S. would 
command tne enthusiasm of Swiss businessmen. The British government
3
had, of course, anticipated objections to the scheme before its inception,
1. C.P.I.C. report 149# 7 March 1916, FO 382-1061-52199/16.
2. Minutes of a meeting of the Licensing Committee, 4 February 
1916, FO 382-1061-48917/16.
3. Memorandum by C. Hurst, 17 July 1915, £0 382-407-96817/15*
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but were perhaps deficient in propagandizing its advantages, especially
in German speaking Switzerland. Frey’s prediction at tne first meeting 
of tile General Assembly on 11 Octooer 1915 that tne members of the 
Assembly would soon become tne most maligned men in Switzerland was 
fortunately not fulfilled since their forthrigat integrity retained for 
these men the respect of all. hut the institution itself, especially 
in its initial phase of operations, wa3 not spared the obloquy of the 
business community. ‘file objections to tne 3.3.S. were many and varied, 
but contrary to tne expectations of tne Foreign Office, they were aimed 
primarily against application procedures and delays in delivering orders, 
rather than against the imposed rations which apparently had been set 
at a sufficiently high level. German sympathizers in Switzerland and 
several Swiss German newspapers made every effort to exploit the dis­
content of Swiss traders, and their agitations roused antagonism to the 
3.3.J. from tne very beginning.
Particularly affected by the 3.3.3. regulations were small traders
and the cottage industries. Working on a narrow margin of profit and
with little capital on nand, these 3wi3U found it difficult to raise
funds for tne bond required oy their syndicate and to leave this cash
1
idle for an indeterminate period. Tne nocessary bookkeeping and the 
statistics of earlier imports were frequently beyond the capabilities
1. War Trade Department-FO, 31 March 1916, letter, FO 382-1061-
61802/16.
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of tiie small businessmen whose records were negligently kept and 
whose importing in the past had been conducted entirely by parcel 
post. Not unnaturally, businessmen of this sort experienced 
irritation at the numerous and expensive formalities in the S.S.S. 
procedure.
Weightier objection was raised by larger firms against what
they regarded as unconscionable delays in the delivery of goods
across France. These delays and the outcry raised against them were
widespread and serious enough during the winter of 1915-16 to drive
the directorate of the S.S.S. to the point of resignation, and call
1
into question the continued existence of the Trust. In January 1916 
the French Chamber of Commerce in Geneva in fact addressed to the 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs a resolution calling for the 
abolition of the S.S.S., giving as reasons for their dissatisfaction 
the large cautionary sums required by the syndicates, the unfairness 
of being forced to disclose details of previous business (to fix the 
amount of imports allowed) which gave competitors valuable commercial
information, and especially the difficulty of transporting goods
2
across France. Indeed public feeling was so strong that the S.S.S.
1. E. Grey-Cambon, 1 April 1916, Memorandum, FO 382-1076-54175/16.
2. Grant Duff-FO,  ^February 1916, dispatch with a copy of the 
Chamber of Commerce resolution dated 19 January 1916, FO 382- 
1060-29116/16.
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was forced to publish an official apology on 5 February 1916,
1
promising to facilitate rail transport through France.
Delays on the French railways had affected Swiss imports from 
the beginning of the war. On mobilization in 1914, all railways in 
France passed under the control of the military authorities. Those 
near the front in an area known as the ’Zone of the Armies' were under 
the orders of the Commander in Chief; those in the rear - the rest of
France - were under the Fourth Bureau (quatrieme bureau) of the
2
Ministry of War* From the start the railways suffered from a short­
age of rolling stock %?hich became progressively more marked as the 
number of French troops to be supplied on the front climbed to two and 
a half million, with another two and a half million on the lines of
communication and at supply depots, and the British Expeditionary Force
3
reached the million mark. The Channel and Atlantic ports grew so 
congested with supplies for the P’rench and British armies in the Spring 
of 1915 (not to mention French civil needs), and Marseilles was so 
clogged with supplies for the Dardanelles campaign that the Fourth 
Bureau 'strongly advised' the Swiss to confine their traffic to the 
port of Cette in order to lighten the burden on the main French ports
4
and ra.il lines,
1. Guichard, oi.cit.♦ p.214* The text of tne letter of the S.S.S. 
is found on pp.219-16.
2. A.M. Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front 1914-1918
(London, 1937), I, 4, 11.
3. Bertie-FO, 7 March I915, dispatch, FO 332-422 75753/lfr* 4C.S3 5T/ 1 S’
4. Bertie-FO, 7 June 1915, dispatch, FO 382-422-75753/15*
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It is difficult to imagine a less convenient Trench port than
Cette (now Sete), which lies southwest of Montpellier, some ninety
miles west of Marseilles. Swiss importers immediately raised a
howl of complaint, but in August 1915 the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs (Delcasse') announced that Cette was to be reserved for Swiss
traffic, its use was to be permanent, end there was no likelihood of
change in the decision of the authorities. The French government
could no longer guarantee the transport of Swiss goods from other
ports, and although they were not prepared to forbid shipment to them,
their use had to be at the risk of the owner and the shipper, and the
consignments could not exceed in bulk one complete waggon load.
Delcasse claimed that important measures had been taken to put Cette
1
in a fit state for dealing with a large and regular trade.
This was not the opinion of a Foreign Office representative sent
out from the consulate in Marseilles to inspect the facilities at 
Cette, who reported that the port was out of the question for further 
traffic. Cstte was hardly able to cope with local trade. The maximum 
draught at quayside was eight meters, the cranes were inadequate, and, 
as the rail line did not extend to the warehouses, carting was necessary 
for which labour was scarce. 250 to 300 waggons a day were required
for Swiss grain alohe, of which only 60 were available. Cette was,
2
he judged, 'a hopeless place’.
1. Bertie-FO, 5 August 1915> dispatch, FO 382-423-108628/15.
2. M. Crowe-FO, 9 November 1915, dispatch, F0 382-424-170004/15.
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The Foreign Office had for a long time suspected that the 
difficulties experienced by the Swiss in importing goods from over­
seas really stemmed from France’s own commercial interest in that 
country and her desire to suppress competition. In early 1915» 
various British firms had alleged that although they had undertaken
not to export to Switzerland, their French competitors continued to
1
do so. O’Malley felt it was very likely true that the French were
trying to cut Great Britain and Italy out of the Swiss market to their
own advantage and to the detriment of the blockade. Sir Francis
Oppenheimer did not doubt this for a minute and saw this policy as
responsible for the tenacity with which the French had been insisting
that they must issue fresh licenses for any British export passing
through France to Switzerland after being licensed by His Majesty’s 
2
government.
Oppenheimer was referring to an old bone of contention between 
the British and French licensing authorities. The British had assumed 
that their ally would allow British goods to pass to Switzerland on 
the strength of the British export licemse on the presupposition that 
the War Trade Department had satisfied itself as to the ultimate 
destination of the shipment, but the French Customs officials had been 
holding such goods at the Swiss frontier until the British exporter
1. e.g., Pirelli Ltd. (rubber products)-FO, 15 May 1915» letter,
FO 582-422-60058/15.
2. Minutes by O’Malley, Oppenheimer, ibid. Craigie found the 
French policy ’intolerable’.
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obtained a French license as well. The resultant inconvenience 
and aggravation can easily be imagined. V/hen the French govern­
ment ignored frequent British representation on this point during 
the Spring of 1915> the Foreign Office sent an unequivocal telegram 
on clair to Bertie, knowing it would be picked up by French Intelligences
I have been expecting for more than two months to 
receive the views of the French government on our 
proposals. (British firms) are unable to understand 
the delay in reaching an arrangement nor why the French 
government should place difficulties in the way of the 
transit to Switzerland of British goods even after full 
investigations as to ultimate destination have been made 
by H.M. government whilst French goods of the sane class 
apparently are allowed to pass. 1
Bertie, of course, followed this up with ia strong note* to Delcasse,
The question of securing French export licenses for British
exports to Switzerland through France was the subject of ’a long and
2
at tines acrimonious discussion’ during the Paris conferences in 
June 1915 which had been called to formulate a common Allied economic 
policy before the £5,3.S. proposals were presented by Oppenheimer,
5
Crozier, .and dell'Abbadessa to the Swiss government during the summer.
At last the French agreed that goods licensed by the British, even 
though prohibited of export by the French government would not require
1. Grey-Bertie, 22 May 1915» telegram, FO 3G2-422-60038/l5»
2. Bertie-FO, 26 May 1915? telegram, FO 302-422-66862/15*
3. The minutes of these conferences were summarized by C. Hurst,
19 June 1915, FO 382-422-80837/15-
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in addition a French export license but y/ould be allowed to be shipped
freely across France on the strength of the War Trade Department
recommendation, unless there were special reasons for suspecting an
enemy destination. The assimilation of the British to the French list
of prohibited exports during the summer of 1915 well as more precise
identification of the good3 involved eliminated further sources of 
1
friction, thou^i a truce in this unedifying interallied struggle was
far from being declared.
A disturbing memorandum submitted in October 1915 by Sir Francis 
Oppenheimer gave further evidence for suspicion that the French were 
continuing to hold up British consignments in an effort to oust compe­
tition from the Swiss market. Enclosed was a confidential document 
from a Zurich coffee dealer which purported to prove *an attempted 
policy of blackmail1. It appears that large consignments of coffee 
had been seized by French cruisers and were being held in French ports
until the Swiss purchaser signed an undertaking to purchase future
2
requirements only through French importers. The Foreign Office felt 
that this plot was hatched through the misguided zeal of local officials 
without the knowledge end consent of hippier French authorities, but 
were, of course, deeply troubled by it.
1. Bertie-Delcasse*, 5 August 1915» aide memoire, FO 362-423-107028/15• 
Custoras-FO, 6 September 1915» letter, FO 382-423-12667/15•
2. Memorandum by Qppenheimer, 20 October 1915t with statement by 
M.F. Aebly of Zurich, FO 382-423-149053/15.
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It was the opinion of the Contraband Department that the
exclusive use of Cette for Gwias imports would at least have the
advantage of minimising the opportunities for the obstruction of
trade by subordinate French officials and they therefore tried to
arrange tixrough tne board of Trade regular sailings to that port
for British shipments. dir Sdward Grey informed tha hoard of
Trad© that because Italy and France acre tanking use of tho abnormal
condition of transit traffic across their territories to supplant in
Switzerland not only the trade of Gerraauy and Austria but also that
of otiier neutrals, of the United Kingdom, £vnd of each other, it was
politically desirable to oake every effort to maintain and to strengthen
British commercial ties with the Swiss *3ince tho political intercourse
of the two countries consists almost entirely in the discussion of
commercial questions*. This effect could be achieved by encouraging
1
British shipowners to make Cette one of tneir regular ports of call.
Tne Board of Trade, however, did not aold out auca hope of 
inducing the Allied shipping Control to schedule more sailings to this 
out-of-the-way port, for the principal difficulty with using Cette seems 
not to have been the harbour’s depth which sufficed for all but the 
largest ships, nor the inadequacy of its facilities which were reportedly
1. Grey-Board of Trade, b November 191b» letter, FO 592-424-I6l70b/l5
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1
being improved, but irregular sailings because of lack of cargoes
2
to be picked up there. Craigie recommended the appointment of 
Meadows Smith to investigate and deal with transport problems in
3
France, and meanwhile sent in a preliminary report in which he re­
iterated the opinion that Cette was 'absolutely unsuited' for British 
exports. A deliberate attempt was being made by the French V/ar Office, 
he stated, to hinder British trade in the mistaken view that French 
trade would thereby benefit. Although during the summer of 1915 
goods were being forwarded from Le Havre and Bordeaux to Switzerland, 
by the autumn deliveries had almost completely stopped and little or 
nothing was passing Cette. Bertie was consequently pressing the 
French government for the use of additional ports for British-Swiss
5
traffic.
Craigie suggested that the Foreign Office inform the French 
government that they could no longer accept without protest a situation 
which had led to the complete dislocation of trade relations with 
Switzerland and trusted that Swiss traffic would be permitted to pass
1. Gurney (consul at Marseilles)-F0, 4 October 1915> telegram,
FO 302-423-143959/15• M. Crowe was, however, unimpressed
by these 'improvements'.
2. Gibson and Son (tanners)-FO, 23 November 1915» letter, FO 382-
424-177429/15.
3. Bertie-FO, 11 November 1915> telegram, FO 382-424-I69664/I5.
4. Memorandum of Craigie on Transport in France, 19 November 1915* 
FO 382-424-173987/15.
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through ports at which British steamers habitually called, Cette 
in his opinion, should be reserved for grain only since its
facilities were unsuited for other goods.
At a conference called at the Quai d*0r8ay as a result of 
British complaints, representatives of the Fourth Bureau of the 
French Ministry of War agreed to arrange for one train a week from
Le Havre (French rolling stock), a bi-weekly train from Bordeaux
(Swiss rolling stock), and a second bi-weekly train from St. Nazaire,
1
if the British would provide the necessary fifty to one hundred waggons. 
The Secretary of the Army Council in London, however, regretted that no 
British railway equipment was available for Swiss service because of
a shortage of rolling stock (although a number of waggons were being
2
built in Canada), shipping difficulties, and differing wheel gages. 
Nevertheless the Swiss Federal Council ordered the Federal Railway to 
provide the required locomotives and waggons which the British were 
unable to supply. Service on this run therefore began within a fort­
night (December 1915)- In announcing this, Grobet-Roussy pointed out 
incidentally to Skipworth that only 170 waggons a day arrived from 
France as against 900 from Germany, and hoped the British government
1. Bertie-FO, 17 December 1915» telegram, FO 382-424-195705/15.
2. FO-Bertie, 23 December 1915» telegram, FO 382-424-196926/15*
War Trade Departraent-FO, 19 January 1916, letter, FO 382-1055- 
11508/16. 2,500 British waggons were, however, in the service
of the B.E.F. at this time.
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would continue to press the French for better rail facilities for 
under present circumstances it was useless for the S.S.S. to issue
permits as Swiss buyers were already threatening to sue the S.S.S.
1
for damages caused by delays in delivery.
It was natural that the Swiss public, who were of course 
unaware of these conflicting Allied policies, should blame the newly 
formed S.S.S. for their troubles and difficulties in obtaining supplies* 
The S*S*S* came into operation just at a time when the Allies were 
drawing tight the blockade net and were endeavouring to prevent the 
escape to the Central Powers of shipments of any importance to the war 
effort* A general failure to distinguish between the trust organiza­
tion and conditions which it could in no way control resulted in a 
shower of criticism being misdirected at the scapegoat S.S.S. during 
the early months of its existence. Gradually, however, informed 
circles in England and in Switzerland came to realize that difficulties 
experienced in Anglo-Swiss trade resulted principally from the policy 
of the French Ministry of War rather than from inadequacies in S.S.S. 
procedures. This realization extended even to other Ministries in 
the French government.
1. Grant Duff-FO, 4 January 1916, telegram, FO 582-1055-2140/16. 
Bertie was accordingly ordered to point out to Briand that 
British trade seemed to be at a disadvantage in France, and 
while His Majesty's government were reluctant to admit that 
French authorities were purposely hindering British trade, the 
blame could no longer be placed on congestion in ports* 
FO-Bertie, 6 January 1916, telegram, ibid.
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In December 1915» Lord Granville paid Briand a visit to
complain of the situation and was told to his surprise that Jules
Cambon (secretary-general of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) was
about to write a personal letter to the Minister of War 'complaining
in the strongest language of the incompetence, obstinacy, and want of
1
good will of the 4th Bureau of the Ministry of War*. Bertie kept
hammering away on the same theme during January 1916, pointing out to
Briand that the decision of the Fourth Bureau to channel all British
goods to Switzerland through Cette was intolerable as it had been
'conclusively shown by the unanimous verdict of merchants, agents,
consular officials, etc. that Cette was totally inadequate' apart from
the fact that it was not a regular port of call. He therefore
requested that the competent authorities cancel immediately the Fourth
Bureau's announcement that Cette was the only authorized port for
2
British traffic.
A scheme evolved by the director general of French Customs to 
circumvent the obstructiveness of the Ministry of War by excepting all 
consignments of less than 10,000 kilos from the requirement of a license 
from the Fourth Bureau unfortunately came to grief. Consignments of 
this class from the interior of France to Switzerland, or even of
1. Bertie-FO, 29 December 1915> dispatch, F0 382-1055-2647/16.
2. Bertie-Briand, 22 January 1916, letter, F0 382-1055-13679/16.
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British goods to Italy across French territory were excepted from
this licensing requirement, but British goods to Switzerland were not 
1
so treated. The conclusion was inescapable that the Fourth Bureau 
wanted to block British trade to landlocked Switzerland,
In February 1916 the Foreign Office, exasperated by frequent 
reports from British and Swiss firms as well as from the Central 
Intelligence Branch of the Board of Trade of delay or non-delivery of 
goods, ordered Bertie to threaten the French government that
•unless the transit system between French ports and 
Switzerland can be shown by practical results to be 
working in a way equally satisfactory to British and 
French trade, H.M, Government will ••• be strongly 
urged to withhold the facilities hitherto accorded for 
the transhipment in British waters of French exports 
destined for Scandinavia and the Netherlands’, 2
On the day following the delivery of this communication, during
the course of a meeting of the French Comite" de Restriction, reference
was made to the inequality of treatment accorded by the Fourth Bureau
to French and British goods. The Fourth Bureau officer present at
this meeting promised at the urging of Gout to discuss the matter with
a Colonel Gassouin and a Major Hirsh who appear to have been responsible
for the policy of that organization. But this promise had little
effect: in early April, in fact, the Fourth Bureau refused to forward
1. Bertie-FO, 29 December 1915t dispatch, FO 382-1055-2649/16.
2, FO-Bertie, 18 February 1916, telegram, FO 382-1055-21466/16.
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1
any more British goods from Le Havre to Switzerland.
This was the last straw. The French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs himself immediately issued a ringing memorandum to the 
subordinate officials of the French Customs and railways, pointing 
out in unambiguous terms the disastrous effects of a policy which 
'has shocked the British government' and 'has exposed to real abuses' 
British commercial correspondence with Switzerland. Nor did he
hesitate openly to fix the responsibility for the situation on the
2
Ministry of War. This extraordinary raemoradum was not ineffective, 
for Meadows Smith was soon assured by Major Hirsh of the Fourth Bureau 
that small consignments from Great Britain would be forwarded without
further formality not only from Cette, but from Bordeaux, Marseilles,
3
Nice, and Monaco as well. In spite of difficulties caused by 
unavoidable congestion at quayside, a general shortage of railway 
equipment in France, and irregular sailings to Nice, Monaco, and 
Cette, Swiss traffic was moving rather well by the autumn of 1916.
Lord Granville, who had always entertained considerable doubts as to 
the good will of the officers of the Fourth Bureau, and had been certain
1. Bertie-FO, 2 April 1916, telegram, FO 382-1055-65556/16.
2. This memorandum is found in Bell, Blockade, p.505*
3. Bertie-FO, 5 May 1916, telegram, FO 382-1055-86067/16.
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they were occupying themselves with questions which did not really
concern them, i.e., with possible traffic with the enemy, was led
to believe in September 1916 that this was no longer the case and
that the Fourth Bureau was 'doing its best to cope with the very
1
arduous task imposed on it'.
Statistics released by the French ambassador in Berne in 
November 1916 confirmed Lord Granville's opinion. By the Franco- 
Swiss convention of April 1914, France had undertaken to deliver 
57*000 tons of cereals to Switzerland each month. The figures for 
1916 were*
Total rail deliveries (tons) Of which cereals comprised 
May 94,000 49*000
June 95,000 59,000
July 119,000 86,500
August 115,000 89,500
Three trains a day brought cereals to Switzerland: two from
Cette, and one from either Marseilles, Nice, or Monte Carlo, while
two other trains a day carried other goods from one or more of these
ports. Each week three trains hauled British traffic from Bordeaux,
1. Bertie-FO, 15 September 1916, telegram, FO 582-1056-185164/16.
205
1
and one train brought French goods from Le Havre. Swiss waggons
comprised most of these trains, and the largest and best Swiss
locomotives had to be sent down to Lyons to draw them up to Belle- 
2
garde, but this does not detract from the achievement of the Ministry 
of War in scheduling and routing these trains under difficult wartime
conditions.
To achieve even greater efficiency in the use of the railways 
a Director General of Transport (M. Claveille) was appointed by the 
French government in the autumn of 1916 to take over the functions of 
the Fourth Bureau and to maintain absolute control over traffic and 
tonnage. Under Clavoille*s leadership little difficulty was
1. Rumbold-FO, 28 November 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1057-245652/16. 
Evidently the goods from Le Havre were purchased by the Swiss 
from overseas through French middlemen.
The effort of the S.N.C.F. in keeping Switzerland supplied is 
impressive considering the vast increase in goods disembarked at 
French ports during the war. The monthly average for 1913 was
2,800,000 tons. The figures for 1916: January* 3»600,000 tons; 
March* 4*000,000; August: 5*000,000.
2. Craigie-Waterlow, 21 April 1917* letter, F0 382-1564-86475/17•
3. Bertie-FO, 11 December 1916, telegram, FO 382-1057-250906/16.
Sir H.A. Lee and Meadows Smith were highly impressed by M. 
Claveille, though old Sir Henry hinted that if an energetic 
Englishman had been put in Claveille*s job back in 1914* all 
transportation difficulties would have long since been overcome!
206
experienced in sending goods through France to Switzerland during
the final two years of the war, to the satisfaction of both the
1 *
British and the Swiss.
The Swiss public was, of course, unaware during 1916 that a 
conflict between military and diplomatic interests was affecting the 
transport of their goods across France. Belays and inconveniences 
in obtaining goods were blamed on the newly formed S.S.S. who thereby 
found themselves victims of a slander campaign before they had time 
to prove themselves. The Foreign Office, convinced that the S.S.S. 
provided the only rational solution to the problem of Swiss trade, 
extended themselves throughout 1916 in defence of tnat organization 
against the attacks v/hich threatened its early destruction. At first 
sight it seems strange that many Frenchmen would be indifferent, if 
not hostile, to the 3.S.S. which, after all, had been established to 
deprive the Germans of much needed supplies, but their position did 
have its own logic. Meadows Smith, after visiting a number of French 
ports, discovered and duly reported the existence of a feeling among 
subordinate French officials and railway men that holding back all 
Swiss supplies was a patriotic gesture, according to the general, if
1. Lardy-Hoffmann, $0 January 1917* report, Pol.Bept., R.P., Paris 21, 
1915-1917, 2001 (B) a
fMm. Cochin et Claveille ont rivalise de bonne volunte et j’espere 
que les mesures nouvelles constitueront un reel progres...Le ton 
du discours prononce' au Senat vendredi par M. Cochin (journal 
Officiel du 27 janvier) etait aimable vers la Suisse et avait 
pour leit-motiv les mots "faciliter le transport vers la Suisse 
de tout ce qui est consigne' a la S.S.S. dans les limites des 
contingents”*.
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inarticulated, thesis that the fewer goods which reached
Switzerland the better, for this would mean fewer still could be
sent on to Germany. Those who were prepared to suffer the S.S.S.,
a body which they felt to be animated with good intentions but obliged
to endeavour to please a great number of people with conflicting
interests, thought the trust*s resolve would be ‘stiffened' by
1
rigorous rationing measures.
The strategy of the Foreign Office to counter these measures
was to enhance the authority of the S.S.S. by prompt and ample consign­
ments to that organization of any goods that could be spared. In 
this practice they had been for a long time frustrated, as has been 
shown, by the French Ministry of War who whether through misguided 
and shortsighted patriotism or through a fear of British commercial 
prowess, had put every obstacle in the way of shipping these goods.
While the obstructive attitude of the Customs and rail officials 
in France had the virtues of logic and simplicity, that of the French 
government itself was confused by inconsistencies between their mini- 
cipal Trading with the Enemy laws and their international obligations. 
In this regal’d, the policy of blacklisting Swiss firms according to an 
interpretation of their Trading with the Enemy laws which seemed to
1. Bertie-FO, 1 December 1916, Report of Meadowe Smith,
FO 382-1057-246769/16.
208
run counter to the obligations incurred by the signature of the
■i.h.B. agreement caused endless confusion and constant irritation
to doth the Swiss and the British governments*
The original Black List of enemy firms had been prepared by
the British foreign Trade Department according to the Trading with
the iftieiny Act of 23 December 1915 which forbade trade between persons
domiciled in the United kingdom and persons or organizations of
1
♦enemy associations* wno were domiciled in neutral countries.
Since the British were anxious to inconvenience trade with neutrals 
as little as possible, only persons and organizations with undoubted 
enemy connections were blacklisted and, in fact, no firm in Switzer­
land which was a member of the S*d.B. was blacklisted because of 
’enemy associations’, although several members of the 3*5.S. were put 
on the list by accident or for having violated the statutes of the 
trust.
There were two types of British blacklist;
1. The Statutory List, published openly, containing the names of all 
firms with undoubted enemy connections. Trading with any of these 
firms was punishable in law.
1. Siwey, op.cit., pp.144-145*
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2, The List of Suspected Firms, unpublished and secret, containing 
the names of all firms for which export licenses were in fact 
never issued by the British licensing authorities and with which 
British firms were on application for a license Advised1 to have 
no dealings.
These lists formed the basis for the French list published in August 
1916 to which were added the names of Swiss firms which were members 
of the S.S.S. and which were suspected of having violated the French 
Trading with the Enemy law. These firms were refused consignments 
according to the French ligislation which bluntly forbade trade with 
all German nationals everywhere. Under this title Swiss firms owned 
and managed by German nationals (and there were many of them) were 
blacklisted, as well as daughter firms (Tochtergesellschaften) of 
German firms established on Swiss territory.
In French law the nationality of a firm was determined by the 
nationality of its parent organization and thus the ’daughter firms’
were regarded as German by the French, though in Swiss law they were
1
clearly and wholly Swiss. Accordingly such firms were blacklisted 
by the French in what the Swiss regarded as a direct violation of 
Article 3 of the Reglement interieur de la S.S.S. which stated:
1. Bell, Blockade, pp.507-508*
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Aucune maison inscrite dans le Begistre du r 
Commerce ne pourra, en raison de la nationalite 
des chefs, associes, secretaires ou actionnaires, 
etre exclue du benefice de recevoir dee marchandises
de la S.S.3.
On the day of the publication of the first British Statutory
List (29 February 1916), the Foreign Office informed Grant Duff that
the principle to be adopted vis a vis Swiss firms was that ’licenses
to export to Switzerland through; the S.S.S.E. are ... only refused
in exceptional cases where the reputation of the consignee is
1
particularly bad*. Skipworth interpreted this principle as 
meaning that neither the letter nor the spirit of the S.S.S. agree­
ment allowed any action which v/ould deprive the Swiss firms from 
receiving goods through the 3.S.S. 'unless they have broken the
rules of this Society in such a way as to render them liable to 
2
expulsion’.
It was therefore the practice of the British authorities to 
grant export licenses to all members of S.S.S. syndicates without 
regard to their so-called ’nationality', on the assumption that the 
control exercised by the 3.S.S. was sufficient to keep the goods 
from enemy destination. This practice coincided with the theory 
that the 3.3.3. was not only a blockade organization but an instrument
1. FO-Grabt Duff, 29 February 1916, telegram, FO 332-1057-53424/16.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 21 March 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1057-58155/16.
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of maintaining or even of expanding British trade with Switzerland,
and :it must succeed. This policy was explicitly <x>mmunicated on
7 April 1916 to the Swiss Federal Council who were assured that
export licenses would be refused to S.S.S* firms only in exception-
1
ally suspect cases. In the British way of thinking, the inter­
national obligations incurred by the signature of the S.S.S. agree­
ment superceded the prohibitions of their own domestic Trading with 
the Enemy statutes.
The French did not share this view. During the negotiations 
for the S.S.S. in the summer of 1915» the French government made it 
clear that the provision (Article Three), whereby enemy subjects in 
Switzerland would be allowed to receive goods provided they were 
inscribed in the Commercial Register and were members of the S.S.S., 
would apply, as far as they were concerned, only to goods passing in
transit through France, but that no French citizen could by law sell
2
goods to an enemy subject under any circumstances. To enforce this
law the Comite de Restriction drew up a list of Swiss firms with
’enemy connections* and forbade French subjects to have any dealings 
2
with them. This prohibition restricted French commerce with firms 
enrolled in the S.S.S. just at the time when the British were 
endeavouring to increase their exports to such firms in order to
bolster the tottering structure of the S.S.S.
1. FO-War Trade Intelligence Department, 23 October 1916, letter, 
FO 382-1095-208947/16.
2. Bertie-FO, 30 December 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1557-1598/17.
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Tc odd to the already considerable confuaion in this matter,
the S.S.S. itself developed its own secret blacklist of firms for
whom it would no longer act as consignee. This list included 56
firms or individuals (of which only 10 were to be found on the French 
1
list) which had broken the S.S.S. regulations or were otherwise
undesirable. Thus S.S.S. firms could appear on three black lists:
on the British (for violating the rules of the S.S.S.) which made no
real difference for they received consignments from third parties in
their own syndicate in any case; on the French, which nullified the
advantages of belonging to the S.S.S.; and on the secret S.S.S. list,
which prevented their receiving consignments from the organization of
which they were members. Only the Italians, ever ready to bargain,
absolutely refused to blacklist firms which, they felt, did the
2
Allies no good and the Swiss firms no harm.
Obviously the solution to this confusion was to decide on a 
common set of norms which would give unity tc Allied blacklisting 
policy. The economic conference of the Allies held in Paris in mid- 
June 1916 had recommended that laws and regulations should be brought 
into accord by prohibiting trade by Allied subjects with
1. A copy of this list is found in FO 362-1074-202868/16.
2. Rodd-FO, 14 October 1916, telegram, FO 382-1074-205592/16.
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1. irmabitanta of enemy countries whatever their nationality,
2. enemy subjects wherever resident, and
1
3. firms controlled by the enemy.
The problem of deciding whether a Swiss firm fell into one of these 
categories, and an understandable reluctance to abandon trade to 
foreign, tnough Allied, competition prevented the Allied and Swiss 
governments from ever adopting a common blacklisting policy.
The British Statutory List played host at times to some of the 
most famous names in Swiss industry, not excluding Brown, Boveri, and 
Company, Aubert Grenier, Jaeger and Company, Kunz A.G. of Windisch, and 
many others. Their inscription and ultimate removal followed a set 
patterns accusation of violation of the s.S.S. rules, inclusion on the 
Statutory List, protests and investigation by Skipworth (and often by 
the S.S.S.), reconsideration by the War Trade Intelligence Department,
ultimate rehabilitation and inscription on the British list of
2
♦suspected firms1 or complete removal from both lists.
1. Recommendations of the Economic Conference of the Allies. Held 
at Paris on June 14« 15,' 16 and 17 1916. Cd. 8271. (London,
WZT-
2. For Brown, Boveri and Company cf. FO 382-1081-6507, 27849, 
43718, 46383/16. Rarely did an S.S.S. firm remain on the 
British A List for long. The payment of the fine imposed by 
the S.S.S. usually sufficed to regain the favour of the British
blockade authorities.
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The Foreign Office, whose confidence in the S.S.o. grew with
the months, tended to despise the practice of blacklisting which they
regarded as useless and unnecessarily irritating. S. Waterlow
confessed privately to Craigie in 1917 tnat he could see no legal
means to prevent a Swiss firm on an Allied blacklist, but not on the
o.b.b. blacklist, from receiving goods from other members of its
syndicate. "The root absurdity of tne position is that Allied
governments snould not (sic) black list firms without consulting with
1
the bociete buisse de Surveillance iiconomique.’
The earlier practice of the »Var Trade Department of gaily 
blacklisting suspects on what the Foreign Office considered insuffi­
cient evidence of guilt weakened the authority of the b.S.S. and often 
put it in a ridiculous light. For their part the Swiss regarded this 
’arbitrary’ blacklisting as a breach of faith on the Allies1 part, 
for the Swiss government had consented to the S.S.S. ’in the distinct 
belief that it would prevent external interference with Swiss commerce 
and thus enable the economy of the country to proceed as satisfactorily
as possible1. Politically the practice of blacklisting was ’of more
2
than doubtful wisdom*. Skipworth felt that if the War Trade Depart­
ment were free to refuse to allow certain firms to receive goods, the
1. Waterlow-Craigie, 9 April 1917» private letter, FO 382-1576-
72915/17.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 21 February 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1060-38693/16.
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S.S.S. agreement would be of no value to the Swiss, as by black­
listing a sufficiently large number of firms, it would be rendered
1
useless for the purpose for which it was created. The British 
government managed through consultation and more precise investiga­
tion to keep the number of Swiss firms on their own blacklist to a 
satisfactory minimum consonant with the needs of the blockade and 
the dignity of the S.S.S.
The French government whose opinion in matters pertaining to 
the Swiss blockade had been regarded, since the Spring of 1915» as 
theoretically paramount, adopted the view that their own blacklist
(including the names of Swiss firms) must be maintained and adopted
2
by the Allies until a proposed joint blacklist was drawn up. Their 
persistence was such that the Foreign Office, while expressing their 
regret at this attitude, were reluctantly forced to agree with the 
French policy, in spite of the assurance given the Swiss government 
in April 1916 that it was not their intention to refuse licenses for
5
rationed goods on account of the character of the consignee. Faced
with the choice of seeing British goods consigned to the S.S.S. 
detained in transit through France or of refusing the export license 
when the consignee appeared on the French blacklist, they decided to
1. Skipworth-Grant Duff, 17 February 1916, letter, ibid.
2. Bertie-FO, 22 January 1917» telegram, FO 382-1577-18245/17-
3. Rumbold-FO, 13 March 1917, dispatch, FO 382-1578-57029/17-
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choose the latter as being leas harmful to all parties. They 
determined, hcwevei, to explain frankly to the Swiss government 
why it would be necessary in future to refuse export licenses in
1
certain cases, and to disclaim .*11 responsibility in tne matter.
On 2 March 1917 the order was given to the War Trade Department
to refuse export licenses to firms whose names appeared on the French 
2
blacklist* It was made clear to the French government tnat the 
adoption of their blacklist entails! the withdrawal of an explicit 
assurance to the Gwiss government, and the British government con­
sented to do 30 most reluctantly until the completion of a joint
3
blacklist in which the S.S.S* acquiesced. Preliminary work for
the establishment of an agreed blacklist had been proceeding for some
time iii Berne between the Allied commercial attaches :-tnd the officials
of the G.S.S. Grobet-Roussy showed himself amenable to the idea of
a joint blacklist, but would not agree to listing firjas on any other
ground than that they had violated a regulation of the S*3*S. Piaton,
the French attache", wanted a list comprising all firms either of
German association or working for the enemy, or guilty of trying to
export goods of German origin to the Allies, Grobet-Eoussy was
joined by Craigie and Skipworth in his emphatic opposition to Piaton*s 
4
proposals.
1* FO-Bertie, 2 February 1917* telegram, FC 382-1577-18245/17•
2. FO-War Trade Department, 2 March 1917$ Letter, FO 382-1577-
44188/17.
3* Bertie-FO, 27 February 1917» and FO-Bertie, 8 March 1917> both 
telegrams, FO 382-1578-46570/17*
4« Acton (.Qharge) -FO, 1 March 1917» dispatch, FO 382—1578—51294/17
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Meanwhile, Sir Horace Eumbold left a memorandum with Hoffmann
7/hich stated that the British government had found it necessary
'while disclaiming all responsibility' to conform to the French
blockade practice and to refuse export licenses to Swiss firms on the
French list. his government did so with the greatest reluctance,
Eumbold added, and stated further that an anxiety not to be exposed
to a charge of bad faitn had prompted their frank account of the 
1
facts. Piaton was irked by this disclaimer of responsibility,
complaining to Craigie that the British government had unjus tifiably
placed the burden of responsibility for the adoption of the blacklist
on the French government. Craigie rejoined that the British view
was made perfectly clear to Paris, and he added he was personally of
the opinion that there was no advantage in any case in the adoption
of a blacklist for fs.S.S. firms. Actually Piaton himself shared 
2
this opinion.
Watorlow’s minute on Craigie's report of the situation in Berne
provides an interesting insight into Anglo-French blockade relations*
I cannot repress a feeling of satisfaction that, for 
once in a way, the consequences are brought home to 
the French government of their having precipitately 
insisted on the wrong course...we can leave it to the 
French to clear up the mess they have created. Person­
ally I think that, Switzerland being very strictly
1. Rumbold-Hoffmann, 9 March 1917» memorandum, FO 582-1578-
7^029/17.
2. Rumbold-FO, 29 March 19171 with a memorandum of Craigie, dated 
27 March 1917, FO 582-1578-70419/17*
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rationed and 3.S.S. control super-excellent, the whole
business of Blacklists is now futile. The inconveniences, 
both commercial and political, wnich it causes, are out
of all proportion to tho good results. 1
The business of developing a joint blacklist dragged on for 
the last year and a half of the war in a series of tedious meetings 
and in endless correspondence between the Allies and the Swiss. 
During thi3 time the British licensing authorities were forced to 
conform to the French blacklist, though presumably the Swiss firms 
so affected continued to receive goods through third parties in the 
1.3.3. Legally this practice left much to be desired, but a3 a 
practical answer to the problem imposed by the French government1 s 
unyielding insistence on their blacklist it worked so well that 
neither tho Swiss nor tho British governments were at all anxious 
to see the joint list completed and so exercised considerable 
ingenuity in dolaying its completion. The Swiss government 
naturally had no intention of seeking to alter a situation which 
favoured their foreign trade, and the British wore not only happy 
to deliver their exports to Switzerland but derived unanticipated 
benefits from the investigation of suspect firms in the course of 
preparing the proposed joint blacklist. Craigie observed in the 
Spring of 1918 that the joint investigations had so far given 
excellent results for under the cloak of preparing the list in
1. Waterlow*s minute, ibid
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association with the S.S.S. Allied investigators had for the first
tine been able to enter, as a matter of right, the premises of
firms belonging to the S.S.S. and to make a thorough survey of
1
their enterprises. The continuation of these enquiries depended 
on continued interest in the development rather than in the completion 
of the joint list.
The french government, on tue other nand, pressed on with 
austere logic to complete tne joint list in order to close the 
loopholes by which Allied goods legitimately found their way to firms 
on the French blacklist. A number of firms which wore known always 
to nave nad a close truce relation with the Lnited kingdom were 
included on this list *witn little evidence of guilt*. Sir Horace 
huLibolu saw this as a further indication of a general tendency known 
to exist among members of tne French blacklist committee to place 
restrictions on Swiss truue with treat Britain, and to justify their 
action with the argument that while the British, with their vast 
mercnunt fleet, would be auie immediately after tue war to secure 
markets overseas, the French must content themselves with securing 
a predominant economic position in hurcpeun nations like Switzerland, 
humbold alleged tnat a k. hammerer, tne special French delegate 
investigating firms on the French blacklist, uad informed these 
firms that the boy coil against them would be lifted ii they agreed to
1. Craigie*s report on the Joint Blacklist, 20 March 1918, 
FO 382-1976-56478/18.
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take ‘a special interest1 in French trade and observe the utmost
1
secrecy in this regard vis a vis the otnex- Allies.
The joint blacklist finally agreed on by tne Allies and the 
S.si.d. after several drafts was presented to the Swiss government
2
in a note only on 25 October 1910» several days before the armistice. 
On 11 November the list became a dead letter and so was decorously 
and quietly buried by Sir Horace Rumbold who informed the Swiss 
government unofficially during the armistice oeriod that they need
5
not reply to the note. By then its authors were too busy revital­
izing trade with Switzerland to mourn the fate of the stillborn 
blacklist.
During the course of the war then, as we have seen, the S.S.S. 
came to be regarded as the best and most efficient instrument of 
blockade devised by the Allies. It gained this reputation in the 
face of, at times, serious opposition at home and abroad.
In the months following its creation, the S.S.S. seemed in 
danger of collapse under the vigorous attack directed against it by 
public opinion in Switzerland. It was largely due to the Foreign 
Office^ confidence in the soundness of the S.S.S. as a blockade
1. Kumbold-FO, 27 July 1918, dispatch, FO 382-1976-134l6l/lQ.
2. Paul Cambon-iO, 23 October 1018, letter, £*> 382-1977*178728/18.
3. Rumbold-FO, 24 December 1918, telegram, FO 382-1977*211595/18.
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instrument and their desire to ensure its survival that this period 
Tdtnessed a change in Great Britain’s diplomatic posture towards 
the Confederation. Before the establishment of the trust, the 
Foreign Office had prodded the Federal Council to accept the organ­
ization by withholding shipments of essential commodities and by 
adopting a generally unco-operative attitude to Swiss commercial 
interests. After the trust’s acceptance, the Foreign Office did 
all in tneir power to strengthen tne authority of the organization 
against domestic opposition by filling its every legitimate re-quest. 
Doubtless this policy was not innocent of commercial motivation, but 
whatever the reasons, it drew tne two governments closer in a spirit 
of co-operation.
simultaneously bue policy of accommodation brought the Foreign 
Office into conflict with French interests, both commercial and legal. 
French exporters were chagrined to sue British rivals gaining a foot- 
nold on hitnerto sacrosanct areas of Frenca in teres b in Switzerland, 
ana sought redress through their government agencies concerned with 
transportation and blocK He. The Fourth Bureau of tne Ministry of 
war co-operated wiu greater efficiency than legality in obstructing 
the delivery oi British goods to Switzerland over French rails, 
while the Ministry for Foreign Affairs die their part by forcing on 
the British bus adoption oi iue biuoK list (a orooos Bwiss firms) 
proposed by tne interministerial niaoxlist Commission.
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The threat of similar treatment of French exports to 
Scandinavia and the Netherlands, combined with continuous 
representation to Briand, ultimately removed bhe obstacles to 
transporting goods across France, and cn unspoken conspiracy 
botwoon the British and Swiss authorities obviated the diffi­
culties imposed on Anglo-Swiss trade by the French blacklist.
Far from being a decisive element in Anglo-Swiss relations, as 
had boon feared by both sides during 1?15» the S.S.S. became a 
source and symbol of their mutual trust and co-operation.
The strength of tho organization gre?/ with the months and 
criticism gradually subsided as it won the confidence of both the 
Swiss business community and the government. Toward the end of 
the war the Federal Council took the extraordinary step of decreeing 
that the decisions of the S.S.S. to impose fines on firms which 
had violated its rules would have obligatory force, would be
without appeal and would be subject to no epeciec of revision by
1
judicial authorities. Business men saw the value of co-operation
1. Arrete7 du Ccnseil federal conpernant les amendes prononcees par 
la SSS et la STS ainsi que la realisation forcee des merchandises 
imporiees par leur intermediaire (du 29 Octobre 191B): *Con- 
formement aux dispositions particulieres en vigueur pour la 
societe suisse de surveillance economique (S.S.S) et 1'office 
fiduciaire suisse pour le controls du trafic des merchandises 
(5.T.3.), toutes les decisions par lesquelles ces institutions 
infligent des amendes ont force obligatoire et sont sans appel. 
Ces decisions ne peuvent etre soumises a aucune espece de revi­
sion de la part des autcrites judiciaires. * cf. H.E. Bu.ttwyler, 
Ber Seekrieg und die Vifittschaftspolitik des Neutralen Stfafetes 
(Ziirich, 1945) > p.142: * ...so erscheint es unglaublich was for 
Kompetenzen hier privaten Vereinigungen zum grossen Teil im 
Interesse des Auslandes libertragen wurden.*
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with the society and as its procedures beccune more familiar, 
imports wore aeiivered with a minimum of inconvenience. The 
Foreign Office found in the organisation a more tiian satisfactory 
solution to the problem of channeling British exports to desirable 
consignees.
On 23 February i>16, tne various blockade committees and
commissions, wa.cn 01 ten duplicated one unothere' work, were placed
under the unified direction of «.v ne# 1/ created Ministry of Blockade
1
unaer Lord no&ert Cecil. To keep pace with unis change in the
British government, tne 1‘reuch raised Denys Cochin, tne president
of tiie Couate de hosfriction to ministerial rank o i l 23 Marcu  191o,
tiiOugix txiO formation of a 30parate French Ministry of Blackade was
2
delayed until November 191/.
Dei ore the war tiie post of British minister at heme had 
been reserved usually for young- diplomats for a snort time at the 
beginning of their career or for older men in their last years before
3
retirement. Bvolyn Crant Duff appears to have fallen into the 
latter category though he was only in his early fifties when he was 
appointed to tiie post in August 1913* As the strategic importance
1. Beil, Blockade, pp.449-434• As Cecil remained Under­
secretary of ftate for Foreign Affairs, the influence of 
tiie Foreign Office remained dominant in blockade matters.
2. Guichard, op.cit., pp.60-72, 112.
3* Uhl, on.cit., p.39.
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of the Legation in Berne became clearer during Lae course of tiie 
war, the Foreign Office became anxious to strengthen the staff 
with the best men available. Grant Buff, who in the opinion of
the Political Department had not always made the Swiss viewpoint
1
sufficiently clear to the Foreign Office, was replaced by Sir
/
Horace Rumbold in September 1916. Sir Horace, who had been Charge 
in Berlin just before the war and afterwards head of the Prisoners 
of 'war oection of the Foreign Office, brought with him a capability 
and a forcefulness which inspired confidence in his staff and 
respect among the Swiss.
At the same time Robert Leslie Craigie was sent out from 
the Contraband Department of the Foreign Office to Berne with the 
title of Secretary of the Legation to direct the Swiss blockade 
from nearer at hand. He and Sir Horace arrived just as the Swiss 
were signing the General Commercial Agreement of 2 September 1916 
with the Germans. Their first task then was to advise the Foreign 
Office on the stand to be adopted by the British government in these 
new circumstances.
1. Carlin-Pol. Bopt., 20 January 1919* dispatch, Pol. Dept.
2001 (k), bchacntel,
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VI
SUPER-EXCELLENT CONTROL
The course of Anglo-Swiss commercial relations from the 
beginning of 1916 until the end of the war was set by the pattern 
of the S.S.S. regulations, for the Ministry of Blockade endeavoured 
to achieve their aim of intensifying economic pressure on the Central 
Powers during this period dimply by exercising the rights conceded to 
them by the S.S.S agreement. Both the Swiss and the two groups of 
belligerents felt satisfied in the early months of 1916 that a balance 
had been struck in the control exercised respectively by the S.S.S. 
and the Treuhandstelle, but the signing of the Swiss-German agreement 
of 2 September 1916, in the judgment of the Allies, tipped the balance 
in Germany's favour. Consequently the Allies adopted in late 1916 
and early 1917 a policy aimed at re-establishing equality of treatment
through stricter interpretation of the rules of the S.S.S.
1
Particularly galling to the Foreign Office were two clauses in 
the Swiss-German agreement according to which, first, an estimated
40,000 head of cattle were to be delivered to Germany before May 1917 
and, second, firms working for the Allies would receive no further coal 
from Germany.
1. Since the Ministry of Blockade was housed in the Foreign Office and 
staffed by Foreign Office officials, the term 'Foreign Office' will 
be employed in this context as a general term for the blockade 
officials.
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The *cattle clause* was especially offensive as the Swiss had 
several weeks before signing the treaty with Germany requested and 
obtained from the C.P.I.C. an increase of twelve per cent in their 
fodder ration. As fodder and cattle were *in many respects inter­
changeable*, Owen 0*Malley regarded Allied fodder as being driven 
across the German frontier in the form of a native Swiss product, and
suggested a corresponding reduction in the Swiss ration of fodder, and
1
also, for good measure, of rice, foodstuffs, and livestock. This 
suggestion was endorsed by the Foreign Office, and the French were 
invited to join in presenting the Swiss government with a choicej
either eliminate cattle exports to Germany, or accept a reduction in
2
fodder, rice, and alimentary fats.
The British reasoned that any export of livestock would leave 
fewer cattle to be fed in Switzerland and therefore, if the Swiss 
persisted in selling animals to the Germans, a reduction in their fodder 
supply would be called for. The French, on the other hand, argued 
that a reduction in fodder supplies would actually have the opposite 
and undesirable effect of increasing exports of cattle to Germany be­
cause they could no longer be fed by the Swiss. The French maintained 
that the Allies* hands were tied in this matter, and they were in fact 
right, because the Swiss actually had a surplus of cattle (172,000 head
1. Minute by O’Malley on Grant Duff-FO, 9 September 1916, telegram, 
FO 382-1089-179566/16. It should be recalled that Switzerland 
was far from being agriculturally self-sufficient and had to 
import most of its foodstuffs.
2. FO-Bertie, 16 September 1916, ibid.
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over the 1911 figure) and, as they were already suffering from a 
1
lack of fodder, any reduction in the fodder supply must necessarily 
have led to further cattle exports to Germany. Briand therefore
suggested that the Allies content themselves with a protest against
2
the cattle deal and a general threat to reduce all Swiss rations.
With regard to the 'coal clause' the Foreign Office reacted to 
the news that firms working for the Allies would receive no more 
German coal by threatening to institute a Swiss section of the
Statutory Blacklist which would include Swiss firms though they might
3
be members of the S.S.S. Sir Horace Rumbold deprecated this threat 
on the grounds that it would cause unnecessary distress to the Federal 
Council who had prided themselves on confining the German demand for 
a coal boycott on all firms engaged in any sort of commerce with the 
Allies to only those firms which produced munitions for the Allies. 
Rumbold felt 'it would perhaps be going a little far to insist that 
the Swiss government ought to ensure the supply of German coal to 
factories actually making munitions of war for the Allies'. Besides, 
the power exercised by the S.S.S. had never been stronger and the
1. Rumbold-FO, 23 September 1916, telegram, FO 382-1074-190205/16.
Also, Guichard, op.cit.« p.221.
2. Briand-Bertie, 1 October 1916, letter, FO, 382-1074-207449/16.
3. FO-Rumbold, 19 October 1916, telegram, FO 382-1074-204014/16.
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Allies had obtained such control over goods imported under the aegis
1
of the Society as existed in no other neutral country. There seemed
to him no reason 'to rock the boat* in this regard.
But in London the suspicion prevailed that the Swiss government 
might welcome a little pressure to strengthen their hands against 
further German demands since the coal boycott, though restricted, had 
stirred Swiss industrialists to general indignation. Rumbold was 
therefore informed that the Allied governments found it impossible to 
acquiesce in the altered circumstances brought on by the 2 September 
agreement, for abnormal exports of cattle to Germany called for 
reconsideration of the rationing policy regarding fodder, fats, and 
foodstuffs, while the German coal boycott made Allied discrimination
2
against firms making munitions for Germany not only just but inevitable.
These deliberations resulted in a joint Allied note of protest 
being delivered to the Swiss Political Department on 7 November 1916, 
two months after the conclusion of the Swiss-German agreement. This 
note expressed surprise that Switzerland would allow herself to be 
forced to sell cattle to Germany in exchange for coal whose delivery 
had been guaranteed to Switzerland by agreement before the war. Since
1. Rumbold-FO, 9 October 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1074-207510/16.
2. FO-Rurabold, 27 October 1916, telegram, FO 382-1074-207510/16.
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unfair advantage was given to the Germans by the cattle clause the
Allies were forced to make four counter demands:
a) a lowering of the tolerance (authorized by the S.S.S. 
regulations) of Allied materials in goods exported to 
Germany,
b) an embargo on lubricating oil for factories making arms, 
munitions, and explosives for Germany,
c) an interdict on the use of copper, received after 18 
November 1916, for wires and electrical machinery bringing 
energy to Swiss factories producing war goods for Germany,
d) a prohibition on the export of hydro-electric machinery and 
of cotton products to Germany.^
These reprisals were intended to counter also the restrictions on the
employment of German iron, coal, and machinery for the manufacture of
2
Allied war material.
Hoffmann received this verbal note with a very ill grace, and
his serious annoyance was patent to the Allied ministers. Marquis
Paulucci de Calboli later observed to the British Minister that he had
^ -never seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs so disturbed. The delivery
1. Allied Ministers in Berne-Political Department, 7 November 1916, 
joint Note verbale, FO 382-1075-228019/16. The Swiss referred 
to this note somewhat derisively as the •Schmierbl Nbte*
2. cf. N.B. VI (9 March 1917), pp.l-*f.
3. Rumbold-FO, 8 November 1916, telegra*, PC* 382-1075-225056/16.
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of the note was ill-timed, for only an hour before Hoffmann had
accepted the figures for the number of prisoners of war to be interned
in Switzerland by the favour of the Swiss government (30,000 men), a
work which he considered more important and more humane than the
blockade. The constant harrassment of Switzerland in matters of
blockade by both sides profoundly discouraged him, and the Swiss debt
1
of 800 million francs was a constant source of anxiety. Craigie and 
Rumbold went carefully over the note, and a few days later Rumbold called 
on Hoffmann in the company of M. Dunant, who had arranged the details 
of the prisoners of war agreement, in an attempt to soothe the Foreign 
Minister’s feelings.
Hoffmann gave the formal reply of the Federal Council to the 
Allies in a skillful note verbale on 13 November 1916. He observed 
that the rules of the S.S.S. restricted Swiss industry much more than 
the Swiss-German arrangement had, and these rules amply sufficed to 
prevent the export to Germany of war material. The Swiss government 
had never received from the German government assurance tliat coal would 
be furnished, far less unconditionally furnished, but only an assurance 
’qu’aucun obstacle ne servait mis aux transports du charbon1• The 
agreement of 2 September had distinguished between war material in the 
narrow sense (weapons, explosives, and munitions) in the production of
1. kumbold-FG, 9 November 1916, dispatch, FO, 332-1075-228003/16.
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which German raw material and coal were prohibited, and war material 
in the broad sense (machinery for the manufacture of war material, 
searchlights, and so forth) for which German raw material but not 
coal was prohibited. On nothing else was the boycott laid. The 
charge against the Swiss government of accepting inequality of 
treatment was therefore unjust, as were the Allied governments* 
restriction on the use of lubricating oils, which unequivocally 
violated the spirit of the S.S.S. Hoffmann concluded by proposing 
a conference with Allied representatives to discuss the whole matter.^ 
Rumbold warmly recommended Hoffmann*s proposal to the Foreign 
Office as public opinion in Switzerland had turned against the Allies 
since the publication by the Federal Council of a summary of the Allied 
note of 7 November. The Federal Council had not consulted the Allies 
previous to its publication though, after the note was handed to him,
Hoffmann had threatened to publish a *Red Book* containing the note
2
which was 'sure to alienate Switzerland*. The Swiss press, 
especially the Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, was extremely critical of the 
Allied note, and even the friendly Journal de Geneve failed to express 
their customary approval of Allied policy.^ Rumbold suspected that
1. Pol. Dept.-Allied Governments, 15 November 1916, note verbale,
FO 382-1075-23^266/16. Rumbold-FO, 17 November 1916, telegram,
FO 382-1075-232007/16. cf. N.B. 17 (9 March 1917) PP.6-7.
2. Rumbold-FO, 9 November 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1075-228003/16.
3* Rumbold-FO, 20 November 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1075-2389o7/l6.
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the Swiss General Staff were using the note of 7 November to stir up
public opinion against the Allies, and felt it would be unwise to take
further steps to antagonize the Germanophile party.^
Allied expressions of surprise and indignation at the German 
coal boycott rang somewhat false, however, as long before the presenta­
tion of the note of 7 November steps had been taken to provide firms 
producing munitions for the Allies with coal and iron to counteract a 
possible German embargo. In August Skipworth had evolved a scheme
to group all firms working for the Allies in a Coal Union. This
organization, under the direction of a M. Philippe Girod of Geneva, 
would pool available stocks and would receive a regular minimum supply
of coal from Prance and Ureat Britain, which would be distributed to
2
member firms, with special preference to munitions manufacturers.
The coal requirements of chemical and munitions firms boycotted 
by Germany was estimated at 5»000 tons a month. Half this amount could 
easily be supplied by the British, and very cheaply if it were purchased 
from Admiralty stocks, and taken by ship to Rouen, and thence by targe 
and rail to Delle, Vallorbe, or Bellegarde.^ When the details of the 
Swiss-German agreement, distinguishing the three grades of war material, 
became known, Captain Piaton of the French Embassy discovered that the
1. Rumbold-FO, 20 November 1916, telegram, FO 332-1075-233870/16.
2. Skipworth-Grant Duff, 11 August 1916, report, FO 382-1093-159^9 Vl6.
3« Unsigned memorandum on the Swiss coal supply, 18 September 1916,
FO 382-109^-185160/16.
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affected firms (i.e., those making weapons, explosives, and munitions 
for the Allies) would require only 100G tons a month, a figure 
representing less than the amount the Allies would have had to pro­
vide for firms on the German blacklist which the 2 September agree­
ment had suppressed I  ^ The French agreed to supply this small
2
amount themselves, while the British began to export ^00 tons a
3
month of pig iron to Swiss firms providing Allied munitions.
Meanwhile a list of firms making munitions for Germany was compiled,
if
with a view to embargoing their supply of lubricating oil.
The conference suggested by Hoffmann took place in Berne in
5fourteen meetings between 18 December 1916 and 23 January 1917, and 
met again during March. The Allies maintained that Swiss factories 
were kept going no less by Allied deliveries of food than by German
1. Skipworth-Rumbold, 7 October 1916, Report on the coal supply,
FO 382-1093-206539/16.
2. 3ertie-F0, 6 November 1916, telegram, FO 332-1093-227209/16.
3- Ministry of Munitions-FO, 10 November 1916, letter, FO 382-1075-
227170/16.
k. Rumbold-FO, 6 November 1916, telegram, FO 382-1075-228011/16.
5. The Swiss were represented by Grobet, Schmidheiny, Dr. E. Laur
of the Bauernsekretariat, and Dr. J. Kdppeli, chief of the 
agricultural section of the EVD. Piaton, Carletti, Craigie, 
Skipworth, and E.E. Sawyer of the Ministry of Munitions 
represented the Allies. The proces verbaux are found in 
FC 382-1567-22761/17.
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deliveries of coal. If the Germans could regulate the coal supply, 
the Allies could with equal right diminish food exports to the Swiss: 
therefore they threatened a reduction in quotas of the supplies they 
delivered to the S.S.S. Furthermore, they felt it was outrageous 
that Swiss agricultural products, especially cattle fattened on 
Allied fodder, should be delivered to the enemy and demanded greater 
control over these exports. The Cwiss representatives refused, of 
course, to accept the principle of limitation of their agricultural 
exports, and presented counter proposals, demanding large increases 
in fodder rations from the Allies in return for selling cattle to them 
rather than to the Germans.'1'
.vhen the Swiss persisted in these demands, Rumbold sought an 
interview with Edmund Schulthess, Chief of the Department of Public 
Economy, who was also President of the Confederation for the year 1917* 
to discuss the agricultural problem. Jchulthess rejected the suggestion 
of cattle export control, maintaining it would affront Swiss pride to 
see Allied control extended over Swiss domestic products, as it was 
vital for Switzerland to retain free control over sufficient quantities 
of agricultural products to pay for purchases from Germany of coal, 
iron, fertilizers, and potatoes. Far, however, from being adverse
1. In return for the sale to France, rather than to Germany, of 
J+0,000 head, the Swiss asked for increases in oil cake (to 
30,000 tons in six months), maize (to 50,000 a year), oleaginous 
seeds (to 12,500 tons a year), and linseed (to 16,000 tons a 
year). Kumbold-FP, 3 January 1917* telegram, FO 382-1567-3123/17*
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to limiting exports to Germany by selling the greater part of
available cattle to France, he heartily approved of this measure,
since the general economic agreement with Germany was due to expire
on 1 May 1917, and afterwards, in the new negotiations, the Germans
would presumably exact from the Swiss as much as they could. If the
Swiss had already disposed of a large quantity of their surplus
agricultural produce through sales to the Allies, the Germans could
make fewer demands on Swiss resources. Schulthess was aiming at
*the minimum which we shall have to give to Germany in the Spring*.
At least 10,000 head of cattle would be available for export to the
Germans in 1917* and this number would increase to possibly 150,000
if the Allies carried through their ill-advised scheme of reducing
fodder imports to Switzerland. But Allied cattle purchases and a
reasonable policy on fodder would enable the Swiss to maintain greater
independence vi3 a vis the Germans. ^
The Allied governments were impressed with the reasonableness
of Schulthess*s arguments, but were unable at once to find sufficient
2
fodder to secure the option on a cattle purchase. Both Italy and 
Great Britain were themselves suffering from fodder shortages through
1. Rumbold-FO, 10 January 1917, dispatch, FO 382-1567-11576/17.
2. Rodd-FO, 16 January 1917, telegram, F0 382-1567-12787/17.
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lack of tonnage to bring what they needed from America, so Lord Hobert 
Cecil sounded out Denys Cochin on the possibility of the French 
government buying the cattle and maintaining them in France which 
would be ’safer and more economical* than straining ship and rail
resources in forwarding enormous quantities of fodder to Switzerland.
2
The approximate cost of 30*000 head was estimated at £2,000.000.
As the French balked at paying so large a sum, the Allies decided to 
sign a preliminary agreement with the Swiss regarding the other points 
raised in the exchange of notes during November, and leave the cattle 
question for further negotiation.
These negotiations for further restricting Swiss commerce by 
tightening S.S.S. control were carried on in two sessions during the 
winter of 1917 and culminated in the signing of the agreements of 23 
January and 20 March 1917. The Allies were motivated more by political 
than economic factors, and sought in these negotiations not so much to 
inhibit Swiss commerce as to satisfy public opinion (especially in the 
French speaking cantons) that they were not prepared to cede advantages 
to the Germans.' Allied prestige, which had presumably been diminished 
by the German success of 2 September 1916, was to be restored by a show 
of strength in these negotiations.
1. Cecil-Denys Cochin, 11 January 1917* letter, FO 382-1567-5820/17*
2. Rumbold-FO, 23 January 1917, telegram, FO 382-1567-18757/17.
3. Bell, Blockade, p.plB
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The original proposals recommended to the French government 
on 3 November 1916 by the Comite de Restriction to form the b$sis of 
Allied demands called for a sharp reduction in Swiss rationing quotas. 
Switzerland had been rationed as regards 205 articles; it was now 
proposed to diminish her quota in respect of 102 of them, and to 
eliminate it altogether in the case of 21 others. These measures 
would entail a reduction of Allied imports into Switzerland by 33 
per cent.1 In addition, the Foreign Office gave every indication of
insisting on the demands made in the joint note to the Political
2
Department on 7 November 1916.
Fortunately for both sides, cooler heads prevailed in the 
negotiations and the Allies, after an initial show of severity, receded 
a good deal from their original demands. A great number of questions 
was discussed in the two sets of negotiations, as, for example, the 
use of Allied lubricants, the employment of copper in electric install­
ations, the employment of copper installations, the amount of Allied 
materiel to be allowed in finished exports to Germany, various quota
restrictions, and the question of Swiss exports through Germany to
3
the northern neutrals. In the final settlements it was agreed that
1. Guichard, op.cit., p.222.
2. cf• Cornaz, op.cit., pp.3**~35»
3. A complete list is found in the S.l.o. R.I, pp.116-117.
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Swiss firms making munitions for the Central Powers should obtain 
lubricants only from them, the efficiency of the S.S.S, was augmented 
through several technical measures, some reductions in rationing 
quotas were enacted (though not on the scale of the Comite de 
Restriction*s suggestions), various restrictions were imposed on the 
export to the Central Powers of cotton (2,000 tons a year), silk, 
linen, tobacco, lead, and copper, and the use of copper wires and the 
like in Swiss plants generating electricity for the Central Powers 
was interdicted.^- On the other hand, the Allies allowed greater
liberty to the Swiss in exporting to Holland and Scandinavia goods
2
obtained through the agency of the S.S.S., and pledged themselves 
to supply sufficient coal to firms which continued to manufacture 
machines for the Entente.
In spite of their menacing start, the outcome of these 
deliberations was mutually satisfactory, for while the Allies were 
persuaded they had preserved their political honour in redressing the
1. FO 382-1567-22761/17 contains a summary explanation and the
text of the agreement of 23 January 1917* cf. Bell, Blockade, 
pp.520-521. Captain Piaton was authorized to arrange for the 
transmission of surplus electric current to France and the Swiss 
undertook to supply France with 15,000 kilowatts from the power 
station at Olten Groesgen. The Societe Motor de Baden was 
meanwhile supplying Germany with 23,000 kilowatts. H. Goodhart 
(charge)-F0, 27 December 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1567-1677/17•
2. Cornaz, op.cit., p*35, note 18.
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supposed injury done by the Swiss-German accord of 2 September 1916, 
the restrictions imposed on the Swiss were sufficiently counter­
balanced by concessions that their national pride remained intact.
The genteel art of diplomacy found a place even in tne work-a-day 
world of the blockade*
Further discussions on the cattle question were conducted in 
Paris during the Spring of 1917* The French government, as has been 
said, thought too costly the plan whereby Swiss cattle were to be 
purchased, maintained in Prance throughout the war, and used for re­
stocking the invaded provinces when peace came, but they agreed to 
study the possibility of slaughtering the animals for meat for the 
army*1 The Swiss seemed amenable to retaining h0,000 to 50,(XX) head 
for a year if the Allied Shipping Control in London would put aside
one extra 5*000 ton steamer a month to carry fodder to French and
2
Italian ports for delivery to Switzerland.
An enquiry into the available supply of fodder for the Swiss 
disclosed that the Swiss government owned 10,000 tons of oil cake in 
Italy, although the Italians claimed it was their own and refused to
1* Bertie-FO, 29 January 191?* telegram, F0 382-1567-22916/17*
2. Rumbold-FO, 26 January 1917* telegram, FO 382-1567-2^721/17.
The merchant navies of the .Entente were put under control of 
this central authority which allotted tonnage according to needs 
and priorities of the war situation. The Swiss ’ration* of 
ships was ten, of about 5*000 tons apiece.
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forward it to Switzerland. Actually, as Rumbold discovered, the
cake did belong to the Swiss but the Italian government were attempting
to use this, and a supply of oleaginous seeds (8,000 tons) detained at
Genoa, as a pawn in bargaining for a separate agreement to obtain
certain materials from the Swiss rather than in the general interest
2
of the blockade. Waterlow observed that *the Italians are very
mauvais couchours*, and Schmidheiny discovered from his own investiga­
tions of the matter that there was no shortage of oil cake in Italy, 
as the Italian government had claimed, but, on the contrary, there 
were large stocks which oil cake manufacturers were anxious to get 
rid of.^ He corroborated Rumbold*s opinion that the Italians were 
holding the seeds and cakes not for home consumption but for future 
and separate bargaining with the Si/iss. The Federal Council were 
outraged by this attempt at extortion, and gave Rumbold reason to
believe that they would break off discussion of the cattle question
5
if the Italians were allowed to persist in their attitude. Ultimately,
1. Rodd-FD, k February 1917, telegram, FO 382-1567-27881/17.
2. Rumbold-FO, 17 February 1917, telegram, FG 382-1567-37759/17*
Rumbold-FO, 2k February 1917, telegram, PC 382-1567-^2529/l7*
3. The British Ambassador in Rome flatly denied this. In fact, he
stated, Italian cattle were being slaughtered because of insuffi­
ciency of foddor. Rodd-PO, 2 March 1917, telegram, FO 382-1567- 
5C/4ll/l7. In any case, there was a certain amount of fodder in 
Italy which rightfully belonged to the Swiss and which the Italians 
refused to release.
k. Rumbold-FO, 17 March 1917* telegram, FO 382-156$- 57912/17*
5. Rumbold-FO, 5 March 1917, telegram, FO 382-1568-^9229/17•
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a compromise was reached whereby the Italians delivered half the 
fodder at once and the other half in the autumn of 1917*
Meanwhile the French appeared to have lost all interest in 
buying up surplus Swiss livestock even for military supplies* Benys 
Cochin mentioned to Bertie that he regarded the cattle purchase plan 
costly and useless, and he *attached no importance to the contingency 
that 80 to 10G,000 head of cattle might be exported to Germany* * ^
He insisted it was -ranee which would hive to bear the cost of purchasing 
the cattle and of feeding them, and in return for these liabilities 
3he was to have the privilege of acquiring a commodity she did not want,
ainco there were then more cuttle in France than at the start of the
2
war* Tie saw no profit, as Craigie had suggested to him, in specula­
ting in bwiss cattle to be sold at 'inflated* prices after the war in
3
Belgium and the devastated provinces of France*
I.ore clearly to make his point, Cochin crossed over to Folkstowe
k
in a French destroyer to meet G.F. iaterlow* He said he would have 
none of the proposed scheme to minimise livestock exports to Germany
1. dertie-FD, 9 March 1917, telegram, FO 382-1568-5(^60/17.
2. bertie-FG, 10 March 1917, despatch, FO 382-1568-55285/17* Benys 
Cochin had apparently entered on a personal vendetta against the 
owiss. iv'aterlow commented in a related file: *M* Cochin, obsessed 
with the notion that Switzerland makes munitions predominantly for
Germany, has become so impervious to facts that I do not see what 
we can do*. FO 582-1568-53266/17*
3* Craigie-Cochin, 5 March 1917, letter, FF 382-1568-5073Vl7»
General Lyautey, Minister of 4 r, and Hear Admiral Lacaze, Minister 
of Marine, were at this time pressing Cochin to reduce supplies to 
Switzerland which they considered excessive in themselves, and puttir 
undue stress on French transport facilities* Guichard, op.cit*. pp.
222-223*
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(France to purchase half the Swiss cattle surplus, the Italians to 
deliver oil cake, the Allies tc provide shipping for 25*000 tons of 
fodder till August, the Swiss to sell four times as much condensed 
crilk to the Allies as to the Central Pov/ers) so long as the compulsory 
purchase clause remained. If the British Treasury were willing to 
underwrite the entire cost of purchasing the livestock, he would 
consent, but since this seemed improbable, he proposed instead that 
the Swiss be pressured into limiting their cattle exports to Germany 
to 30,000-^0,000 head and into reserving 28,000 tons of condensed 
milk for the Allies under the sole condition that the Allies promise 
to facilitate the transport of fodder to the Confederation.
Waterloo was sceptical about the Swiss agreeing to these terms, 
and told Cochin as much, but the French Minister 'in a manner (as 
Waterlow reported) that struck me as a little smug1 was confident he 
could get the Swiss to agree. Waterlow thought this 'unlikely*.
Crowe thought it 'disappointing* ."L
At the same time Rumbold was reporting that he had learned from 
private sources that Denys Cochin's intransigence was due to the 
influence exerted on him by M. Branet, M. Chappuis, *and other fire­
brands' representing agricultural constituencies in the French Chamber 
2
of Deputies. Craigie in a private and very confidential letter to
1. Memorandum by Waterlow on his discussion with Denys Cochin,
31 March 1917, FC 332-1569-67528/1?.
2. Rumbold-FO, 31 March 1917* telegram, FO 382-1569-68695/17•
2*4-3
Waterlow referred to the latterTs discussion with Denys Cochin:
I am sorry that our pig-headed old friend was not brought 
to accept our cattle proposal, though you clearly did your 
best. You will realize, of course, that it is the political 
influence at home of tne agricultural deputies which is 
making him so impossible over this question. They are 
afraid that the French fanners will not be able to get such 
ruinous prices for their cattle when the moment comes for 
re-stocking the invaded provinces if there is a considerable 
influx of »Swis6 cattle ! I know this to be a fact and it 
throws an unpleasant sidelight on French politics. 1
But Denys Cochin, to the amazement of the British, succeeded 
in inducing the Gwiss to accept his own proposal. When Schulthess 
had been first sounded out on limiting the export of cattle to 
Germany, he declared with irritation that the suggestion amounted to 
an infringement of Swiss sovereign rights, and refused to entertain 
any proposal to restrict purely domestic produce. But on 13 April 
1917 when Denys Cochin propounded the same suggestion to Grobet- 
Roussy on the letter's visit to Paris, it was favourably received:
Schulthess seemed prepared to accept the limitation of export which
2
he had so indignantly rejected a couple of months previously.
1. Craigie-w’aterlow, 3 April 1917* private letter, FO 382-1569-
75339/17.
2. Rumbcld-FC, 23 April 1917, dispatch, F0^?S2-1569-36hO9/l7. 
Rumbold went on to complain of the 'behind the back tactics' 
of Denys Cochin for not making these arrangements through the
ordinary diplomatic channels*
2kk
An explanation of the Swiss reversal is to be found in two 
letters from Ernst Laur to Schulthess written from Paris in early 
May. In an interview, Cochin had given laur 'einen ungtlnstigen 
Eindruck* of stubbornness when the cattle question was raised.
Laur had puzzled over how to minimize cattle exports to Germany if 
the French did not purchase the animals, and could only hope the
war would come to an end before German demands for livestock became
1excessive.
The second letter was even more ominous:
Es kann kein Sweifel bestehcn dass in Frankreich ein 
steigernder Unwille gegen die Heutralen herrscht. Der 
Schweiz wird namentlich die Viehausfuhr vorgeworfen 
und gestorn noch brachten mehrere Zeitungen eigentlich 
bdsartige Artikel gegen unser Land.
Laur understood from the members of the C.P.I.C. that a Swiss 
delivery of 30*000 head of cattle to Germany would cost Denys Cochin 
his ministerial post, which accounted for the letter’s unyielding 
attitude. He felt the Swiss should give in because they could not 
afford to break with France, especially since the entry of the United 
States into the conflict on 6 April. *tair brauchen Frankreich als
FUrsprecher bei den Vereinigten Staaten, danit es uns nicht geht wie
2den nordischen Staaten*. Since Germany was certain to impose harsh
1. Laur-Schulthess, 6 May 191?* letter, Nachlass BR.Edmund Schulthess 
(1912-1935)* Schachtel k.
2. There were rumours that the United States would impose boycotts
on all the neutrals until they agreed to eliminate all re-export 
to Germany. This was in fact done on 9 July 1917*
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demands in the next economic agreement, the Swiss must keep in the 
good graces of the Allies.^
The Federal Council, apparently convinced that dealing with the 
devil they knew was safer than trying their luck with Denys Cochin's 
successor, tentatively accepted Cochin's proposals even though they 
implied an abdication of Swiss sovereignty over the use of her own 
produce. The Swiss were free to accept these proposals for although 
the Swiss-German agreement of 2 September 1916 had terminated on 30 
April 191?, the uncertainty of the military situation in the east 
after the first Russian revolution, the apparent success of 
unrestricted submarine warfare (began on 1 February 1917)« and an 
unwillingness to restrict their commerce longer than wartime conditions 
required, had induced the German government to settle for a three month
prolongation of the existing commercial treaty, without presenting
2
fresh demands to the Swiss. The Federal Council, greatly relieved
at this turn of events, authorized the Swiss negotiators in Faris to
3
sign the 'Cattle Export' Agreement with the Allies on 12 May 1917*
1. .Laur-Schulthess, 10 May 191?» letter, Nachlass BR. Edmund
Schulthess (1912-1955)» Schachtel A.
2. cf. Rumbold-FO, 24 April 1917% dispatch, FO 382-1569-83039/17•
3* The Swiss government cent Grobet, Chuard, Paul Robert, and £.
Laur to these negotiations.
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This agreement embodied the concessions won by Denys Cochin, 
viz., a clause limiting Swiss cattle exports to 30,OCX) until 15 
March 191?'t without compulsory purchase by the Allies.^ If circum­
stances forced the Swiss to export more, the Allies were to have the
2
option of buying the livestock or of supplying more fodder. The
Allies were to receive until 15 March 1918 70 per cent of the Swiss
export of condensed milk, the Central Empires 20 per cent, and the
neutrals 10 per cent. Switzerland agreed to deliver to the Central
Empires no more than three-quarters of the average butter and cheese
export to those countries for the years 1911-1913- Other clauses in
the treaty provided for shipping facilities (eleven ships were to
supply Swiss needs until 30 September, end ten thereafter), Allied
deliveries of fodder, copra and copra oil, and copper sulphate, and
4
Swiss deliveries of wood to France and Italy.
1. As the Swiss, in the 2 September 1916 agreement with the Germans, 
had pledged the delivery of 45,000 head of cattle to them in eight
months, the new figure of 30,000 in ten months represented a
considerable reduction.
2. Denys Cochin managed to insert a stipulation that oil seeds for 
Switzerland be crushed into fodder in Marseilles. Bertie observed 
that 'the desire for such a provision in favour of a French 
industry may well have had Tiuch to do with Mi. Denys Cochin's wish 
to negotiate an arrangement on his own terms'. Bertie-PO, 30 
April 1917, dispatch, FO 582-1569-89348/17.
3* In 1916, the Germans and Austriane had taken 15 per cent of the 
total export of condensed milk; Great Britain, France, and Italy
received ^0 per cent. Cornaz, op.cit., p.39* note 22.
4. Text of the Agreement of 12 M^y 1917» FO?382-1569-99160/17.
2k?
The importance of this agreement lies not in the Allies' 
avenging themselves on the Swiss for the supposed injury implied in the 
Swiss concessions to Germany on 2 September 1916, but in their extending 
their influence over the domestic economy of Switzerland (cattle, butter, 
milk, and cheese). Until this time the belligerents had contented them­
selves with demands on the use of their own products, or of those they 
delivered from third nations, but now they succeeded in gaining some 
control over Swiss domestic products. Though in the S.S.S. agreement 
Allied interference in the uoe of Swiss agricultural produce was speci­
fically excluded, the Allies now maintained that the 'special relation' 
existing between their exports and Swiss agricultural products (e.g., 
between the. fodder the Allies supplied and the cheese produced from 
livestock fed on this fodder) gave them the right to control even these 
exports. Although it was felt in some quarters that the precedent set 
by the 12. May 1917 agreement removed practically all safeguards against 
foreign meddling in Swiss domestic economy,1 the Allied position did have 
an incontrovertible logic which demanded acceptance.
The emphasis of this agreement, as was the case with most Allied- 
Swiss treaties during The war, was negative, that is, it minimized Swiss 
exports to the Central lOmpires. More positive were the less obtrusive 
but equally successful Allied attempts to make use of Swiss industrial
1. Cornaz, for example, writes: ...der dussem Einmischung in die 
innern tfirtschaftsverh&ltnisse des Neutralen praktisch keine 
Grenzen mehr gesetzt. Nur noch Macht und Opportunist waren 
fiir den Grad dieser Einrnischung massgebend. Cornaz, op.cit.,
p.38.
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potential in the production of munitions. Early in the war the
Ministry of Munitions hud sent Ernest £<• Sawyer to Berne to place orders
with Swiss manufacturers of goods valuable for the British war effort.
So that he might enjoy the protection of diplomatic immunity, Sawyer was
made a secretary to His Majesty*s Minister at Berne in May 1916.
The war gave new impetus to the manufacture of munitions in
Switzerland. when the watch industry fell on hard days in 1914, Jules
Bloch of La Cliaux-de-Fonds# recognised the munition producing potential
there and organized the conversion of the watch factories in the Swiss
Jura and in Geneva to the production of delicate brass shrapnel-fuses.^
The new war industry did not confine itself to fuses, however, As the
need for munitions increased and the availability of manpower in the
belligerent nations declined, the munitions industry in Switzerland grew
and contracts were let for gunpowder, explosives, cartridges, and other
projectile parts of copper, zinc, aluminium, and electro-steel.
•lawyer found himself not only writing contracts with Swiss firms,
but also arranging for the transport of raw materials (and later of coal
and coke) through France, as Swiss firms, in a not unnatural anxiety to
be assured of sufficient work to justify the conversion of their factories,
2
signed contracts only on condition of a guaranteed supply of raw material.
1, Much of the credit for rescuing the Swiss watch industry belongs 
to Bloch, but his fame has been obscured by his conviction for 
bribing an official to avoid payment of taxes on war profits. 
Geering, op.cit., p.577.
2. Grant Duff-FO, 8 October 1915, telegram, FO 371-2474-146789/15.
2^+9
With the backing of the military authorities who appreciated the value
of this contribution to the Allied War effort, transportation was 
facilitated, and a steady and smooth supply of raw materials was 
ultimately assured,^ enabling the allies to follow a nclicy of placing 
sufficient orders with the Gwiss to prevent the extension of German 
orders.
By June 1911) the allies were receiving 5/6 of the total munitions
2
of war manufactured in Switzerland as against 1/6 which went to Germany, 
The Germans, as we have seen, retaliated by embargoing coal for all firms 
manufacturing Allied munitions, but this measure was frustrated by the
establishment of the Coal Union under P, Girod of Geneva to supply coal
3
to munitions firms ’friendly to the Entente*.' Thus by the time the 
German Blacklist was abolished and the owiss Ausxuhrkommiosion 11 was 
set up (under the terms of the Gwiss-German agreement of 2 September 1916) 
to prohibit the export to the Allies of munitions made with German coal,
the French owiss munitions manufacturers had for the most part been made
k
independent of German suppliers,
1. A, Nicholson-Grant luff, 2b October 1915* letter, FG 371-2^7**- 
1^905Vl5.
2. Grant Duff-FO, lS June 1915* telegram, FC 382-;f26-796l8/l5,
3. Skipwortn-Grant Buff, letter, 14- August 1916, £0 382-1093-159^9Vl6.
k. 3umbold-F0, 23 October 1916, dispatch, £0 382-1075-218^52/16.
Rumbold reported that there was ’no reason to fear interference with 
the export of munitions’.
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At the beginning cf 19X7, with the transfer of Hindenburg and
Ludendorff to the western front, German interest was so drawn to 
Switzerland's potential for producing war material that the German 
legation in Seme had to take over a hotel to house its expanded 
commercial staff, a section of which was bending its efforts to securing 
munitions contracts* Until this time anxiety to maintain their export 
trade had induced German officials to wink at their own blacklists and 
restrictive measures, hut since Ludendorff's accession to power a policy- 
prevailed of winning the war at all costs, regardless of the immediate 
and the ultimate effects on German commerce and exchange." Civilian 
imports were to be considered only after military needs had been filled* 
Nevert* elcss Sawyer entertained few fears that Switzerland would 
become an arsenal for the manufacture of German munitions since the fuse 
manufacturers were located mainly in Geneva and in Chaux-de-Fonds, whereV w
2
the Allies had n?>.ready captured most of the market. He felt the German 
policy of boycotting coal for Swiss firms and of imposing strict conditions 
on the use cf German materials, far from impeding the export of munitions 
to the Allies, had actually put it on a firmer footing by securing the 
good will of .Swiss authorities for the Allies who were careful to exercise 
pressure through the agency of the S.3.3. rather than through peremptory
1* Kumbold-FO, 8 January 1917, dispatch, F0 382-1567-10590/17.
2. Keport on Swiss Munitions by S*3* oawyer, 13 December 1916,
F0 382-1567-3^7/17.
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decree* To show just how far the draconian methods of the Germans 
had alienated Swiss officials, Sawyer instanced the example of machines 
made with German coal and steel. By the terms of the Swiss-German 
agreement of 2 September 1916 these machines were not to be exported to 
the Allies, but the Swiss customs authorities were allowing them to 
pass if the maker could show that he had imported even the slightest 
amount of Allied coal or steel during the previous year which could 
have been used in the construction of the machine.^
The export statistics for munitions show how the Allies dominated
2
the market during this period:
M o n t h ______  To Allies__________ To Central Powers
(francs)August 1916 15,443,471 399,114
September 14,400,088 405,048
October 14,935,299 193,534
November 14,143,019 482,505
December 15,399,W 682,177
January 1917 17,506/f68 643,471
February 18,208,560 434,401
March 13,330,806 1,645,758
April 20,870,6^3 1,935,252
May 10,168,742 1,624,144
June 25,808,479 1,785,071
1. Sawyer-Rumbold, 8 January 1917, report, FO 382-1568-24727/17•
2. Sawyer-Rumbold, 15 March 1917, report, 5G 332-1568-62120/17, and 
Sawyer-Rumbold, 10 August 1917, report, £0 382-1570-156856/17.
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The Ministry of Munitions, who regarded the Swiss fuses as the 
’best and most reliable* were taking over 3/^ of the total Swiss fuse 
exports to the Entente. Although strenuous German efforts to place more 
work in Swiss factories resulted in increased exports to the Central 
Powers in Parch 1917 (due mainly to the development of fuses manufactured 
from zinc, which the Germans could supply themselves) the Allies continued 
to obtain by far the greater share of the munitions output.'*' Throughout 
1917 the French and British co-operated in supplying Swiss munitions 
manufacturers with metallurgical coke and coal. Sawyer was responsible
for the distribution of the British contribution which amounted to a
2
month3.y total of 1200 tor3 of coke and 1400 tons of coal. These 
relatively small amounts did not unduly strain Allied transport facili­
ties, so a steady supply could be counted on.
Sawyer, overestimating the labour shortage in the Central Powers, 
predicted that the Germans would employ Switzerland during 1918 to an even 
greater extent in making fuses and munitions."^ In doing so he under­
estimated the long tern effect of the blockade on the German financial 
position. The value of the mark had fallen steadily since the beginning
1. FO-Minietry of Munitions, 14 May 1917, report, FO 382-1569-96284/17*
2. Sawyer-Rumbold, 20 November 1917, report, FO 382-1573-229068/17*
3. Sawyer-Waterlow, 1 December 1917, letter, FO 382-1573-231091/17*
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of 1915* and the German government had been forced during 1917 to
set up import prohibitions to protect the currency against further
erosion.'*' A report circulated in the Ausw&rtiges Amt during August
1917 noted that German munitions orders (especially for fuses) would
in fact have to be reduced during the winter of 1917-1918 because they
could be made in Germany and because further purchases in Switzerland
2
would cause a lowering in the value of the mark.
A continued Allied market for Swiss munitions seemed assured when 
the Americans placed a General Williams in charge of their purchases in 
Switzerland and agreed in December 1917 to sign munitions contracts there 
only through the offices of the French and British Ministries of Muni­
tions.^ Nevertheless, 1918 saw a rapid decline in the Swiss munitions 
industry as Italy placed no more orders after January and the French 
did not renew their contracts. The British received **00,000 fuses a
week during January and February, but the number tapered off to 100,000
** 5
a week during March. No more fuses were received after June. The
1. Bell, Blockade, p.637«
2. Professor Dr. J&ckh-Bethmann-Hollweg, 27 August 1917* report, GFM,
21, 35** • Dr. Jdckh goes on to suggest that the German policy in
Switzerland of supportin the Federal Council and the Swiss General 
Staff did not mean the Germans should be too accommodating to the 
Swiss in economic matters as *die Schweizer sind gerissene GeschMft- 
sleute*•
3. Ruiabold-PO, 16 December 1917* telegram, FO 382-1573-2386**6/17«
**. Memorandum on Swiss munitions by E*E. Sawyer, 2 February 1918,
FO 382-198*+-286l9/l8.
5. Memorandum on Swiss munitions by Waterlow, 25 June 1918, FO 382-198**- 
1130*+7/l8. There were, however, still a few contracts running for 
aircraft supplies and other instruments.
wartime competition for Swiss munitions had clearly been won by the 
Allies, The statistics for the export of Swiss iron and copper manu­
factures for the war years give a general indication of the proportion 
of goods delivered to the belligerent groups, which is surprising 
considering that most of the iron came originally from Germany:^
Iron Copper
C.Powers Allies
*
C.Powers Allies
191^ h.2. 10.3 0.8 1.9
1915 11.7 29.0 3.7 22.
1916 8.3 60.5 3.0 132.5
1917 21.0 59.5 11.7 199.^
1918 18.0 KZ.h 7.3 90.7
Skipworth was also able to direct the export of aniline dyes from 
the factories in Basle to the United Kingdom, which had received before 
the war 3/k of her supply from Germany.' Since the raw materials for the 
manufacture of these dyes (aniline oil, phenol, nitro-benzole, etc.) could 
also be used for explosives, they were provided by the British under the 
close supervision of Skipworth. At the end of 191^ the dye manufacturers 
of the Swiss Society of Chemical Industries agreed to sever relations with 
Germany and to supply dyestuffs to the United Kingdom equal in value to 
raw materials received, but by 1917 they were actually sending dyes worth
1. In millions of francs. Geering, op.cit., p.576.
2. Foreign Office memorandum on dyestuffs, 5 December 191^* FO 368- 
1133-79188/lA.
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five or six times the value of the raw materials sent to them.
These dye manufacturers were not under S.S.S. control but signed a
Chemical Guarantee provided by Skipworth and posted a bond of £5,000
2
each. With minor exceptions this system worked to the benefit and 
satisfaction of both the Swiss and the British throughout the war.
The problem of monopolizing the Swiss munitions market, while at 
the same time reducing Swiss imports to a basic minimum, was aggravated 
by the counter need of the Entente powers, especially of Italy, to find 
buyers for their products in Switzerland. Consequently, after the daily 
business of blockade had been assumed by the S.S.S., diplomatic exchange 
on the regulation of Swiss imports was carried on as much between Great 
Britain and her Allies as between the Foreign Office and the Political 
Department. In this regard, great efforts had to be expended to curb 
Italian trade in wine, fruit, and silk which were unquestionably passing 
through Switzerland to the enemy.
Although a large surplus and vigorous rivalry between them had 
made rationing of wine and its consignment to the S.S.S. in 1915 entirely 
unacceptable to the French and the Italians, the British succeeded in 
March 1917 in pressuring the Italian government to agree to consign wine 
provided the French did likewise.^ The delegates meeting in Paris to
1. Board of Trade-FO, 5 October 1917, memorandum, FO 382-1596-193207/17*
2. Skipworth-Rurabold, 7 January 1918, Report on Dye Manufacturers,
FO 382-1985-9217/18. 
3. Rodd-FO, 2 March 1917, telegram, FO 382-1579-^6882/17*
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reconsider Swiss rations in Spring 1917 accepted in a co-operative 
spirit the proposal to consign wine to the S.S.S., but placed the ration 
at a very large figure (1,000,000 hectolitres, plus 12,000 casks to 
'individual* rather than commercial users)• Crowe found this ration 
'monstrous', but the Foreign Office was nevertheless forced to agree 
to it."*" Though wine and spirits passed under control of the S.S.S. 
on 1 June 1917$ several attempts were made by the Foreing Office 
subsequently to persuade France and Italy to agree to a reduced ration* 
These attempts failed, and large quantities of wine continued to be 
shipped to Switzerland, where, it was claimed, some of it was mixed
with Swiss domestic wine, and re-exported to Germany as a 'domestic
2
agricultural product'.
As a concession to the Italians, fruit had not at first been
consigned to the S.S.S., and was shipped not only to Switzerland but to
3
Germany, Holland, and Scandinavia. Ambassador Rodd defended the ship­
ments to Germany on the grounds that muc|i of the population of Southern 
Italy and Sicily depended for their livelihood on the export of oranges 
and lemons, and that the enemy could not derive great benefit from goods
1. C.P.I.C. Report 1157, 12 April 1917, FO 522-1579-81533/17, FO-Bertie, 
7 May 1917, telegram, FO 382-1579-907^17.
2. FO-Rumbold, 20 September 1917, telegram, FO 382-1579-182482/17. 
Strong protests were made to the Swiss regarding the adulteration 
of wine in this way.
3. Sir A. Johnstone (The Hague)-F0, 4 January 1916, telegram, FO 382- 
1077-2845/16.
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of so perishable and militarily valueless a nature."*" The Italians 
considered the passing of a certain amount of fruit to Germany a much 
lesser evil than closing the markets of Southern Italy and Sicily.
The fruit had to go somewhere, or the economy would be ruined, and
besides,these perishable commodities were essential for providing Italian
2
credit for purchases abroad.
The French and British governments, however, considered citrus 
fruit of high nutritive value and useful as an anti-scorbutic, but were 
unable during the summer of 1916 to finance the purchase of the Italian 
crop, as had been suggested.^ They were alarmed by the vase increase 
in Italian fruit exports to Switzerland and Germany. The figures for 
oranges,** for example, were:
1913 191** 1915
to Switzerland 38,607 **7*596 126,1**2 (quintals
to Germany 168,*t03 295 ***32 **17*95**
The Italian policy of exporting fruit to Germany prejudiced the
British blockade position vis a vis the neutrals since, although the
British navy were seizing and placing in prize whole shiploads of fruit
1. Rodd-FO, 28 April 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1077-82791/16.
2. Rodd-Cecil, 29 April 1916, private letter, ibid.
3* Report of the War Trade Advisory Committee, 6 July 1916, FO 382- 
1077-133805/16.
**. Rodd-FO, 2** August 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1077-17081Vl6.
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from neutrals to Scandinavia, Italy, an ally, was freely exporting to
Germany.1 To bring this practice to a halt, Crowe strongly urged
blacklisting Italian firms engaged in the fruit trade, but Rodd felt
it 'hardly equitable* to punish individual companies when their own
government did not prohibit the export of fruit, and that this was not
2
a ’felicitous manner* of dealing with an Allied government. Never­
theless, the Foreign Office felt at least a gesture must be made. The 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed that the British 
government expected all their Allies to prohibit trade with the enemy, 
and so long as they did so, it was not necessary to restrict the trade 
of a British with an Allied subject. When however they did not, 'His 
Majesty's government are compelled by existing legislation to see that 
British subjects do not break the law by dealing with enemy firms through
Allied firms*. They felt the establishment of a British blacklist of
3
Italian firms was therefore both legal and necessary.
Fortunately this measure did not have to be adopted, as the 
Treasury reluctantly consented, in the late Autumn of 1916, to finance 
the purchase of Italian fruit which would otherwise find its way to
1. Memorandum by O'Malley on the passage of supplies from Italy to 
Germany, 4 May 1916, FO 382-1077-84841/16.
2. Rodd-FO, 26 September 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1077-195979/16.
3. FO-Rodd, 7 October 1916, ibid.
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Germany. As this decision came during the harvest season when the
trains were already going north. Sir Edward Capel-Cure, a British
economist at the University of Siena who had volunteered assistance
to Rodd in economic matters, did yeoman’s work in cancelling contracts,
stopping consignments, and negotiating the transfer of the crop to the
British government. Disposal of government purchases was entrusted to
a commission under E.T. Dotteridge, who sought out alternative markets
and sent much fruit to the front, but through inevitable delays and
confusions, much of the crop deteriorated and increasingly heavy demands wei
made on the Treasury guarantee.x During the following season (1917-1918),
however, largely due to the failure of the Spanish crop and better
organization of purchase and transport in Italy, a profit was realized
which more than compensated for the losses of 1916-1917.
V/ith the assurance that the purchase of their fruit crop was
guaranteed, the Italian government at last consented to the consignment
2
of fruit to the S.S.S. and to its being rationed. This resolution of 
the problem was, of course, highly satisfactory to the Foreign Office,
though the long delay in including fruit on the consignment list had caused
3
them ’deeply [to] regret Italian methods of waging war*.
1. J.R. Rodd, (Baron Rodd of Rennell), Social and Diplomatic Memories, 
(Third Series), 1902-1919 (London, 1925)* p.301.
2. C.P.I.G. Report 1567, 10 December 1917, FO 382-1584-233913/17.
C.P.I.C. Report, 1058, 14 February 1917, FO 382-1584-39085/17.
3. FO-Rodd, 24 February 1917, telegram, FO 382-|584-40l6l/l7.
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The third commodity whose consigiiment to the S.S.S the Italians 
had vigorously opposed was silk, which of the three was the most 
important not only because it accounted for about l/*+ of Italy’s 
exports but also because of its unquestioned military value. At the 
start of 1916, all types of silk (with three exceptions) could be freely 
exported from Italy to Allied or neutral nations.'*' Since neither the 
Italians nor the Swiss put any obstacle in the way of exporting raw 
silk or silk goods, much silk of Italian origin went on to Germany.
Sk per cent of the raw silk used in the German textile centre of
2
Grefeld, for example, came from Italy.
Since silk was required in the production of zeppelins and air­
planes, the Foreign Office interested themselves in stemming its flow 
into German factories. Some investigation convinced Craigie that the 
most formidable obstacle to eliminating the German supply was *the power 
of the silk trade in France and Italy*. Besides, as O ’Malley noted,
'silk is a desperate subject to deal with because it does not fall into 
broad categories like cotton and because it is never possible to say 
exactly what the foreign (French and Italian) terms mean. It seems absurd
1. Rodd-FO, 6 February 1916, telegram, FO 382-1079-26587/16. In 
relation to Italy, Germany was at this time 'a neutral*.
2. Memorandum on the silk position in Germany, June 1915* FO 382-1079- 
3l87l/l6. As stocks in Germany decreased during the war, attempts 
were made to build up home production of silk. A 'German Silk 
Culture Society* was formed but ran into difficulty because mulberry 
leaves, according to this report, did not stay green long enough in 
Germany I
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that the Foreign Office should have to try and argue with the French 
government about anything so abstruse^
When pressed on the point, however, the French government declared
themselves ready to reduce their own silk exports as soon as the Italians
2
did. The Foreign Office, realizing that the Italian government would 
never agree to a complete prohibition of export for silk, determined on 
the establishment of an Allied purchasing organization to keep Italian 
silk from the German market by buying it directly in Italy. After 
several approaches were made to the Italian government, Dell'Abbadessa 
announced to Lord Granville that he was 'authorised by his Government to 
agree to the prohibition of the export of silk provided H.M. Government 
and the French Government were prepared to make some arrangement to save
the important Italian silk industry from ruin', meaning, of course, on
3
condition of a cash settlement.
An interallied conference on silk was therefore held in Paris in 
September 1916. The French and British urged a complete prohibition of 
export, but the Italians maintained they could consent to prohibit the 
export of only those types of silk of undoubted military value and on the 
receipt of convincing proof that no economic loss would ensue for them.
An investigation was begun to determine how mucjpt Italian silk could be
1. Minutes by Craigie and O'Malley, ibid.
2. Report of the Comite de Restriction, 31 May 1916, FO 382-1079- 
119972/16.
3. Bertie-FO, 18 August 1916, dispatch, FO 382-1079-16538Vl6.
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absorbed by French industries. Meanwhile, O’Malley, feeling that the 
British were ’in a dubious position countenancing traffic between 
Germany and an Ally which we would rigorously suppress if carried on 
between a neutral and Germany’, suggested the statutory blacklist for 
Italian silk manufacturers.^
The Italians, however, eventually agreed to prohibit the export 
of all types of silk except ’thrown silk*. Silk therefore became 
contraband in all three Allied countries on 1 October 1916, and was to
p
be rationed and consigned to the S.S.S. as of 6 October. ' Under 
pressure from their silk traders, the Italian government delayed the 
publication for their prohibition until a week after the British and 
French announcement in order to give Italian speculators the opportunity 
to enjoy a last flurry of sales in Germany before the gates clanged 
shut." The C.P.I.C. retaliated by making the Italian ration retro­
active by one week.
The establishment of precise rations for various types of silk 
involved the Allies in considerable wrangling in Paris, as the Italians 
held out for high export quotas for those types of silk which were
1. Bertie-FO, 20 September 1916, telegram, FO 382-1079-187775/16.
And O ’Malley’s minute.
2. Bertie-FO, 23 September 1916, telegram, FO 582-1079-190135/16.
3. Paul Cambon-FO, 16 October 1916, note, FO 382-1079-206876/16.
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corisignable to the S.S.S.^ 'Undyed thrown silk1 which could still 
be exported without consignment to the S.S.S. and therefore without 
guarantee against re-export to Germany, was sent to Switzerland in 
huge quantities.^
The War Trade Department deplored this breach in the blockade 
wall since thrown silk could be made into thread for sewing uniforms
and into tissue for parachutes, aircraft fabric, cartridge primers,
2
and clothing, but in view of Italy's precarious economic position they 
felt it inadvisable to take any step which would result in the collapse 
of her silk industry while the war was in progress. They therefore 
recommended the implementation of a scheme whereby Great Britain would 
join France in the purchase of Italian silk going through Switzerland 
to Germany, assuming that a small quantity could be absorbed by the 
United Kingdom, and some by France, but that there would be no diffi­
culty in finding a market for the rest in the United States. The loss
involved in these purchases, if any, would presumably be small considering
3
the high prices silk commanded on the world market.
1. Memorandum on Italian Exports to the Enemy (prepared for the
cabinet by S. Waterlow), 30 January 1917, FO 382-156WH03V17.
Waterlow put the export of undyed thrown silk at about 3,000 tons 
a year.
2. iar Trade Department-FO, 9 February 1917, report, FO 382-560-32291/17•
3. Memorandum on the Italian Silk Position (prepared by Mr. Warner of
the Linen and Silk Committee of the War Trade Depart ent), 9 January
1917, FO 382-1560-9091/17.
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The Foreign Office were sceptical about the success of this 
plan for they were certain the Treasury would balk at the prospect 
of providing the required sum, and the Germans would counter sales in 
the United States merely by offering higher prices which the Italians 
would find irresistible. Lord Robert Cecil observed that the Italians 
were 'most unreasonable* since they were getting 150 per cent more 
than the pre-war price for supplying the enemy with military goods.^
The ingenuity with which the Italian government threw up obstacles 
to prevent a conference on silk exports from being held in the Spring 
of 1917 can only provoke a retrospective smile. The first Italian 
ploy came from the Italian Minister of Finance, who refused to authorize
the Italian delegates to participate in the conference until the British
2
agreed to accept 70 per cent of their 1916 silk import from Italy, and
3
the French reduced their silk tariff. The British and French there­
fore agreed to discuss these problems at the conference. Then it was
announced that the Italian delegates could not attend the conference on 
the date fixed (1*+ May 1917)* Waterlow was convinced that the reason
for the delay was that the Italians were satisfied with the state of
affairs in which they could export to the enemy and felt that only harm
1. Minutes by Water low, Crowe, and Cecil on FO 382-1562-119715/17-
2. To arrest a fall in the value of the pound, British imports of
luxury items had been curtailed in early 1917- The import of
Italian silk had been reduced to 50 per cent of the 1916 total.
3. Bertie-FO, 28 March 1917, telegram, FO 382-I562-6585V I 7.
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could come to theq^ from a confrontation with their Allies in this 
regard. He therefore reluctantly recommended conceding at the outset 
the acceptance of 70 per cent of the 1916 silk import.'*’
Next the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested the
'silk conference* be held in Rome rather than in Paris, and that Swiss
2
delegates be invited as well. The Foreign Office countered by
contacting the American government with the suggestion that the United
States become a 'compensatory market* for Italian silk since the main
difficulty was Italian reluctance to chance the ruin of their largest
industry.'’ So tempting was the prospect of the huge American market
that the Italians at last consented to negotiations entered upon
without prior conditions in Paris beginning on 5 June 1917* Robert
woods Bliss, councillor of the United States Embassy in Paris, was
appointed delegate of the United States government with instructions
k
only to report on the proceedings.
1. Minute by Waterlow on Cambon-FO, 10 May 1917* letter, FQ 382- 
1562-9^735/17.
2. Rodd-FO, I k May 1917* telegram, FO 382-1562-97888/17.
3. FO-Cecil Spring-Rice, 15 May1917* telegram, FO 382-1562-97888/17. 
k. Bertie-FO, 2 June 1917, telegram, FO 382-1562-110610/17.
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The conference on silk was held from 5 to 9 June 1917 and 
was a great success for the Foreign Office, whose policies found 
acceptance with the other representatives.x The most important 
points agreed upon were the addition of undyed thrown silk to the
Allied list of prohibited exports, and the organization of an inter-
2
allied bureau to purchase Italian silks at a fixed rate. ' Waterlow 
found the result of the conference 'highly satisfactory' and most 
significant. 'It means that we have stopped the most important
remaining hole in the blockade and have solved a number of difficult
3
and important questions.'
Although the Italians agreed to prohibit the export of thrown 
silk on 25 June, at the last minute they demanded the removal of the 
silk purchasing authority from Lyons, as had been decided upon in Paris,
to Milan, where the control of purchases would be more difficult for
k
the other Allies. 'The usual oriental methods', Waterlow remarked 
with resignation, and Rodd was instructed vigorously to oppose the
1. froces Verbnux, 5. 7. 8. 9 .iuin 1917. TO 382-1562-131010/17.
2. C.P.I.C., Report 1263, 9 June 1917, FO 382-1562-119^3/17.
3. Minute by Waterlow on George Graham-FG, 9 June 1917$ telegram, 
FO 382-1562-115290/17. 
*t. 3ertie-F0, 22 June 1917* telegram, FO 382-1562-12^278/17.
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Italian suggestion. The Italians, with admirable tenacity, then 
appealed again to the British government to raise British silk imports 
from 50 to 70 per cent of the 1916 level, in return for their own 
concession on the site of the commission, but this request was denied 
on the ground that the Italian silk industry was already fully 
guaranteed against loss and such a concession would involve similar 
privileges to other nations.'1' In a final compromise the Purchasing
Bureau was in fact established at Lyons, but with subsidiaries
2
(suecursales) at Milan and Turin, The bureau was capitalized at
10,000,000 French francs provided jointly by the British, French, and 
American governments. As the Swiss had signed in Paris on k September 
1917 an agreement incorporation the decisions of the June silk con­
ference,^ this last commodity of military importance ceased legally to 
be exported from Italy into Switzerland.
Illegal exports apparently did not cease, however. An accusation 
that considerable smuggling of silk, cotton, and other commodities was 
taking place across the frontier at Chiasso (near Como) was made in the 
Italian Chamber of Deputies by Deputy Pirolini in December 1917* 
Pirolini accused Albert Grimm and Francisco Rusca, chiefs of the S.S.S.
1. Road-PO, 5 July 1917, telegram, FO 382-1563-1331*3l/l7. PO-Rodd,
20 July 193-7, telegram, FO 382-15^3-1^07^9/17.
2. Bertie-FO, 22 December 1917, telegram, FO 382-1563-2^2838/17.
3. Text of the Agreement, September 1917, £0 382-1563-17^913/17*
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bureaus in Genoa and Rone respectively, of smuggling and of favouring
certain Swiss firms in making consignments to the S.S.S. No concrete
evidence was found to support the accusation against Grimm, though
Rusca’s family connections in import firms in Switzerland put him in
a very had light.^ Trouble flared up in the Italian. Chamber again
in February 1918 with further accusations by Pirolini, which were
answered by various Deputies including the Minister of Finance and
2
the Minister of Commerce.
In the course of an investigation instituted by the Minister of
Commerce, evidence came to light that the Swiss Minister in Rome,
Alfred Planta, was involved as an ’intermediary and protector* in the
silk and cotton scandals. He was, of course, instantly recalled by
the Swiss government.^ The Italian Minister of the Treasury also
called for the removal of the Italian minister in Berne, Paulucci de
Calboli, ’who, in his opinion, has been foolish and has shown great lack
1 bof ability and discretion.
When Rodd joined in urging the recall of Paulucci de Galboli,
Baron Sonnino politely refused, pointing to the special delicacy of 
Italian relations with Switzerland by reason of the proximity and the
1. Rodd-FO, 27 December 1917» dispatch, FO 382-1967-Jf§H^/l8
2. Rodd-FO, 2b February 1918, dispatch, FO 382-1967-39397/18.
3. He was replaced by Georges Wagniere, former editor of the pro-
Allied Journal de Geneve.
b. Rodd-FO, 11 March 1918, telegram, FO 382-1967-^5287/18.
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consequent need for tact, and suggesting that the French were in 
reality 'more indulgent* than the Italians in blockade matters.^
The disclosure of Planta*s involvement in the scandals evoked 
sharp reactions in the Foreign Office. Commander Leverton Harris wrote 
that *this just goes to show that we cannot trust the Swiss and are being 
constantly fooled by them** Waterlow, however, took up the cudgels 
in defence of the Swiss and the S.S.S. in particular* He claimed he 
knew of no instance of ’being fooled* by the Swiss and resented the 
implication that the Swiss blockade was in any way unsatisfactory, since 
Swiss exports to the enemy had long been reduced to a minimum, * a result 
all the more creditable when it is remembered that in Switzerland we have 
to work, in concert with very difficult allies, a system which in theory 
is run mainly by the French, but on which in fact we have always done 
all the real work and taken the lead*. Crowe agreed that the difficulty
lay not with the British, 'but with Allies who do not play the game, for
2
private interests'.
1. Rodd-FO, 2h March 1918, dispatch, FO 382-1967-58071/18. Baron 
Sonnino's allegation was absurd: if anything, the Foreign Office had 
their hands full trying to restrain the French blockade authorities 
from adopting an unreasonably harsh position vis a vis the Swiss. 
Waterlcw's minute: The point is not that the Italians refuse to be 
dragged by us into a ‘’forward1* blockade policy, but their representa­
tives show incapacity and wilful obstructiveness in carrying out the 
details of the policy on which all are agreed. 'When the Minister 
(Paulucci de Caboli) spends 2/3 of his time on leave, and, when at his 
post, talks in a degaitiste sense; when all his staff have German or 
Austrian wives; when the commercial attache has been twice bankrupt 
and is boycotted by his French colleagues: it is clear that only very 
radical measures can be of any use*.
2. Minutes on Rodd-FO, 11 March 1918, telegram, FO 382-1967-39397/18, 
Apparently this discussion between Commander Leverton Harris and S, 
Waterlow generated some heat. Lord Robert Cecil brought it to a halt 
by speaking privately to the Commander.
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The Swiss were indignant at criticism of the S.S.S (referred to 
as the Societe sans scrupule in the Italian Chamber of Deputies) 
especially by the Italians who, they felt, were no less involved in the 
scandals than the unfortunate MM, Planta and Rusca. When Carletti, the 
Italian commercial attache, called on Grobet-Roussy on 6 May 1918 to
request the removal of Rusca from the S.S.S. bureau in Rome, his request
was rejected with some heat. Grobet-Roussy was convinced Italian 
officials were trying to distract attention from themselves to the S.S.S., 
and to lay at the door of that organization the responsibility for 
scandals which properly concerned the Italian government alon#.^"
Besides Carletti could offer no proof of Rusca1s guilt. ^parently the 
Italian government felt too many officials would be implicated if evidence
were released, and although Grobet-Roussy expressed to Craigie his
willingness to remove Rusca without evidence if this were necessary to 
exonerate the S.S.S., Craigie felt this would be unfair to the organization.' 
Consequently Rusca remained at his post and the affair died a quiet death. 
Later, an investigation by the Foreign Office of the activities of the 
S.S.S., undertaken as a result of the Italian scandal, convinced the
1. Memorandum by Craigie on a conversation with Grobet, 7 May 1918,
FO 382-1967-883^1/18. Cf. also Rodd-FO, 2 May 1918, dispatch,
FO 382-1967-80330/18.
2. Memorandum by Craigie on a conversation with Grobet, 2^ June 1918, 
FO 382-1967-12567Vl8. Waterlow commented that it was improbable 
that documentary proof would be published as it would necessarily 
establish Ta complicity of Italian officials. It never was.
3. Memorandum by Craigie, 24 June 1918, FO 382-I967-I2567V I 8.
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Contraband Department that their confidence in the S.S.S. was not 
misplaced, and showed that its officials in Switzerland were above 
reproach in living up to the obligations of the Society.^
Perhaps it would not be out of place at this point to say a word 
about the resignation on 18 June 1917 of Federal Councillor Arthur 
Hoffmann, head of the Federal Political Department. Hoffmann had never 
been popular with the Foreign Office because of his well known sympathy with 
the Central Empires. In June 1917 he made the error of attempting to 
negotiate a separate peace between Germany and the Kerensky government in 
Russia. Specifically he sent a telegram, giving the German conditions 
for peace to Robert Grimm, a Swiss Socialist who was in Petrograd in 
June 1917* This telegram was intercepted and published in a Swedish news­
paper. Hoffmann's position was impossible. Whatever his reasons (and he 
claimed they were strictly humanitarian), he was in fact party to an attempt 
to engineer a peace to the benefit of the Central Powers, a highly un­
neutral act. He therefore resigned immediately (18 June 1917)* and 
the other members of the Federal Council disclaimed all knowledge and
responsibility for Hoffmann's step, which he had taken on his own
2
initiative without consulting them.
1. G.C. Harben (War Trade Intelligence Department), 13 August 1918* 
Report, FO 382-1967-139938/18, and 26 August 1918, FO 382-1967- 
1^6753/187 Craigie's critique of Harben's reports, 11 November
1918, ro 382-1967-186695/18.
2. The 'Hoffmann Affair' is explained in great detail in Bonjour, 
op.cit., II, 612-637.
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At the time of his resignation, Hoffmann claimed he sent 
Grimm only information he nad gleaned from newspapers and from general 
conversation with German statesmen. The documents cf the German 
Ausvtartiges Amt. captured by the Allies at the end of World Wax II, 
prove he had actually contacted the German government specifically to 
discover their peace terms."
But Hoffmann’s swift resignation relieved the Foreign Office of 
the embarrassment of dealing directly with this breach of neutrality, 
when Carlin stopped off in the Foreign Office on 19 June to ascertain 
their attitude to the events of the previous day, hewas received by 
Sir William Langley who spoke mildly of the difficulties of a general 
peace, especially regarding tho colonies, but gave no indication that
2
the Foreign Office would seek satisfaction for Hoffmann’s indiscretion, 
'i'ne British newspapers were filled with comment on the ’Tales of 
Hoffmann' and 'Grimm's Fairy Tales’ for about a week, but then interest 
died.
1. e.g., Romberg-Auswartiges Amt, 19 June 1917> telegram, OFM 21,
145• 'Urn Herm Hoffmanns Situation zu erleichtern ist es absolut
erforderlich dass nicht bekannt wiru, dass wir das Telegrarom fur 
Grimm inspiriert haben. Version muss aufrechterhalten werden, dass
Herr Hoffmann auf Grund seiner allgemeinen Informationen Grimm 
ilber seine Beurteilung der J'riedensmoglichjk.eiten unterrichtet
habe.'
2. Carlin-Pol. Dept., 19 June 1917* dispatch, EPD RP London 21 1916- 
1917, 2001 (D) a.
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The most important result of this event, in so far as the 
blockade was concerned, was the transfer of the Commercial Section 
(Haude1sabteilun;:) of the Political Department to taw Department of 
Public Economy. Thereafter Federal Councillor, Edmund Schulthess 
would deal with all matters relating to the blockade. Gustave Ador, 
of Geneva, formerly president of the International Red Cross, and known 
as a friend of the Entente, was put in charge of foreign affairs, 
replacing Hoffmann.
The effects of the great events in Russia which put victory 
almost within the grasp of the Central Empires, were counterbalanced 
by the entry of tue United States into the war in April 1917* ®ie 
effect on Switzerland of America’s momentous step from neutrality to 
belligerency, and on the Confederation’s relation with Great Britain, 
will be considered in the following chapter.
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VII
UNCERTAIN ASSOCIATE: AMERICA
When questioned by A.J. Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, 
about the possibility of the United States adopting the British 
blacklist soon after America’s entry into the war, F.L. Polk, 
Counselor for the State Department, allegedly remarked, ’Mr. Balfour, 
it took Great Britain three years to reach a point where it was 
prepared to violate all the laws of blockade. You will find it 
will take us only two months to become as great criminals as you 
are! ' 1 Allowing for exaggerated and imprecise use of language,
Polk’s statement affords some indication of the magnitude and 
swiftness of America’s change of attitude towards the blockade 
when she*abandoned her position as champion of neutrals for that 
of most menacing of belligerents. After her entry into the war 
on 6 April 1917$ the United States applied contraband control
1. B.J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page
(London, 1923) II, 2^5* A statement of Polk on this matter 
is found in T.A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States 
Toward the Neutrals 1917-1918 (Baltimore, 19^2), pp.1-2. 
note 2. Bailey proposes to show in his book that the United 
States cannot be regarded as a ’great criminal’ in the matter 
of blockade. He would presumably reserve this honour for 
Great Britain.
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more rigorously and with greater originality than the British had 
been able to do so, particularly in regard to export control, which 
she skillfully employed as a bargaining weapon to regulate supplies 
to neutrals adjacent to Germany
The use of this weapon, or the threat to use it, caused the 
Swiss the utmost alarm. As a British intelligence report on the 
situation in Switzerland in November 1917 noted,
•Resentment at the British blockade has receded into 
the background. In the eyes of the Swiss, America 
is to England as King Stork is to King Log, but at 
the same time '‘resentment” is not what the Swiss 
feel toward the American policy. They seem to 
regard America as an elemental, non-human force ^
which cannot be argued with, resisted, or controlled* •
The British themselves shared some of the Swiss apprehension 
regarding their new co-belligerent whose enthusiasm threatened to 
topple the whole structure of the Swiss *blockade* which was 
built on finely balanced agreements arrived at in interminable 
conferences over the years. To moderate and direct to the best 
interests of the blockade the vast though unpredictable potential 
of America became therefore one of the main preoccupations of the 
Foreign Office in their dealing with the Swiss question during 
the final nineteen months of the war. The initial American 
reluctance to take part in established blockade schemes, and their
1. W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade (London, 1952), I, 10.
2. Memorandum of the Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information, 
15 November 1917* ’The Situation in Switzerland*, FO 571-30**0-
220967/17.
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iasistance on dealing independently with the Swijs without 
sufficient prior consultation with the British, led to considerable 
confusion and some embarrassment in Great Britain’s own relations 
with the Confederation.
The Swiss had first begun to look to America as a source of 
grain during the Balkan Wars which temporarily disrupted the wheat 
supply from Russia and Rumania. The closing of the Straits in the 
summer of 1914 and the general shortage of foodstuffs in Europe 
reestablished this dependence on America to the point where the 
Swiss were forced to look exclusively to the New World and largely 
to the United States for their wartime grain needs. This dependence 
spread to other commodities as well, with the result that the Swiss 
government were distressed to find their nation’s economy inextricably 
bound to that of the United States when America abandoned her 
neutrality in April 1917* Switzerland was at that time drawing 
most of her copper and cotton, as well as her grain and fodder, 
from the United States, so that the value of Swiss imports from that 
nation increased from 92 million francs in 1911-1913 to 332 million 
francs in 1914-1916. In 1916 the United States supplied 23.7^ 
percent of all the food imports of Switzerland and, between 1915 
and 1918, 95 percent of her wheat imports."*" The increasing Swiss
1. P. Erdman.Swiss-Americ n Economic Relations (Basel, 1959)$
p.38.
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dependence on America is illustrated by the following chart
showing the value of various exports from the United States to
Switzerland:
June 1915-June 1916 June 1917-June 1918
meat products
oils
footV' fodder
£ 588,186 
2,542,755 
125,992
1,228,197
6,844,144
4,586,379
total of all exports 8,082,516 21,264,078. 1
Naturally the Federal Council were apprehensive when rumours 
began to circulate in the Spring of 1917 that the American government
This apprehension was all the greater as the Swiss minister in 
Washington, Dr. Paul Ritter, had, through his attempt to re­
establish relations between the United States and Germany after 
Count Bemsdorff had been handed his passports in February 1917,
incurred the suspicion in the eyes of the State Department of
3
collusion with the Germans. As it was possible that they might be
1. Bell, Blockade, p.668. Increases in prices account for some of 
this rise, but trade had obviously grown spectacularly.
2. P.A.Stovall (U.S. minister in Berne) - R. Lansing (Secretary
of State), 24 April 1917, telegram, FR 1917 Suppl.2, vol.II,p.H59
3. Memorandum by Lansing, 21 February 1917, FR 1917, Suppl.l, p.108. 
Lansing got Ritter to admit, to his extreme embarrassment, that 
the proposals for reestablishing diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Germany had been approved, if not inspired, by 
Bernsdorff himself.
were considering a general embargo on their exports to the neutrals.2
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regarded in Washington as rather too closely tied, both politically
and economically, with the Central Empires, the Swiss government
were anxious to assure the Americans no less of their neutrality
than of the dependence of their nation’s economy on the good will
of the Allies. Ritter was therefore recalled and replaced on
23 July 1917 by Hans Sulzer, a young Swiss industrialist, who, it was
felt, was alive to the difficulties of the Swiss economy and would
gain more sympathy in Washington for the Swiss cause, Hoffmann
also arranged for a special mission to accompany the new minister
to the United States *in order to explain the peculiar economic
conditions of Switzerland in connection with the possible restriction
of foodstuff shipments from America*.1 This three member mission,
selected by reason of their close association with America, toured
the United States from 15 August to 3 November 1917* publicizing
Swiss needs and endeavouring to win the favour of businessmen,
2
politicians, and government officials to the Swiss cause,
Meanwhile, a larger and more important mission, headed by 
A.J. Balfour,Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since the fall of
1. Stovall-Lansing, 7 June 1917* telegram, FR 1917* Suppl,2, 11,1167-68,
2. This mission was comprised by Lt. Col, Staempfli, National 
Councillor John Syz, and Professor William E, Rappard, of the 
University of Geneva, who had taught political economy at Harvard 
from 1911 to 1913 and was a personal friend of Woodrew V/ilson, 
former president of Princeton University. P,A,Stovall,
Switzerland and the World War (Savannah,Georgia, 1939), p,133«
Rappard recounted his experiences in W.E, Rappard, La Mission 
Suisse aux Stats-Unis (Geneva, 1918). A German intelligence 
report submitted just after their return to Switzerland recounts 
that the mission had ’nichts erreicht* • Chief of the Naval 
Admiral Staff - Auswartines Amt, 30 November 1917, report, GFM 
21, 554.
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the Asquith government in December 1916, sailed from England to the 
United States in April 1917 to integrate the new belligerent into 
the Allied blockade system by inducing them to adopt lists of 
prohibited exports and of undesirable consignees in neutral countries, 
to employ their own shipping in the common Allied cause, to 
requisition ships being constructed in America for neutrals, and to 
give the Allies the first option on available foodstuffs and fodder.'*' 
Although in discussion with the Balfour Commission during their 
five week stay in the United States the officials of the State 
Department tried, in spite of their nation’s transition from 
neutrality to belligerency, to retain some semblance of consistency 
in their stand on the rights and duties of blockade by alleging that 
American co-operation would not rely on measures which they had 
hitherto regarded as unfounded in international law, the Americans 
showed themselves prepared to co-operate in the blockade under the 
rubrics of conserving supplies for themselves and their associates, 
of observing existing trading with the enemy legislation, and of
2
conserving tonnage for American and Allied military necessities*
The Balfour Commission expressed satisfaction with the way 
the Swiss ’blockade* was proceeding, and recommended that no drastic 
measures be adopted against the Confederation in view of the
1* Balfour-Page, 10 April 19171 Letter (+Memoranda),FR 1917» Suppl*2, 
II,8o8-8l4.
2. Report of the War Trade Board (Washington, 1920), p*12. cf* Bailey, 
op.cit., p,50-63*
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satisfactory Allied supervision of transport to Switzerland and the
excellent control exercised internally by the 3.S.S* The French
joined the British in this recommendation and suggested further that
the American 'scrutiny of exports to Switzerland' be effected through
existing inter-allied agencies, and that the United States dispatch
representatives to the C.P.I.C, in Paris.^ These suggestions were
2
received favourably by the State Department, though several months 
elapsed before representatives were assigned to those bodies*
TheSwiss minister in London was meanwhile instructed to enlist 
the support of the Foreign Office in moderating possible harshness 
on the part of the Americans* Persistent rumours that America was 
planning to embargo all exports to neutrals continued to cause 
anxiety in Switzerland. Carlin therefore sought reassurance from 
Sir Eyre Crowe that the Balfour Commission would not fail to emphasize 
in Washington the effectiveness of Allied control over Swiss 
commerce/and mentioned that he was gratified at a statement of Lord 
Robert Cecil that no appreciable quantity of goods imported from 
overseas to neutral countries was passed on to Germany. He wondered, 
however, if the Americans were aware of this fact. Crowe assured 
him that the Balfour Commission were alive to Switzerland's problems 
and 'had gone out with full instructions'. As Carlin was worried
1. J.J. Jusserand (French Ambassador in Washington)- Lansing, 7 Way 1917* 
letter, FR 1917, Suppl.2, II, 1160-61.
2. Lansing-Jusserand, 7 June 1917, letter, FB 1917, Suppl2, 11,1965-66*
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that ships would return from France to the United States in ballast 
for reasons of haste, he was likewise assured that *due consideration* 
would be given to Swiss export trade.1
In spite of Crowe’s confident air, the Foreign Office themselves 
were uncertain about the role the United States could play in 
improving the Swiss section of the blockade even if the State 
Department were willing to co-operate fully with the Allies. The 
French ambassador in Berne had suggested having America forward 
agricultural and industrial supplies only on condition that the
Swiss kept their exports to Germany within the limits allowed by the
2
S.3.S., but as these limits had always been scrupulously observed, 
the suggestion seemed useless. Craigie and Hugh Wilson of the 
American legation in Berne, who dealt with contraband questions in 
the early days of American involvement in the war, were strongly 
of the opinion that it would be better for the United States to 
keep out of the S.S.S. arrangement altogether, so as to leave her 
hands freer to exert ad hoc pressure on the Swiss should the need
3arise.
Waterlow therefore drew up for the instruction of the Foreign 
Office a memorandum on ’possible American action as regards the Swiss
1. Memorandum by Crowe on a conversation with Carlin, 21 May 1917*
FO 382-1592-103295/17.
2. RuraboId-FO, 2 June 1917, dispatch, £0 382-1592-11^123/17.
3. Craigie-Waterlow, 2 June 1917, private letter, ibid.
282
part of the blockade*• This memorandum deserves careful attention 
as it provides a concise summary of Swiss blockade conditions in mid- 
1917* Waterlow stated that no new organization was desirable or 
necessary in consequence of America's entry into the war as nothing 
could reach Switzerland through France or Italy without consignment to 
theS.S.S., which had shown itself a matchlessly efficient organization 
for curtailing exports into Germany. Unique among the neutrals, 
Switzerland's economic control was the responsibility of not one 
but three Allied governments who had won the confidence of the Swiss, 
a confidence which rumours of 'drastically applied* American pressure 
had begun to replace with irritation and deepening anxiety among the 
Swiss. In the abstract, there were two and only two heads under 
which American contribution to the 'increased strategy of the 
blockade* was possible: reducing Swiss exports to the enemy of goods 
they imported, and reducing the export of goods they produced 
domestically.
a) No imports into Switzerland were re-exported to the enemy 
except those allowed by the S.S.3. agreement and special Italian 
produce (silk, wine, and fruit). TheS.S.S. bye-laws were part of an 
international instrument to be revoked or modified only through 
negotiation between the three Allies and the Swiss government.
Although American pressure might perhaps obtain revocation of this 
instrument, force the Swiss to sever all economic ties with the 
Central Powers, and enter exclusively into the Allied economic sphere, 
this was both unnecessary and undesirable as it could not be effected
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without counter concessions, 1 for all economic problems hang 
together*• It was therefore best to preserve the S.S.S. even 
though under this agreement some limited quantities of imported 
goods passed to Germany, It followed then that unless the United 
States were party to the S.S .S . agreement she could do nothing to 
affect Swiss re-exports permitted by its bye-laws. Her outside 
assistance was of doubtful utility. On the other hand, the blockade 
cause would be much advanced if the United States could be induced to 
divert Italian products from the enemy by purchasing silk and fruit 
in large quantities.
b) Domestic Swiss exports to the Central Empires had been 
greatly curtailed by general economic causes, assisted by constant 
Allied bargaining. But the fact that the Swiss had to export 
something to Germany (to obtain iron and coal which the Allies 
could not supply) set a natural limit to this process. Whether 
further pressure would be of any avail was doubtful as the limit had 
probably been reached in the Spring of 1917*
To sum up then, the most hopeful sphere of American co­
operation was the diversion of Italian silk and fruit from the 
1enemy.
In an accompanying minute Crowe explained that the insufficiency
1. Memorandum of Waterlow, ’Possible American Action*, 5 June 1917* 
FO 382-1592-114996/17.
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of means of pressure at British disposal with regard to the 
northern neutrals derived from the British government’s dependence 
on the operations of prize courts. Consequently the Foreign Office 
was forced to invoke the aid of the United States in the form of 
export prohibitions as the essential principle of blockade activity 
to overcome this insufficiency* But with regard to Switzerland, 
he noted:
’It will be seen on consideration that the principle 
finds no application in the case of Switzerland, 
where our means of pressure or coercion rest not on 
the operation of international law in the prize 
court, but on the operation of the municipal law 
of France and Italy, through whose territories 
practically all imports into Switzerland must flow.
It is clear that there is no difficulty whatever as 
to the machinery for applying pressure to any degree 
that may be considered desirable so long as the three 
allied governments are in agreement as to the action 
to be taken. It is for this reason that I share the 
opinion that we have no need or occasion to bring the 
United States at all into the question of how to 
control imports into Switzerland’, 1
Soon, however, there were indications in Washington that the 
Americans were about to take an active part in controlling imports 
into Switzerland (and the other neutrals bordering in Germany), 
regardless of Crowe’s opinion about its necessity or utility. On 
15 June 1917 an ’Espionage Act* was signed by President Wilson, 
giving him broad powers over United States commerce and trade, 
and on 22 June an Exports Council was created by executive order
1. Crowe’s minute, ibid
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(based on these powers) to formulate export policy.1 Fears that 
this body would soon advocate the enactment of harsh measures against 
neutral commerce were only partially dispelled by the assurance of 
the Stath Department to the Swiss that
’it is not the intention of the Government of the 
United States to interfere with the exportation of 
needed supplies to Switzerland or other neutral 
fiuropean countries where measures have been adopted 
to prevent the reshipment of such supplies to Germany 
and its Allies, subject always, of course, to the 
paramount needs of this country and its allies.,.1. 2
This assurance notwithstanding, the American president
proclaimed on 9 July 1917 a ’general embargo*, prohibiting the
unlicensed export to neutrals of a small list of products, including
grain and fodder,*^ which would be supplied, as the president
declared in his accompanying statement, only after Allied needs
If
had been filled. The Swiss felt this proclamation put them on 
the same level as America’s declared enemies and before long 
experienced the effects of the embargo in the practical impossibility 
of obtaining export licenses from the Secretary of Commerce, 
especially for wheat, which for four months they were unable to
1. On 12 Oct. 1917 the Exports Council gave way to the War Trade 
Council, and the War Trade Board became in effect America’s 
Ministry of Blockade. Report of the «/ar Trade Board, pp.2-6.
2. F.ju. folk (Counselor for the State Department)-Ritter, 19 June 1917, 
letter, FR 1917, Suppl.2, II, 1168*
3. Presidential Proclamation, 9 July 1917, FR 1917, Suppl.2, II, 903- 
905. The list of prohibited exports was augmented several times 
during the war.
Jf. Bailey, op.cit. p.71»
286
purchase in the United States. The aim of the American policy
(as the border neutrals soon realized) was to coerce them into
2signing rationing agreements with the United States.
Fortunately for the Swiss, the American government were, for
3
political and sentimental reasons, particularly favourably disposed 
towards Switzerland and had no intention of throwing the Confederation 
*into the arms of the enemy*. The Americans therefore inclined to 
greater leniency in dealing with the Swiss than they observed toward 
the northern neutrals. In the early autumn of 1917 they accordingly 
entered into discussion with the Swiss minister in Washington with 
regard to American-Swise commercial relations, and apparently adopted 
a *soft line* as suggested in their earlier assurance that it was not 
their intention to interfere with Swiss imports.
Naturally the capriciousness of their new ally bewildered 
the Foreign Office. Original British fears that the United States 
would disrupt the Swiss control system by imposing an uncompromising 
embargo v/ere soon displaced by apprehension that the Americans were 
becoming too accommodating to the Swiss and would, by granting broad
1. Wilson (ChargS in Berne)-.oansing, 2k November 1917* telegram, 
FR 1917, Suppl.2, II, 1180-81.
2. Spring Rice-F0,2^ July 1917* telegram, FO 382-1592-1^6023/17.
3* There was much talk about 'the two oldest republics in the
world* and much lobbying by Swiss Americans.
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trade concessions, squander the opportunity of exerting pressure on 
Switzerland if it were called for. It was with considerable relief 
therefore that the Foreign Office learned that the negotiations 
between the War Trade Board (established on 12 October 1917) and 
dans Sulzer (the new Swiss minister in Washington) had come to an 
impasse.
The Swiss experts in the Foreign Office viewed these 
precipitous negotiations as an attempt by the Swiss government to 
separate the United States government from the Allies in arranging 
for the supply of American foodstuffs and raw materials on more 
favourable terms than the other Allies were willing to concede.
There was, in fact, considerable irritation in the Foreign Office 
that the War Trade Board, a *body conscious of its lack of 
experience in such negotiations and fully informed by IUM. Embassy 
of the extremely complicated nature of the blockade arrangements of 
the Allied Governments as regards Switzerland^ should not have put 
Sulzer off by suggesting prior joint consultations with the British 
and French governments who were most intimately concerned with 
Swiss affairs.^"
Tiie ^uai d*Orsay shared Foreign Office appreheiisions that the 
United States would concede advantages to the Swiss without 
obtaining appropriate counter concessions. But when M. Mltin, who
1. Waterlow’s report on the Swiss-American Agreement, 6 December 
1917, JO 382-1593-23^795/17.
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had recently succeeded Denys Cochin as Minister of Blockade,
visited London in September to discuss which demands on the border
neutrals the entry of the United States made possible and desirable,
he and Waterlow were hard pressed tc find areas in which the Swiss
section of the blockade could be improved. Both would have liked
to eliminate Swiss aluminium, carbide, and ferro-silicon exports
to Germany, but as these were domestic Swiss products they could not
be interfered with. Some minor reductions in leather and preserved
meat traffic seemed desirable but beyond this the measures against
Swiss trade appeared entirely satisfactory,^ The Allies therefore
contented themselves with advising the State Department that they
attributed the highest importance to the United States not binding
herself in any way without previous consultation with the French who
(nominally at least) directed the Swiss section of the blockade,
so as to be free in future to exert pressure on Switzerland if it were
ever needed. Above all the United States must not bind herself 
2
to passivity.
In this regard, the first draft of the tentative treaty drawn
up by the War Trade Board and the Swiss minister (which the State
1, Waterlow*s minute on Spring Rice-F0,17 September 1917, telegram, 
FU 382-1592-180507/17.'
2, FO-Spring Rice, 5 October 1917, telegram, FO 382-1592-190527/17.
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Department had in the end rejected) appeared to the Foreign Office
as a thoroughly unsatisfactory arrangement ’in that it seem(ed)
to bind the United States Government to meet Swiss demands for
certain quantities of important goods, yet provid(ed) for no
adequate compensation on the part of the Swiss’.'*' When the deadlock
was reached (over, among other things, the questioh of lubricating
oils for Swiss factories) the War Trade Board proposed to transfer
2negotiations to Paris where they would be taken up de novo* As 
Paris was to be the scene cf a major conference at which senior 
Allied blockade officials planned to integrate America’s 
contribution into the general effort, Waterlow welcomed the 
unexpected decision to conclude the Swiss negotiations there as 
’very timely1 because ’it should be possible to settle the whole
3
thing with the French there’.
Waterlow briefed the American delegation on the Foreign 
Office view of the Swiss situation in an interview with Dr. Alonzo 
Taylor of the Department of Agriculture who accompanied Vance C. 
McCormick, head of the War Trade Board, during their quick visit 
to London before the Paris conference. Both men agreed that the
1. FO-Bertie, 31 October 1917, dispatch, FO 382-1593-205566/17. This
file contains a copy of the first draft of the agreement.
2. Spring Rice-FO, 17 November 1917* telegram, FO 382-1593-220305/17#
3. Waterlow’s minute on Spring Rice-FO, 15 November 1917i telegram,
FO 382-1593-218555/17.
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final decision could be reached only in Paris. Waterlow*s expert
c ‘ ' * .
knowledge of Swiss affairs prompted the French Embassy in London to
request the Foreign Office to dispatch him to the conference* In
Paris, as he had predicted, Waterlow was able to complete the real
business regarding Switzerland in a series of private meetings with
French blockade officials before the actual opening of the conference*^
Waterlow and the French agreed that burdening Switzerland with
excessive demands at this time was irrational and impolitic* It was
irrational because the obligations of the Allied-Swiss agreement
signed in May 1917 reduced Swiss agricultural exports to Germany to
an entirely satisfactory level and, according to reports from Sir
Horace Rumbold and k.L.Craigie, the elimination of Swiss exports
of machine tools and electro-metallurgical products, of aluminium
and calcium carbide, if achieved, would not seriously inconvenience
the Germans, as other sources were open to them. Moreover, these
2
exports yielded a revenue of four million pounds sterling, which 
was indispensitle for Swiss purchases of coal and foodstuffs* The 
attempt to suppress this export trade would only accentuate the 
tendency of Switzerland to become an economic vassal of Germany 
by forcing her to reject the Allied demands and to throw in her 
lot with the Germans in order to obtain coal and, as the German
1, Waterlow*s report, 6 December 1917» dispatch, FO 382-1593-23^795/17• 
2* Bell, Blockade, p.639*
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minister in Berne not obscurely hinted, wheat from Rumania in the 
Spring of 1918.
Excessive demands az this juncture would have been impolitic 
as well, as the Central Empires had never been more powerful. The 
collapse of the Russian and Rumanian armies would, it was expected, 
soon release large forces for the Western front, and the Italian 
second army was withdrawing in confusion from Caporetto to the 
Fiave. Fears of an invasion of -Switzerland were acute as Swiss 
Intelligence reported that five iiustro-German divisions had been 
moved from the Fiave front ana could no longer be located: the
possibility of a quick rush through the dt.Gotthard Fass to turn 
the Italian line by an attack in Lombardy was causing the Swiss 
extreme anxiety.~ io exacerbate tiiese fears by threatening the 
Swiss with further economic sanctions would serve onxy to lose their 
good will without gaining compensating advantage.
as increased economic pressure on Switzerland was under 
these circumstances out of the question, Waterlow and the French 
decided, though they regretted having to squander the opportunity 
to keep alive the potential throat from America, to agree to the 
(slightly revised) Gwiss-Americ-^n agreement since it ‘practically 
does no more than confirm the status quo as regards the Swiss part
1. H. Wilson (GhargS)-Lansing, 22 November 1917* telegram, FR 1917* 
Suppl.2, II, 1179-80. Wilson’s geography was weak: the Central 
Powers would most probably have used the Engadine Valley in 
Graubunden, and not the St.Gotthard.
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1
of the blockade*. Moreover they saw propaganda value in the grain 
clauses of the treaty, though on strictly economic grounds the clauses 
were, from the Allied point of view, unnecessarily concessive, as the 
Swiss had grain stocks for four months. Providing some wheat 
immediately, however, would do much to allay Swiss anxietyi the 
problem was not starvation, but the fear of starvation which haunted 
the Swiss.
TheBritish minister in Berne concurred with these views as he
judged the fear of starvation among the Swi§6 was real, and suggested
diverting two wheat ships from Canada for the Swiss in order to 
2
dispel it.
The Swiss-American treaty^ was duly signed on 5 December 1917 
with the reluctant blessing of the Allies who, though they were 
officially no party to it, lamented what they regarded as the 
treaty*s exorbitant leniency to the Swiss. The original draft, 
deriving from the October meetings in Washington, which the Foreign 
Office had considered inadequate, had necessarily to serve as the 
basis for the final revised treaty because (as Waterlow complained) the 
Americans were committed to it by amour-propre. The treaty itself,
1. Bertie-FO, 30 November 1917, telegram, £0 382-1593-228568/17.
2. Bumbold,FO, 3 December 1917, telegram, £0 3S2-1593-23065V17.
3. ’Memorandum of December 5, 191?, between the War Trade Board and 
the Swiss Government in Regard to Exports from the United States to 
Switzerland*, FR 1917, Suppl.2,II, II85-96.
ft
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which regulated Swiss-American trade until 30 September 1918, 
contained no provision for further restricting Swiss exports to 
Germany. The only positive result seemed to be that the Swiss were 
guarahteed 2**0,OCX) tons of cereal between 1 December 1917 and 
1 September 1918 (when the Swiss harvest was due), and the tonnage to 
carry it, and that an American was to sit on the C.P.I.C. in Paris 
and the Inter-Allied Commission in Berne. Much had been given to the 
Swiss and nothing required of them.
Crowe resigned himself to the loss of this unique opportunity 
for making the Swiss sector of the blockade at least potentially 
airtight only because ’it was inevitable in the circumstances’ • Lord 
Hobert Cecil felt the treaty provided an unfortunate precedent for the 
other neutrals as the grain allotment was unduly generous.'
It was not the grain allowance but the guarantee to provide 
ships to transport it which caused difficulty, and this not with 
the other neutrals, but between Great Britain and the United States. 
According to the English text of the agreement, the 2^+0,000 tons of 
grain were ’to be transported on Allied ships, or on ships supplied 
to Switzerland for this purpose’. This clause represented a decision 
taken by the Kavitaillement section of the inter-Allied conference 
in Paris, and wqs presented to the general meeting as a fait accompli
1. F.O. minutes on the text of the Swiss-American agreement, 
FO 382-1593-23^795/17.
29^
on k December,'1 The Foreign Office apprised the Ministry of 
Shipping of the final wording of the treaty with considerable 
embarrassment for it appeared on careful reading that the terms of the 
treaty committed that body to supplying additional tonnage for the 
Swiss at a time when the depredations of the U-boats and the
transport of supplies to the American army in France were putting an
2
intolerable strain on shipping resources,
Waterlow had been absent from the Ravltuillement meeting in 
laris which had drafted the clause, but on investigation it 
appeared that Lord Rhondda of the Ministry of Food and Sir John 
Beale of the Wheat executive ('The Royal Commission on Wheat 
Sup lies') had attended. This meeting had in fact passed an 
excellent (because harmless) resolution regarding Swiss supplies, 
but later M.Delavaud of the French Ministry of Blockade, as Waterlow 
expressed it, 'presented a garbled and dangerous version for French 
window-dressing purposes'.'' TheBritish, who were not especially
1, Waterlow's report, 6 December 1S17» dispatch, Ft 382-1593-23^793/17*
2, FO-Kinietry of Chipping, 17 December 1917* letter, FO 382-1593- 
2311 W l 7 .
3* Wheat Executive-FO, 21 December 1917* letter (+minutes), FO 382- 
1593-2^15^1/17• The original resolution of the Food and Transport 
section of the conference read: ',..les transports maritimes 
devant etre assures par les soins de la Suisse,' The resolution 
presented by Delavaud ran ',,,la Suisse doit re^evoir , , • un 
contingent garanti de c6r6ales panifiables de 2*»0,000 tonnes 
livrables de prlflrence par le port de Cette • • • Les transports 
se feront sur tonnage alli£ ou sur tonnage mis a la disposition 
de la Suisse pour cela'. The latter was incorporated in the 
agreement.
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enthusiastic about the American agreement with Switzerland in any
case, felt the real onus of fulfilling this clause fell on them
while the French and the Americans came off with the laurals for
magnanimity to the Swiss. Besides, the additional shipping was simply
not available. Therefore, in spite of the representations of the
Swiss minister in London and against the advice of Waterlow who felt
it would be * impolitic * of the 3ritish to wash their hands of the
m a t t e r t h e  Foreign Office announced to the French and the American
governments that the British government would accept no wider
2
responsibility than the original text called for.
Dr. Taylor immediately retorted that the clause was drafted
at the Paris meeting of the Comit6 de Ravitaillement at which the
Foreign Office had been represented, and since they had thus joined
in the unanimous consent to the clause, they had assumed the
responsibility for supplying Switzerland with ships to transport the
30,000 tons a month of cereals. This the Foreign Office denied 
3
vigorously. Sir John Beale, Chairman of the Wheat Executive, who 
had in fact attended the meeting, assured the American ambassador in
1. Minutes by Crowe and Waterlow on the English text of the Swiss- 
American Agreement, 28 December 1917, FO 3S2-1593-2ll5l7/l7* Waterlo 
suggested the Foreign Office find out how far the Allies felt bound 
to the treaty and then make shipping available in return for a
loan from the Swiss which had been under discussion since the 
summer of 1917*
2. FG-Bertie, and F0-3pring Rice, 28December 191?, telegrams,
12 382-1593-211511/ 17.
3. Spring Rice-FO, 28 December 1917, telegram,FO 382-1593-215191/17* 
Waterlow*s comment: ’Characteristic. I was not told of the 
meeting, knew nothing about it, and was not present at it.*
I
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London that the British had in no way promised to supply the 
transport. He added however that if the necessary tonnage could be
found, satisfactory credits should be granted in exchange by the
c 4 1Swiss.
The State Department felt the British attitude made a
travesty of the agreement since the British interpretation of the
clause as a right to buyout not to have the means of transport put
theSwiss where they were before, as they had never had difficulty
in buying, but only in transporting grains. 'The Swiss appeal for
relief was an appeal for tonnage*, concluded Lansing, and added,
‘as for the loan, it does not seem to be in accordance with
international equity to request a loan in performance of what we
2
have already agreed to do’.
When Washington’s appeals to their better nature (it could 
not be an appeal to contractual obligations as the British had not 
been party to the Swiss-American agreement) left the Foreign Office 
unmoved, and an American proposal, that the British provide the 
Swiss with SC,000 tons of grain from their own stocks evoked ho 
response, Ambassador Page was instructed to threaten drastic 
measures. If the British manifested continued reluctance to
1. Page-Lansing, 8 January 1918, telegram, FB 1918, Suppl.1,11, 
1593-9^.
2. Lansing-Page, 15 January 1918, telegram, FH 1918, Suppl.1,11, 
1595-96.
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provide tonnage for the Swiss, the United States would feel 
compelled to withdraw grain from Allied allocations and to take 
ships out of Allied transport service into Swiss grain service,^
But this threat was never carried out.
Eventually the Americans resorted to having the United States
navy convoy American ships charged with grain for the Swiss to
2
French Atlantic ports, until an arrangement was worked out witfc.
the German Ministry of Marine (through the Swiss Political Department)
whereby properly marked American merchantmen would be granted free
passage to Cette unmolested by German U-boats.^ The United States
was enabled by these methods to supply 157,000 tons of grain to the
Swiss by the end of September 1913, and continued to provide shipments
in discharge of its obligation to supply 240,000 tons even after
the commercial agreement of 5 December 1917 expired by limitation
A
on 3° September 1918.
In encouraging British co-operation in finding the needed 
tonnage for Swiss supplies, the Foreign Office had hinted to the 
Swiss government that a loan from the Swiss would not be without effect.
1, Polk-Page, 19 January 1918, telegram, FR 1918, Suppl.1,11, 1596-97*
2. Lansing-Stovall, 3 May 1918, telegram, and Lansing-Stovall;
22 May 1918, telegram, FR 1918, Suppl,l,vol,II,pp.1619-20 and 1624,
3* Prior to this time the Germans had granted immunity to neutral 
ships carrying cargoes to Cette for ultimate delivery to 
Switzerland —  some 470 such voyages were made by March 1913 —  but 
according equal privileges to enemy ships was surely an extra­
ordinary concession,
4. Bailey, op.cit., p,2?0.
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As Swiss banks had provided credits to both belligerent groups —  50 
million francs to a consortium of French banks in July 1916, 50 million 
to a German group in September 1916, 93 million (depending on the 
amount of coal delivered) in August 1917 to the Germans, and again 
37*3 million francs to the French in September 1917 —  the British 
hoped to obtain similar credits for their own benefit. Purchases 
in Switzerland of munitions, machine tools, watches, precision 
instruments, chocolate, and condensed milk had contributed to the 
general fall in the value of sterling, and the Treasury was 
consequently anxious to make payment for these goods in francs 
rather than in pounds.'*'
According to international law specified in the Hague 
Conventions, a neutral government may not itself lend money to a 
belligerent, although they may allow and even encourage a subject to
2
do so as long as they permit similar treatment to other belligerents. 
During negotiations with Germany in the summer of 1917, the Swiss 
government had encouraged a syndicate of banks to provide the Germans 
with credits to secure coal deliveries. Humbold’s hints in August 
to friendly banks in Berne, Lausanne, and Neuchatel that the Foreign 
Office viewed their participation in the German loan with
1. The pound reached a low of 20.95 Swiss francs on 8 August 1917 
(the 191*+ price of sterling was about 25*25 francs).
2. Minute of Mr. Mallein on a loan fromSwitzerland, 1*+ August 1917* 
F0 382-1570-15777V17.
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dissatisfaction distressed the Swiss Minister for Foreign Affairs who,
enquiring if Rumbold were acting on instructions, begged him to desist,
as coal deliveries depending on the loan were indispensible to the
Swiss. To the Foreign Office Rumbold suggested, instead of
attempting to penalize Swiss banks, asking for a substantial loan
under the title of equal treatment.^
The Foreign Office realized noone would be the gainer if the
German-Swiss negotiations were wrecked, and the Treasury agreed
that the negotiations should be allowed to continue to their
conclusion so as to ensure German coal for Switzerland but advised
’diplomatic action’ immediately afterwards to secure the assistance
2
of theSwiss government in raising a loan on British account. A few
days after the agreement with Germany (dated 20 August 1917) was
signed, Federal Councillor Ador informed Rumbold that the Swiss
government was then prepared to encourage a loan to the Entente on
3
the same conditions as the one to Germany.
The French, however, began independent negotiations and 
obtained on 29 September 1917* in consideration of various 
concessions regarding transport facilities and the import of Swiss 
luxury items, their second credit (12,500*000 francs a month for
1. Rurabold-FO,15 August 1917* telegram,FC 382-1571-160246/17.
2. Treasury-FO, 27 August 1917, letter, FO 382-1571-167813/17.
3# Rumbold-FO, 5 September 1917* telegram, FO 382-1571-174453/17.
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three months).1 Though the Treasury had favoured interallied
negotiations for a loan (of an aggregate value equal to that
accorded to the Germans), the Foreign Office were happy to avoid the
complications of dealing with a third party and to keep their own
negotiations separate from the French. Rumbold was instructed to
open talks for an advance to Great Britain of 12,500,000 francs a
month for ten months (125 million francs in all) repayable in ten
years time. Rumbold was to suggest that the continued import of
Swiss luxury items into the United Kingdom and the chartering of
2
neutral ships might be conditioned on obtaining these credits. ' 
Releasing tonnage to the Swiss as a quid pro quo for their 
making credits available to the British thus became an instrument 
of Foreign Office policy. When the Swiss Central Bureau for
3
Transport submitted a memorandum to the British minister in Berne,
1. Rumbold was surprised at the nature and the size of the French 
loan, and was piqued that they had entered into negotiations 
without consulting the British government. Rumbold-FO, 2 
October 1917, telegram, FO 332-1572-190923/17.
2. FO-Rumbold, 17 October 1917, telegram, FO 382-1572-196176/17.
3. This agency (known as *Fero*) was established in March 1917 
to aid Swiss traders in transporting their goods on land
and sea. Because of a general dea th of railway stock and the 
shortage of tonnage on the seas, the Bureau achieved 
indifferent results.
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suggesting they be allowed to purchase outright ten vessels for
their own use rather than lease cargo space on foreign ships assigned
by the Interallied Chartering Committee, Rumbold opposed this plan on
the ground that 'it would deprive us of one of our strongest weapons
in prospective negotiations for a loan'.'*' On the other hand, he was
keenly aware of Swiss transport needs and urged the Foreign Office
that * every effort be made by Great Britain to assist Switzerland in
obtaining necessary tonnage''(through the Chartering Committee), but
never beyond the point khere the Swiss would become independent of
British patronage.
Nevertheless, Rumbold experienced during October and November
much difficulty in negotiating the loan on terms suggested by 
3
Whitehall. The Treasury therefore sent Sir Hugh Levick to
assist him in the negotiations. Levick was a financial expert
of long experience in Treasury matters who had organized for the
Swiss government a 15 million dollar loan from a group of American
if
banks in March 1915* It was expected that the negotiations would
1. Rumbold-FG, 29 October 1917, telegram, FO 382-1572-2073*+5/17. The 
Swiss government got the ships only after the armistice.
2. Rumbold-FO, 22 November 1917, telegram, FO 382-1573-223976/17.
3. 12.5 million francs over a period of ten months, repayable in 
ten years time, at ^.5 percent.
k, Treasury-FG, 29 November 1917, letter, FO 382-1573-227923/17.
Cf. Pfenninger, op.cit., p»67.
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be completed swiftly and successfully under his direction. It can 
well be imagined with what chagrin then he and Rumbold learned of the 
announcement that the Interallied Conference in Paris had, by their 
approval of the Swiss-American agreement of 5 December 1917* guaranteed 
the provision of tonnage for Swiss needs. With thinly veiled 
irritation Rumbold cabled for instructions from the Foreign Office, 
asking what lever might now be used since the assurance that Allied 
ships would be employed in Swiss service 'cuts the ground from under 
our feet' in negotiating the loan.'*'
The strengthened bargaining position of the Swiss was soon 
reflected in harsher terms. In an interview with Rumbold and Levick 
in December,Federal Councillor Schulthess stipulated the Swiss 
would require 60,000 tons a month of shipping (instead of 50,000 tons) 
as a counter concession for the loan which would total only 8 million 
francs a month for ten months (instead of 12*5 million). The interest 
rate, it was suggested, would have to be raised above the usual ^.5 
percent. Rumbold reported that negotiations were at a standstill 
after these counter-proposals, and deprecated the loss of the 'lever 
of shipping* through the United States guarantee. 'It is evident 
that the Swiss Government, having been relieved of anxiety regarding 
their supply of bread corn, can now feel at liberty to try to drive 
the hardest possible bargain with us.' He advised against cancelling
1. Rumbold-FO,7 December 1917, telegram, FO 382-1573-233^8/17.
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munitions contracts as a reprisal, since this would affect mainly
French Switzerland, but thought that an import prohibition on luxury
products (embroideries, etc.) might encourage the Swiss government
to view the loan more favourably.^ With the ruin of the tonnage
scheme for forcing a loan, a policy of delaying the issue of export
licenses and of limiting the import of Swiss products afforded the
2
British government the best means of getting what they wanted.
When it became apparent at the end of December that
negotiations had reached a deadlock, Levick returned to London
3
for consultation with the Foreign Office and the Treasury. His 
report convinced the Foreign Office officials that some action 
should be taken to galvanize the Swiss government into activity.
Lord Robert Cecil therefore requested the concurrence of the Secretary 
of the Board of Trade in refusing licenses for the import of Swiss
1. Rumbold-FO, 15 December 1917, telegram, FO 382-1593-297967/17.
2. The Foreign Office suggested to the War Trade Department
that licenses for the export of e.g. copper sulfide, which 
was desperately needed by the Swiss for viticulture, be 
refused 'uhtil negotiations for a loan show some prospects 
of reaching a satisfactory conclusion1. Minute of Waterlow
on Rumbold-FO, 17 December 1917, dispatch, FO 382-1565-2i+2866/17.
3. Rumbold-FO, 28 December 1917, telegram, FO 382-1573-2^5737/17.
silks, embroideries, and lace work. Though such action might
possibly provoke the Swiss into reducing their purchases of
English cotton cloths and yarns, Lord Robert anticipated that the mere
threat to terminate traffic in Swiss luxury goods would suffice to
ensure a successful issue of the loan.^
Immediately Rumbold let it be known in Berne that the British
government was planning such a move, a group of Swiss bankers and
industrialists met and accepted in principle granting a loan of
8 million francs and possibly more. Federal Councillor Calonder,
Chief of the Political Department, and president of the Confederation for
1918, then appealed to Rumbold to do his utmost to expedite the
3
loan ne otiations. The Foreign Office, sensing they had touched
on a tender Swiss nerve, instructed Rumbold to ‘maintain for the
k
moment an attitude of indifference and reserve'. ^et when he and
Levick next met with the Swiss delegates on 25 January 1918 to
consider the draft of the agreement, they were surprised to find the
5Swiss had receded very little from the terms proposed in December.
1. Ceci 1-Secretary of the B. of T., 8 January 1918, letter, FC 382- 
1981-45 Wl8.
2. Sawyer-Rumbold, 11 January 1918, letter, FO 382-1981-10633/18.
3. Rumbold-FO, 10 January 1918, telegram, FO 382-1981-6626/18.
Waterlow's minute: 'Satisfactory. We have got them worried and 
need be in no hurry.'
4. FO-Rumbold, 12 January 1918, telegram, ibid.
5* These „terms were: ten million francs a month in exchange for
(1) 70»000 tons a month of imports actually delivered in Switzerland 
not in French or Italian ports where they could be requisitioned 
or otherwise delayed,
/contd. over/
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The Foreign Office viewed these terms as ’unacceptable*, so Rumbold 
was told bluntly to reject all three Swiss demands and to ’start 
from there*."1"
Meanwhile, the Board of Trade had approved the reduction in
British imports of Swiss luxury goods. They were to continue to
issue import licenses for these goods under the arrangements then in
force until 1 April 1918, when this traffic would be stopped. The
Foreign Office announced this decision to the Swiss government in a
note on 29 January 1918, and within a few weeks Rumbold reported that
2
the Swiss were showing *a great desire to hurry negotiations’. The
reference 5 continued:
(2) British acquiescence in general Swiss trade with the 
northern neutrals via the Rhine,
(3) the delivery of specific quantities of tin, raw materials 
for dyes, asbestos, sulfate of copper, etc.
Rurabold-FO, 25 January 1918, telegram, FO 382-I98I-I63S7/I8. 
Waterlow commented: ’the Swiss are opening their mouths very 
wide*. 70,000 tons delivered actually meant 109,000 tons of 
deadweight shipping. The Swiss quota of shipping was 78,000 
tons deadweight, which carried 50,000 tons of goods. In fact, 
the Swiss quota was never filled after unrestricted submarine 
warfare broke out in February 1917.
1. FO-Rimtbold, k February 1918, telegram, ibid.
2. Rumbold-FO, 22 February 1913, telegram, FO 382-1981-3^913/18.
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Swiss minister in London stopped in at the Foreign Office to discuss 
the situation with Sir Lyre Crowe on 4 March, seeking assurance that 
the import of Swiss luxury products would not be shut off in the 
event the loan were granted. Waterlow, however, informed Crowe that 
no direct connection had been established between the loan and the 
import prohibition which, in the Treasury view, was per se 
desirable as of 1 April 1918 to stem the outflow of sterling.^ 
Nevertheless both men agreed that a complete cessation of 
Swiss luxury product purchases would be 'dangerous* because of 
consequent unemployment in Switzerland. Carlin was therefore 
informed a week later that the British government had decided to 
continue the arrangements in force since 191? with regard to silks, 
laces, and cotton embroideries, but under the proviso that 
reconsideration might be necessary if (a) the loan negotiations
aborted, and (b) if the value of the pound in Switzerland did not
2
reach a satisfactory level.
The Swiss were at last brought to bay after seven months of
3
discussion. On 20 March 1918 the Swiss representatives signed 
with Rumbold and Levick an agreement whereby the Federal Council 
authorized a Swiss financial consortium to make advances to a group
1. Memorandum on a conversation with Carlin, 4 March 1918 
( + minutes), FO 382-1982-46462/18.
2. FO-Carlin, 13 March 1918, letter, ibid.
3. Mm. Heer, de Haller, Grobet-Roussy.
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of English banks of amounts up to 10 million francs a month for 
ten months (till 31 January 1919) on a sliding scale depending on 
the delivery of stipulated amounts of Swiss imports in European 
harbours and the maintenance of British imports of Swiss luxury 
items.^ Two reasons underlay the Swiss acceptance of this 
agreement which the Foreign Office judged 'a very satisfactory 
conclusion to some very tedious negotiations's
(1) Federal Councillor Schulthess, Head of the Department
of Public Economy, was personally anxious to conclude the negotiations 
in order not to earn the odium of delaying other matters intimately 
connected with the loan,
(2) the Swiss wished to get the loan out of the way before
the start of negotiations with the Germans on 31 March 1918 as the
2
latter were 'showing themselves very arrogant'.
Granting the loan unfortunately proved no panacea for the 
ecohomic ills which beset the Swiss, for both groups of belligerents, 
far from relaxihg control, continued inexorably to increase pressure
1. The terras of the loan were something of a compromise. The 
interest rate was 5 percent per year. The full 10 million francs 
would be advanced if the 50,000 tons a month (78,000 tons 
deadweight) were discharged in French or Italiah harbours. The 
text is found in FO 382-1982-55927/18.
2. Rumbold-FO,21 March 1918, dispatch, ibid.
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on Swiss commerce as the war drew to its close. Schulthess*s fears 
regarding ’other matters* iratimataly connected with the loan were 
fully justified. Although the Board of Trade agreed at the time 
of the loan negotiations to continue issuing licenses for the 
import of Swiss luxury products until June, they refused, under 
constraint from the Treasury, to extend these facilities beyond 
that date, and issued a circular to that effect to the British 
Chamber of Commerce during May.
Carlin feared the inhibition of this trade would have a 
demoralizing effect on the industrial situation and felt the 
British government had deceived the Swiss by receding from their 
assurances of 13 March, especially since the loan had gone through 
and the pound was at that time (May 1918) rising in value.^* During 
June he presented a long memorandum to the Foreign Office, 
explaining the hardships of unemployment and financial loss for the 
Swiss which a British import prohibition would entail. Crowe was 
impressed by the Swiss minister's arguments and hoped, by represen­
tation to the Board of Trade and to the Treasury, that 'some less
1. Memorandum by Crowe on a conversation with Carlin, 13 May 1918, 
FO 382-1982-8562^/18. Strictly speaking the British were 
acting with perfect propriety as they had bound themselves in 
the 20 March agreement only * to do all they could* to maintain 
Swiss imports.
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Draconian treatment can be allowed to the Swiss'*1
The Board of Trade were, of course, not adverse to
strengthening commercial ties with the Swiss, but as the Treasury
eschewed all concessions in view of the rapid fluctuations since
2
1917 in the value of sterling on the Swiss money market, the
Department of Import Restriction (of the Board of Trade) were
unable to consider the renewal of quarterly licenses for the
goods under question*
Carlin's representations became increasingly anxious, if
not desperate, as the 3° June deadline approached, but the Lords
of the Treasury retained a sphinx-like indifference to the Foreign
Office pleas and expostulations on his behalf. At the eleventh
hour, however, they relented to the extent of considering a
prolongation (ultimately till 15 September)^ of licensing on the
current scale if the Swiss government, for their part, would arrange
to advance each month to His Majesty's government an amount not less
than the monthly value (in francs) of the silks and embroidered
if
goods imported from Switzerland into the United Kingdom. The
1. Carlin-FO, if June 1913, letter (+ minutes), FO 382-\982-IOOI63/18.
2. Treasury-Board of Trade, 7 June 1913, letter, FO 382-1982-101977/18.
3* Treasury-FO, 30 July 1918, letter, FO 382-1982-132680/18.
k. Treasury-FO, 27 June 1918, letter, FO 382-1982-11^387/18.
FO-Carlin, 1 July 1918, letter, ibid.
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Swiss minister, though grateful for the extension, was not sanguine 
about the possibility of such a loan as *les industries et 
institutions suisses sont arrivSes h. la fin de leurs ressources*, and 
announced the dispatch to London of a delegation of Swiss manufacturers 
who would show in detail the dangers vitaux which threatened the 
Swiss textile industry because of the British policy*'1'
TheSwiss delegation received a frosty welcome. Only if the 
Treasury altered their attitude would the Department of Import 
Restrictions of the Board of Trade see the delegates since they 
could say nothing to the Swiss beyond what the Treasury had been saying 
for weeks: no loan, no imports* Meanwhile, as Carlin was clamoring 
to know to whom the Swiss delegation were to address themselves, the 
Foreign Office felt constrained to summon a sham meeting to receive 
the Swiss and under the circumstances to accept the blame for the 
Treasury refusal. The meeting, attended by an impressive, if 
ineffective, assembly of Foreign Office potentates, never rose above 
the level of * desultory discussion', and the Swiss retired empty-
2
handed, promising to put forward proposals in the immediate future*
1. Carlin-FO-, 29 July 1918f letter, FO 332-1982-131078/18. This 
letter was forwarded to the Treasury, who were not impressed, 
though they agreed to an extension of licensing until 15 
September if a loan were eventually to be granted.
2* Memorandum on the meeting between Commander Leverton Harris,
Sir Hugh Levick, Mr* Dudley Ward, Col, Peel, and Mm.Carlin 
Weercher, Schwarzenback, Heusler, 8 August 1918* FO 382-1983- 
13822Vlo.
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The proposals —  more precisely a litany of Swiss economic 
woes, the high price of German coal, and the evils of mass 
unemployment, with the assurance that Switzerland would grant no 
further credits to the Central Powers —  were forwarded on receipt 
at the Foreign Office to the Treasury with a plea by Lord Robert 
Cecil for more lenient treatment of the Swiss."' But the Lords of 
the Treasury rejected this plea and accompanied their rejection with 
a more perspicuous analysis (as Crowe conceded) of the Swiss 
political situation than any the Foreign Office officials had 
produced.
The Swiss, they claimed, had in essence given Germany a loan
2
by accepting (May 1918) a doubling of the price of coal. The 
primary consideration as regards the Swiss was presumably the 
political which (even though, with exquisite irony, they admitted 
to being incapa le of properly estimating it) confirmed the Treasury 
Lords in their previous attitude. The Swiss textile exports were 
luxuries for whose prohibition there were excellent reasons even in 
peace time; all the more so in wartime, since they depreciated the 
exchange and jeopardized the purchase of more important commodities*
1* Ceci1-Treasury, 23 August 1918, letter, Ft 382-1983-1^5773/18.
2. See below, pp. 3 ^0 , 3A4 .
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In their desire to conciliate the Swiss, the Treasury had 
proposed an appropriate loan entirely within the capacity of the 
Swiss to pay, and altogether reasonable as the balance of payment 
between the United Kin dom and Switzerland was leaned substantially 
in the latter* s favour. Though the Swiss were pressing on the 
United Kingdom products which they had no desire to take, the 
Treasury were willing to cooperate if a loan were provided to 
mitigate the consequent depreciation of the pound. But the Swiss 
persisted in rejecting this proposal and at the same time painted 
in the blackest colours the effect of a British import prohibition 
on the luxury products of the Swiss textile industry. The Lords 
begged to submit it was improbable that the Swiss authorities 
would persevere in their refusal to grant a loan if the consequences 
were as disastrous as claimed. Moreover, 'the interests of the 
Swiss textile industry are a concern of the Swiss government rather 
than of His Majesty's government', and it was unreasonable to ask 
His Majesty's government to help when the Swiss government were 
themselves 'apparently unwilling to make the very slight effort 
which is required if they are to help themselves'.'1'
1. Treasury-FO, 29 August 1918, letter, FO 382-198>l4837Vl8.
Lord Kobert Cecil and Sir Lyre Crowe were impressed with these 
arguments from the Treasury and consequently decided to shelve 
a proposal to bring the 'cavalier treatment' of the Swiss by the 
Treasury to the attention of the »ar Cabinet.
313
The substance of the Treasury memorandum was transmitted 
to Rumbold on 13 September 1918, and though the Swiss claimed this 
would put *40,000 textile operatives out of work, no import licenses 
for Swiss silks, ribbands, or embroideries were issued after the 15th 
of September.^ There was much talk in Berne about the suggested
loan during the autumn and winter, but the discussions were
2
inconclusive." Consequently no Swiss ’luxury textiles’ were 
imported into Great Britain until 1919* many months after the 
armistice, and it was years before the St. Gall textile manufacturers 
recovered from this bitter loss.
Included in the ’other matters* connected with the British 
loan of 20 March 1918 which had caused Schulthess such anxiety was 
the question of cotton imports into Switzerland. The relentless 
course of economic war was devastating the Swiss textile industry 
dn a two pronged attack: refusing (as we have seen) to accept its 
products, and cutting off its supplies at the source. Since 1916,
the control afforded by the S.S.S. had achieved matchless success
3
in regulating Swiss exports to Germany. TheS.S.S. rations allowed 
25°C tons a year of cotton goods to be imported from overseas into 
the Confederation where much of it was printed, embroidered, made 
into lace, or otherwise improved, and then re-exported as luxury 
items at a corresponding price.
1. F0-K'imbold,13 September 1918, telegram, FO 382-1983-157007/18.
2. At the suggestion of the Treasury, these talks were abandoned 
in December 1918. FO-Rumbold, 21 December 1918, telegram,
FO 382-I983-209672/I8.
3* Memorandum of the War Trade Statistical Department on Direct
/rtnnfH nvpr/
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After the Germans, along with the Allies, had in 1917 
issued prohibitions against the import of these goods to check the 
progressive devaluation of the Reichsmark, the Allies had no reason 
to question the ultimate destination of their cotton exports, Since 
neither group of belligerents would accept Swiss luxury textiles, new 
markets were found in Holland and Scandinavia where, by the end of 
1917, considerable quantities of cotton goods were being sold,'1’ The 
number of people employed in Swiss textile factories and in home 
industries, and the profit realized from sales to the northern neutrals, 
lent great importance to these new markets and induced the Swiss to 
grant large concessions to the Germans so as to obtain the necessary 
German transit licenses. Discussions, at first private, and then on 
the official level, led to the Swiss-German agreement of 13 November 
1917 by which the Germans agreed to issue transport and import 
licenses for the textiles in question if the Swiss would allow the
reference 3 continued:
Exports from neutral countries to Germany, 8 September 1917*
FO 382-1559-1758W17.
1, Gkipworth-Rumbold, 12 March 1918, letter, FO 332-1975-43919/18.
The use of the Rhine for transporting 3.3,3, goods from 
Switzerland to the northern neutrals had been allowed by the 
Allies during the negotiations which led to the agreement of 
20 March 1917* Assiduous Swiss traders had also developed 
a market for their goods in Russia, for which they employed the 
route: Rhine-Sweden-Russia.
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export of large stocks of German held cotton goods in Switzerland 
(built up before the general German import prohibition of 16 
January 1917), silk goods, cotton embroideries, and used cotton 
cloth, under terms of credit which were extraordinarily favourable 
to the Germans and would ensure against a further drop in the value 
of the mark.^
The Foreign Office were, of course, aware of these developments 
but viewed them with a benign eye since exports to the northern 
neutrals provided a useful outlet for Swiss products under 
intensified blockade pressures, gave promise of ousting German 
competition in certain areas of the northern markets, and served
’to keep the Swiss quiet under the increased restrictions which we
2are every day imposing on their trade*." This rosy picture was 
clouded, however, by a disturbing growth in cotton exports to 
Germany itself, and in the cotton stocks held by Germans in 
Switzerland. The deliveries to Germany remained within the quota 
set by the S,S,S. agreement for trafic de perfectionnement exports, 
though reports were brought to the attention of the Foreign Office 
that these regulations were being abused by shipments of large 
pieces of cotton tissue (the export of which was prohibited) with
3
a few dots of embroidery under the guise of ’luxury textiles’, or
1. Pfenninger, oo.cit., pp.9^-97*
2. iaterlow-L.P. Sheldon (<te.r Trade hoard representative in London), 
21 March 1918, letter, FO 382-1975-51725/18.
3. Guichard relates, for example, th t one day in May 1918 customs
/continued over/
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by consignments of second hand cloth which had not been anticipated 
in the S.S.S. regulations. Furthermore the increased stocks of 
cotton tissue in Switzerland, representing enormous actual and 
potential value for the Germans, caused anxiety among the Allied 
governments who were already looking to the post-war markets.
Accordingly, a note verbale was presented by the French 
ambassador to the Political Department on k Febnuary 1918 which, after 
noting the increase in cotton exports to the enemy (though they were 
legitimate) and the growth of German cotton stocks through the 
insufficiency of Gwiss measures to keep them in check, expressed 
regret that 'la circonstances de la guerre • • • a l'heure actuelle* 
necessitated a review of the S.C.J. regulations regarding cotton.^
The presentation of this note was followed by a long series
reference 3 continued:
officials noticed that shirts, 12 meters in length and 
containing scarcely any embroidery, were being exported under 
the description of 'embroidered goods'. Guichard, op.cit., p.270. 
Abuses of this 3ort must have been relatively rare, however, as 
the Jwiss government were under constant pressure from the Allies 
to discover and punish any irregularity at the frontier.
1. Beau-Pol.Dept., February 1918, note verbale. Contained in 
Humbold-FO, 6 February 1918, dispatch, FO 382-1970-270W l 8 .
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of meetings between the members of the interallied commission in
Berne and representatives of the S.S.3. and the Swiss government,^"
which culminated in the signing of an agreement on 8 May 1918* The
details of this agreement (as was the case with all understandings
about cotton) were highly technical, but in general terms the
export of embroideries was further limited, certain stocks of cotton
were confiscated by the Swiss government, and the export of the
remaining stocks, after the cessation of hostilities, was subject
to Allied regulation*
By this agreement the capstone of Allied blockade measures in
regard of Switzerland was fitted into place: there was no more to be
done* The most assiduous investigation failed to discover any flaw
in the blockade wall, and tireless statistical investigation
disclosed reassuringly the confinement of Swiss import trade to the
narrow gate of o.S.S. supervision* Imports into Switzerland were
reduced to a volume commensurate with the needs of domestic 
2
consumption,' but insufficient to permit their re-export to the 
Central Empires in any but negligible and prescribed quantities.
1. The Allies were Craigie,Carletti, Dresel (U.S.), and Piaton.
For the Swiss: Srobet-Koussy, Heer, Ilk£. The Proces Verbaux
of these meetings are found in Fk 3&2~1970-8965V l 8•
2, This occasioned much hardship for industries predicated on a 
healthy export trade. Two-thirds of the embroidery machines in 
St.Call, for example, lay idle after the May agreement. 
Rumbold-FO, 29 dune 1918, telegram, R  382-1973-116066/18•
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For the Allies it remained only to ponder the uncertain effects of
the blockade on the economies of the Central Empires and to await 
the hopefully early cessation of hostilities.
In whose favour the hostilities would eventually be terminated 
was, of course, uncertain in the Spring of 1918. Though the German 
General Staff had seen their two greatest efforts to achieve victory 
in the west — Verdun and submarine warfare —  come to grief, a 
general conviction reigned in Kreuznach that the great Spring offensive 
of 1918 would drive a wedge between the two Allied forces and bring 
the war to a victorious conclusion. This confidence was reflected 
in German diplomacy toward the neutrals and in particular toward the 
Swiss during what turned out to be the last months of the Second 
Reich.
The regulation of Swiss-German commercial relations by the 
General Agreement of 2 >eptember 1916, which expired on J>0 April 
1917» had been prolonged, under certain modifications,^ until 31 July 
of that year by the economic agreement of 3 May 1917* In a third 
agreement signed on 20 August 1917 the Swiss succeeded, by 
accepting a 50 percent rise in the price of coal (from £a .60 to 9° 
francs a ton), and by proportioning credits to monthly coal
2
deliveries, in raising slightly their coal imports from German}'.
1. German coal deliveries were reduced from 253>GOG tons a month to
200,000 tens a month (in theory; in practice the Swiss received 
about 150,000 tons), and certain concessions were made to Swiss
textile exporters in consideration of a sizable credit to the 
Germans•
2» The German minister in Berne was instrumental in increasing coal 
deliveries to Switzerland. He gathered that Swiss confidence in
/contd. over/
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The concept of war material — hitherto confined by the Germans to 
weapons, munitions, explosives, and special types of machine tools —  
was widely extended, and the Swiss government obliged themselves to 
cooperate with the Treuhandstelle Zurich and the Ausfuhrkommission II 
in treating requests for the export of war material to the Entente with 
no less severity than requests for the export of Allied material to 
the Central Powers* These trade regulations were to last until 
30 April 1918.1
Between the signing of the August 1917 agreement and its 
expiration in April 1918 the military situation of the Central Empires 
improved enormously. Defeated in the field and torn internally by 
revolution, Russia was forced to accept the peace of Brest Litovsk*
reference 2 continued:
Germany’s ability to supply coal was shaken, and they might 
therefore become more dependent on the Entente* *Der Schweiz muss 
der Rue ken gestarkt warden, damit sie gegenuber Entente**
Forderung kraftigen v/iderstand leistet*• Romberg- 
riuswarti, ;es Amt, 30 October 1917$telegram, GFII 21, 35^*
1* For the details of the agreement and its follow-through, see 
Pfeaninger, op,cit., pp«70-9^*
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On the western front the Kaiserschlacht opened with spectacular
initial success for Ludendorff’s forces. Rumania’s armies had been
swiftly dispatched, the Ukraine gave promise (deceptively as it
turned out) of solving Germany’s grain problem,^ and the value of
2
the mark rose dramatically on the Swiss money faarket. * Not since
the summer of 191^ had the German position seemed more promising,
and their confidence in the now apparently inevitable victory was
reflected in the aggressiveness of their representatives and in the
harshness of their demands in the negotiations for a new agreement
■2
which began on 26 March 1918.
The Germans set out their proposals in unequivocal terms#
They demanded a 100 percent increase in the price of coal (from 
ca. 90 francs a ton to l80), the extension of the concept 
Kriegsmaterial (with its attendant export restrictions) to virtually
1# The German6 were so confident of receiving enormous stores from 
the Ukraine that they assured the Federal Council that they 
would supply Switzerland with grain if the Allied supply was 
insufficient. humbold-FO, 9 April 1918,telegram, FO 371-3379A- 
6727V 180 The assurance was empty as the Germans were able to 
extract only about 50%00Q tons of grain from the tight-fisted 
Ukrainian peasants. J.V.Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk,
The Forgotton Peace, March 1918 (London, I938V, pp.317-18•
( V * R  \ o o
2* From 6*f.8o Swiss francs in September 1917 to 83# 10Ain March 1918
when the negotiations for the new commercial agreement began.
3# Federal Councillor Motta confessed the behaviour of the German
delegates was producing ’a painful effect' on the Federal Council. 
Rumbold-FC, 13 May 1918, telegram, FO 382-1993-8606V l 8.
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every product of the Swiss machine, textile, and chemical industry,
the substitution of an organization in every detail like the Allied
S.S.3. for the inadequate and inefficient Treuhandstelle Zurich,
and the control of all goods from Allied or neutral lands passing
by rail from Cette to Switzerland.^
The Germans were determined to press home their advantage and
showed themselves ‘insolent* in their attitude to the Swiss with
2
whom they felt they had 'no reason to deal tenderly'. After six 
weeks the negotiations were reported to be near the breaking point 
as the Swiss were unable to accept the German proposals, and the 
Germans were indisposed to yield. The Germans maintained Switzerland 
was useless to them from an economic standpoint and they wkre showing 
greqt favour to the Confederation by continuing their coal and iron 
deliveries. They agreed to recede from their demand for control 
over traffic from Cette but remained adamant about the price, 
distribution, and use of their coal (though the powerful Swiss 
metallurgical industry was also urging their government to remain
1. The Germans made this demand since they had consented to keep open 
the seaway to Cette for the Swiss. They therefore felt entitled 
to supervise the import of Swiss goods from overseas.
2. Rumbold-FC, 9 April 1913, dispatch, FO 332-1993-67165/13. 
Rumbold-FO,1C April 1913, telegram,*^ 382-1993-7^227/18. 3aron 
Romberg distressed the Federal Qauncil by deviating from his 
normally courteous manner. His moods became a 'daily barometer 
of the situation on the Jestern front* after the start of the 
Gomme offensive in March 1913.
3# German coal had been distributed by the Gwiss Gentralstelle fur die 
Kohlenversorgung der dchweiz since January 1918. This organization 
would now demand more precise information about the use of coal 
before it was released.
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firm),'*' and about the establishment of the control organization
analogous to the S. S.S.
At this point the French Minister of Munitions (M. Loucheur)
announced to Lord Robert Cecil that the French government had
decided to manifest its politique lib£rale et .juste1 by offering to
2
the Swiss 100,000 tons of coal a month at 150 Swiss francs* Although 
France was already 700,000 tons short and the supply from Great
3
Britain had not yet been arranged,' Loucheur felt this was an 
excellent opportunity to counter the German moves and it should not
If
be passed over. Crowe learned privately that the French government 
had made the proposal to the Swiss in the hope and the belief it 
would not be accepted but would be used merely as a ploy in bargaining 
with the Germans. The French miscalculated: their offer was accepted
1. Rumbold-FO,27 April 1918, telegram, FO 382-1993-7^829/18*
2* The German price was 180 Swiss francs.
3* Entente coal arrangements had been disrupted by German submarine
warfare. To avoid the dangerous voyage from Great Britain to
Italy, Italian needs were supplied by France at the rate of
250,000 tons a month for which the French were compensated 
by the British. (Channel shipping went on as usual.) But 
rapid German advances in March 1913 had necessitated Great 
Britain*s supplying France with an additional 250,000 tons a 
month to cover losses.
Loucheur-Cecil, k May 1918, letter, FO 332-1993-80*f8*f/l8*
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tentatively but *with gratitude* by the Swiss.^
The French proposal, made by thfc ChargS on 6 May 1918, was
basically this. Swiss coal needs were calculated at 160,000 tons
a month. Since hydro-electric power furnished by Switzerland to
Germany had an energy equivalent of 75,000 tons of coal a month,
the Swiss could with justice demand 75*000 tons of coal from the
Germans. The French would supply the rest (85,000 tons a month) on
- 2condition that Swiss trains fetched it from French depots* But 
it soon appeared that further conditions underlying the basic 
proposal —  to the relief of the British government — ^ prevented 
the Swiss from accepting it. The French conditioned their deliveries 
on Switzerland*s rejecting all German control over the use of their 
coal and supplying French railways with three times the number of 
waggons needed to haul French coal from the pits at St. Etienne.
1. Minutes of Crowe and 'aterlow, ibid. /aterlow: *The political
and blockade results of making promises impossible of
fulfilment can not but be deplored. All the odium will fall 
on us, not the French.*
2. Rumbold-FC, 6 May 1918, telegram, FC 382-1993-80559/18.
3. The British Shipping Controller had found the French proposal
* most startling’ and protested that no ship® and no coal were
available.
This condition was based on the calculation that the French 
would have to haul British coal from the Channel ports to make 
up for what was supplied to Switzerland, and this would involve 
a journey of 600 kilometers - three times the distance from 
St.ktienne to Switzerland.
The Federal Council had dispatched two representatives to Paris to 
discuss the offer but when the impossibility of its acceptance was 
realized the matter was closed by an official French declaration on 
19 Hay that they were prepared, even in the event of an understanding 
between Germany and Switzerland, to continue to supply the necessary 
coal for firms working for the Entente.^
With the failure of the French coal offer, the Swiss had
no alternative but to sign the treaty with the Germans, which they
2
did on 22 Hay, The Germans pledged to supply Switzerland with
19,000 tons of iron a month and with 200,000 tons a month of coal 
at l80 francs the ton, a price rise of 100 percent. Refusing to 
lower their asking price in consideration of a loan the Swiss had 
offered enabled the Germans to bring into the Reichsbank an extra 
18 million Swiss francs a month just at a time v/hen earlier 
borrowings from the Swiss were falling due. Ultimately too the 
high price of coal, which had more than ever become a German 
monopoly in Switzerland, could not but bring Swiss industry 
increasingly under German economic domination, Switzerland in the 
Spring of 1918 was an ideal field for the extension of German 
economic imperialism,
1. Pfenninger, op.cit., pp.109-10, The British minister in Berne 
criticized the Federal Council for having made clumsy use of the 
French offer, as it could have been a powerful weapon in their han,
2. Abkoramen mit Deutschland vom 19. Mai 19iS, SVD, K ' 191^-1918, 
SchachtelN 2 and 3* The agreement was dated a week be ore its 
ac tual si, nature•
325
More significantly, an organization known as the ochweizerische 
Treuhandstelle fur ttberwachung des Warenverkehrs (d.T.S.) superceding 
the inefficient and poorly organized Treuhandstelle Zurich, was
established to regulate the import and the use of all goods exported
2
fromGermany. In every detail this new organization paralleled the
Allied even to the extent of including syndicates in its
structure,^ and £ave every indication of eventually dominating the 
major Swiss industries, with the exception of watches and textiles. 
Intensive supervision of imports and exports was arranged and 
stricter limits within which goods could be exported to the Entente 
were rigorously set in augmented lists of prohibited uses for German 
materials (Material-und Kohlenverwendun; .sliste)^  In addition to 
minimizing the volume of German goods finding their way to the Entente
1. The organization of this body is described in its final report: 
G.T.3. Bericht (III), pp.15-21.
2. Austria-Hungary was not a party to the new organization.
Exports from that nation remained under the supervision of 
the Treuhandstelle Zurich which was not officially disbanded 
until 17 January 1919 (two months later than the 3.T.S.).
A. Huber, Die Einschrankung der Handelsund Gewerbefreiheit durch 
das Notverordnungsrecht des Bundes (Bern, 1925)% p.2^8.
5. There were, however, only four syndicates (coal,metal, chemical, 
general), while the S.S.S. comprised fifty-one.
*f. For the export of war material a ^achweis der Materialidentitat 
was required. Presumably it was almost impossible to obtain.
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during the war, the control measures embodied in the S.T.S. by 
dr astically reducing the freedom of movement of Swiss industry were 
designed to eliminate foreign competition for the post-war period,^ 
(presuming, of course, a German victory) and to force the Swiss even 
further into the German economic orbit.
The Federal Council delayed the organization of the S.T.S. for
as long as possible so that it was formally constituted and entered
2
in the Commercial Register only on 15 July 1918. The setting up 
of the syndicates took somewhat longer and only 80 of the projected 
120 employees had been taken on to run daily business by the time 
the armistice was signed in November 1918.
The Foreign Office had been v/atching these developments with 
close but placid interest. They could do little for the Swiss in 
any case, and moreover with the expiration of the last few munitions 
contracts, the British were drawing not ing indispensible from 
Switzerland. The Swiss-German agreement in no way embarrassed 
exports to the Entente. Rumbold suggested, in fact, it would be in
1. Pfenninger, op.cit.» pp.122-23.
2. Its rules are found in the S.T.S. booklet entitled S.T.S. 
Statuts de la Soci6t6 du 15 juillet 1918. A copy is preserved 
in FO 382-199^ 137191/18. '
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the British interest to supply Switzerland with as little coal
as possible, since they had no need for Swiss products which were
both expensive and superfluous, although some coal should be
spared to maintain the independence of the Swiss metallurgical
industry by preventing its falling completely under German control.'*’
The blockade had run its course as far as Switzerland was
concerned, and now an exact balance had been struck between the
two belligerent groups. But even under strict control the major
Swiss industries (except textiles) had experienced an enormous
2
increase in productivity, agriculture was healthy, and banking had 
never been better. In 1916 the balance of trade had turned 
strongly in Switzerland's favour for the first time in 30 years.^
The preoccupation of most of Europe with the war had enabled the 
Swiss to insinuate their products into areas formerly closed to 
them by superior competition. The ^hief of the Department of
1. Rumbold-FG, 16 May 1918* telegram, FC 382-1993-88619/18*
According to Rurabold,Swiss metal manufacturers were anxious to 
deal with the Allies even at a loss because they saw no future 
in Germany where they would have to compete directly with German 
industries.
2 Dr* Laur, of the Swiss Department of Agriculture, called 1918 
'das goldene Jahr der Landwirtschaft'. H.Boschenstein,
Bundesrat Schulthess (Bern, 1966), p.105*
3# Exports in 1916 were valued at £97*883,000; imports amounted to 
£95|120,000. Guichard, op.cit., pp*209*
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Public Economy (&. Schulthess) regarded the war years, all things
considered, as a Zeit des Anstieges, for the Swiss economy was at
the end far stronger than it had been at the start.^ Fortunes were
made in munitions, machines, and finance, and a high level of
prosperity was attained (among certain classes) in spite of the
restraints exercised by the belligerents.
But the benefits brought by war were unevenly distributed.
Imported foods, such as grains, were, as has been explained, in
short supply, the price of bread rose, and rationing had to be 
2
adopted. There is perhaps some truth in the accusations of the 
radical socialists who called out the ineffective general strike 
on —  of all days —  11 November 1918, that the owners waxed fat 
on war profiteering while the workers starved. The satisfaction 
afforded by a favourable shift in the balance of trade brings small 
comfort to a cold and hungry worker.
1. Boschenstein, op.cit., p.lO^ f.
2. Bread and flour had been rationed since August 1917* The 
bread ration varied between 250 and 225 grams per person per 
week. On 13 SepTember 1918 an Office f6d6ral de 1*Alimentation 
was formed to control the import, production, and distribution 
of food. S.d»S. R1 p.129.
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But at last it had come to an end. In the context of a
German defeat the S.T.S, immediately became otiose and something of
an embarrassment, so it was dissolved with all seemly haste.^ The
dismemberment of the S. S.S. took somewhat longer but was finally
effected just after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles by
am exchange of notes between the Allied governments and the Swiss
2
Tolitical Department on 12 July 1919* The organization had 
served the British well and had done much to take the sting out 
of the astringent measures and unpleasant restrictions the 
British government had been forced by the war to impose on the 
Swiss. That Anglo-Swiss relations during the difficult years 
191^ to 1918 remained friendly in spite of manifold difficulties 
is a tribute to the efficiency of this organization and the 
diplomatic skill of its creators.
1. A note from the German legation in Berne on 17 November 1918 urged thi 
immediate liquidation of the S.T.S. The organization was 
officially dissolved on 10 December 1918. S.T.S. Bericht, p.26.
2. S.S.S. R.I.
330
C0HC1/J3I0N
as a result of the British being forced by tiie circumstances 
of the war to focus their attention on the institutions of Swiss 
national life, diplomatic exchange between the Foreign Office and the 
Political Department took place on a greater scale during the 1914-1918 
period than ever before. Temporarily distracted by the war from 
normal great power diplomacy, the Foreign Office directed much of 
their energy to dealing with the smaller nations of bhrope. A clearer 
picture of the political institutions of Switzerland and of her place 
in the European economic framework gradually emerged from the confusion 
of highly technical reports arriving daily in London from Berne, and 
superseded the simplistic view of Switzerland as a vassal state of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary suggested by rumours emanating principally 
from Rome in the years preceding the war. The Foreign Office thus 
learned to exercise their diplomacy toward Switzerland with realism 
and moderation. An imaginative and flexible approach to the Swiss 
problem, combined with a vigorous prosecution of the import control 
scheme, recommended British policy to the Italian and French blockade 
authorities as well who might have been expected by reason of their 
direct control over transport to Switzerland to have assumed the 
leading role the Foreign Office in fact played.
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For their part, tne Uwiss were inexorably drawn into closer 
contact with the British on whom they came to depend to a degree 
wholly unanticipated before the war. British initiative in structuring 
Allied controls on the Swiss economy compelled the Political Department 
to have recourse in commercial matters less to Paris and Rome than to 
London where the real power behind the ’blockade* lay. For the Swiss 
too, increased contact brought deeper understanding of the British 
government, particularly of interministerial rivalries which the Swiss 
legation in London exploited with some success during the last two 
years of the war. That the Foreign Office became Switzerland's most 
powerful advocate before the Treasury and the Board of Trade's 
licensing committee testifies to the confidence and good will the 
Swiss had won through their accommodating attitude to the restraints 
imposed on their commerce by the Contraband Department, and to Foreign 
Office satisfaction with the way the blockade was proceeding.
Nor did the Swiss hesitate to make the most of tneir bargaining 
position. By playing on Allied (especially Italian) apprehensions 
regarding their neutrality and Allied interest in their manufacturing 
potential, they were able to secure, in spite of totally inadequate 
pre-war planning, a sufficient flow of imports from the Allies during 
the war. They were able simultaneously to retain the good will of
332
the Central Powers' governments regardless of occasional irritation
at Swiss acquiescence in Allied demands.
During the war Switzerland remained peaceful, neutral, independent, 
and in general economically healthy. The British were confident that 
their policy of eliminating Central lower imports from the outside 
world through Switzerland had succeeded as far as was compatible with 
Swiss economic needs. The implementation of their policies was 
achieved without disturbing the traditionally Harmonious relations 
between Croat Britain and Switzerland.
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